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Introduction
This thesis combines work on three important long-run trends and their macroeconomic im-
plications: Financial integration, demographic aging and the use of automation technology
in the production process. The first chapter looks at the effects of financial integration – a
country’s accumulation of external assets and liabilities – on the allocation of capital across
economic sectors. It shows how international capital flows are driven by differences in the
development of countries’ financial systems. An alternative explanation for international cap-
ital flows is provided in the second chapter. Regional differences in the age structure of the
population are shown to generate cross-country differences in the demand for safe and risky
assets and – in a financially integrated world – a risk asymmetry in external asset positions.
Chapter three focuses on a recent technological trend: advances in automation technology.
It assesses the labor market effects of automation by means of a novel patent-based measure
and finds overall employment gains. All chapters have in common that the phenomena they
study are not just important today, but will likely become even more so over the next decades.
Therefore, this thesis offers not just relevant policy advice, but also a research agenda for an-
alyzing the future of capital and labor markets. Next to covering a broad range of topics, this
thesis also applies various methodologies, in particular structural and analytical modeling and
panel data econometrics. The following paragraphs describe the chapters in more detail.
CHAPTER 1: In “Does Foreign Capital Go Where the Returns are? Financial Integration
and Capital Allocation Efficiency” I ask whether, and under which conditions, financial inte-
gration improves the allocation of capital within an economy. I link this question to observed
international differences in the price level of consumption relative to investment, which serve
as a proxy measure of cross-sectoral capital allocations. In contrast to the existing literature,
which explains international differences in relative prices primarily by different productivity
levels, my explanation centers on cross-country differences in financial development and I
show how relative prices are affected by international capital flows.
Frictions in a country’s financial system have a more distortive effect on the investment
goods sector than on the consumption goods sector, as this sector is more dependent on ex-
ternal capital. Therefore, in a country with low financial development, an insufficient amount
of capital will be allocated to the investment goods sector, resulting in a lower price level
of consumption relative to investment in autarky. If an economy integrates with a financially
more developed rest of the world, capital will flow into the investment goods sector and out of
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the consumption goods sector. As a result, the domestic capital allocation will become more
efficient and the relative price will increase. The opposite should be observed in a country
that integrates with a less developed rest of the world. Overall, financial integration implies
converging relative prices across regions. I formalize this mechanism in an analytical model
of a small open economy with two sectors and provide empirical support through a panel data
analysis that covers 113 countries from 1996 to 2010.
CHAPTER 2: “External Asset Positions, Demography and Life-cycle Portfolio Choice”
establishes international differences in demographic aging as a new explanation for external
imbalances in safe and risky assets. This chapter is joint work with Margaret Davenport.
We document that vis-à-vis a group of developed European economies, the United States
hold, on net, risky assets alongside safe liabilities. While existing explanations focus on
characteristics of the financial system, we explore demographic differences as a potential
driver for this risk asymmetry. The population in the European countries is already older than
the US population, and is projected to age at a faster speed over the next decades.
In our structural model, the key element is the life-cycle savings behavior of households.
Individual preferences for portfolio risk decline with age. We build this stylized fact into
a model with overlapping generations, where individuals can adjust their portfolio at each
age. We identify various channels through which the age structure of an economy affects the
aggregate demand for safe and risky assets. Jointly, these channels imply that the younger
region will export safe assets and import risky assets from the older region. While our simu-
lated external asset positions match the data for 1990 to 2015 on average, we also predict the
risk asymmetry to persist over the next decades. Additionally, in our simulation demographic
aging generates a decline in both the safe and risky rate of return which is similar to the data.
CHAPTER 3: The advances in automation technology and their potential effects on em-
ployment are much discussed. There are worries that automation may lead to job losses and
that the effects are unevenly distributed across occupations or sectors. While there exists a
large literature that addresses these questions, the findings are partly contradictory. In “Be-
nign Effects of Automation: New Evidence from Patent Texts”, Lukas Püttmann and I argue
that this may be due to difficulties in measuring automation. We provide a novel indicator of
automation, which measures automation technology as the outcome of an innovative process,
and which is both granular and comprehensive.
Our proposed measure is based on patent grant texts, which we classify into automation and
non-automation innovations. We use a machine-learning algorithm to analyze the texts of
all patents that were granted in the United States between 1976 and 2014. According to our
classification, both the absolute and the relative number of automation patents have increased
strongly over time. We link the automation patents to the industries where they are likely to
be applied, and – through the local industry structure – to US commuting zones. In a panel
data analysis, we find that automation has a positive net effect on employment in the United
States. Distinguishing between manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, we show
that the gains from automation are unevenly distributed: the service sector experiences job
gains, whereas manufacturing jobs are destroyed. Automation thus fuels structural change.
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Chapter 1
Does Foreign Capital Go Where the Returns Are?
Financial Integration and Capital Allocation
Efficiency
This paper asks whether financial integration leads to a more efficient allocation
of capital within economies. I build a model of a small country with an invest-
ment goods sector and a consumption goods sector. Frictions in the domestic
financial system affect the investment goods sector relatively more, so that the
cross-sectoral allocation of capital is distorted in autarky. When the economy
integrates with a financially more developed rest of the world, capital flows into
the investment goods sector and out of the consumption goods sector. In conse-
quence, the capital allocation within the economy improves. The opposite holds
if the rest of the world is less financially developed. Overall, capital allocations
become more similar across countries. I test the model implications empirically
using the price level of consumption relative to investment as a measure of cap-
ital allocation. A panel data analyses for 113 countries from 1996 to 2010 lends
support to the model predictions.
1. Introduction
The benefits of financial integration1 are heavily debated. The literature studying interna-
tional capital flows in relation with economic growth has provided mixed results. While
some authors have found positive growth effects (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2008; Mody and
Murshid, 2005; Quinn and Toyoda, 2008), others found no or negative effects (Alesina and
Milesi-Ferretti, 1994; Rodrik, 1998; Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk, 2002). Still others
present mixed results.2 Despite this disagreement, considerably less research has been done
on the specific channels through which financial integration affects growth and the real econ-
omy more generally. In particular, international capital flows may influence the allocation of
capital across economic sectors. Depending on where international investments are directed,
1Throughout the paper, this term refers to de facto financial integration, the actual amount of external assets
and liabilities that a country holds. A contrasting concept is de jure financial integration, the degree to which
capital account openness is allowed for or restricted by law. Section 3 provides a more detailed discussion.
2For a survey of the literature, see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2010).
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financial integration could thus make the economy more or less productive. The current pa-
per tries to shed light on this issue by asking whether and under which conditions financial
integration improves the allocation of capital within economies.
To understand the link between international finance and the domestic capital allocation, I
argue that domestic financial institutions are of central importance. It has been shown by
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) that the development of the financial system affects the
cross-sectoral allocation of capital in a closed economy. In economies with a poorly devel-
oped financial system, external financing is difficult to obtain. This affects some sectors more
adversely than others. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and subsequent literature provide empirical
evidence for this. The current paper builds upon those findings to study an open economy set-
ting. I model a small economy that consists of an investment goods sector and a consumption
goods sector. First, I consider how domestic financial institutions affect the cross-sectoral
capital allocation in a closed economy, before looking at what happens when the economy
integrates financially with the rest of the world. The effect of integration depends on the
country’s financial development relative to the rest of the world: If the economy is little fi-
nancially developed, it benefits from cross-border capital flows. Foreign capital exploits the
high returns in the under-financed sector, whereas unproductive domestic capital leaves the
country. A negative effect of integration arises in a country with relatively high financial
development. Overall, capital allocations become more similar across countries. I provide
empirical evidence for the model predictions through various types of panel data analyses.
Sectors that produce a lower share of their output for consumption are more dependent
on external finance, as Table 1.1 shows. So in a stylized two-sector world, the investment
goods sector should suffer relatively more from domestic financial frictions like borrowing
constraints. In consequence, we should observe a higher marginal product of capital in the
investment goods sector relative to the consumption goods sector. The capital mis-allocation
should also be reflected in the price level of consumption relative to investment, which is
a measure easier to compute than marginal products.3 The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows
that relative prices are indeed positively correlated with a country’s level of financial devel-
opment. Financial integration is also positively correlated with relative prices (right panel),
but the association could possibly be non-linear. At the same time, there is a strong negative
correlation between the international dispersion of relative prices and the worldwide level of
financial integration, as Figure 1.2 shows. So integration is associated with an international
convergence in the allocation of capital between investment and consumption goods sector.
My model builds upon these stylized facts. The two-sector economy resembles that of
Galor (1992), to which I add a credit market and a borrowing constraint, closely following
Von Hagen and Zhang (2014). Borrowing plays an important role because only certain types
of agents (called entrepreneurs) can invest directly in the investment goods sector, whereas
additional capital needs to be acquired externally from the other agents (households). Solving
the model for a closed economy, I show that the stronger the borrowing constraint, the less
efficiently capital gets allocated: Too little capital is invested in the investment goods sector
relative to the consumption goods sector. The mis-allocation is reflected by the price of
consumption goods relative to investment goods, which is a negative function of the frictions.
3On the aggregate level, Lucas (1990) and Caselli and Feyrer (2007) have shown that wrongful calculations
of the marginal product are the reason why many researchers have concluded that the volume of international
capital flows observed in reality is too low compared to standard model predictions.
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Table 1.1: External dependence and final consumption share
NAICS Consumption
Share
1997-2006
External Dependence
Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998):
1980s
Cetorelli and
Strahan (2006):
1990-2007
311 0.6215 -0.55 0.01
313 0.2603 -0.14 0.06
315 0.8849 -0.24 -0.14
321 0.0206 0.24 0.43
322 0.1103 -0.04 0.19
323 0.0369 -0.37 0.07
324 0.3308 -0.01 0.25
325 0.2943 -0.41 0.14
326 0.1112 -0.11 0.01
327 0.0701 -0.19 0.11
331 0.0073 0.09 0.27
332 0.0282 -0.43 0.07
333 0.0259 -0.33 -0.11
334 0.1157 -0.04 0.09
335 0.2203 -0.24 0.06
336 0.2861 -0.35 -0.10
337 0.3974 -0.32 0.19
339 0.4645 -0.18 -0.03
Corr. with Cons. Share -0.3481 -0.4347
Note: The consumption share is private consumption expenditure over total commodity output minus net
exports (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). External dependence is defined as in Rajan and Zingales
(1998), reported for NAICS industries by Haltenhof, Lee, and Stebunovs (2014). In accordance with
Rajan and Zingales (1998), the United States is treated as the benchmark case where, due to high financial
development, capital should be allocated efficiently.
I next assume that the small economy opens up financially towards the rest of the world,
allowing for various degrees of integration. International capital flows will affect relative
prices as long as the level of financial development of the country differs from the rest of the
world. If the country is relatively less developed, foreign capital will flow into the investment
goods sector whereas domestic savings will flow out of the consumption goods sector. This
happens because the return to investing in the investment goods sector is higher at home,
whereas the return in the consumption goods sector is higher abroad. In turn, the allocation
of capital across the two sectors of the domestic economy becomes more efficient, which
is reflected by an increase in the consumption-investment price ratio. If the economy is
financially more developed than the rest of the world, the opposite will be observed: the
favorable domestic financing conditions allow investments abroad, but simultaneously drain
the domestic investment goods sector of capital. Additionally, foreign capital flows into the
consumption goods sector. In consequence, the domestic capital allocation becomes less
efficient, as evidenced by a decreasing relative price. International capital flows always make
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Figure 1.1: Financial development, financial integration and relative prices
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Note: Financial development is private credit by the domestic financial sector as fraction of GDP (Beck
et al. (2000)). Financial integration is external assets and liabilities as fraction of GDP (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007)). The relative price is the price level of household consumption divided by the price level
of capital formation (Penn World Table (Feenstra et al. (2015))). All values are country means 1996-2010.
cross-sectoral capital allocations more similar across countries.
The model can be tested empirically, as price levels of consumption and investment are
available for a large number of countries from the Penn World Tables. The sample contains
annual data for 113 countries from 1996 to 2010. I apply two different types of panel data
analyses: First, to test whether relative prices converge internationally upon integration, I
regress deviations of a country’s relative price from the respective cross-sectional mean on
financial integration. The estimated coefficient on financial integration is negative and sig-
nificant, which provides support for the convergence effect of integration predicted by the
model.
Second, I test whether the effect of financial integration differs by the level of finan-
cial development of a country relative to the rest of the world. To this end, I sort country-
time observations into a high development and a low development subsample. I find that
in the high development group, financial integration has a significantly negative effect on
the consumption-investment relative price, whereas the effect is mostly insignificant in the
low development cluster. This means that the international convergence in capital allocations
rather stems from a negative allocation effect in countries with a high level of financial de-
velopment than from a positive effect in countries with low financial development. This has
important policy implications. While highly financially developed countries may still benefit
from financial integration in ways not captured in this paper, the findings may weaken the
rationale for capital account opening in those countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows: I next place my work in the context of the existing
literature. Section 3 features the model. I derive the steady state in a closed economy set-
up before showing how the key economic variables react when the country opens its capital
account. In section 3, I lay out the empirical strategy. I describe the estimation technique
and data, before presenting the regression results and some robustness checks. Section 4
concludes.
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Figure 1.2: Financial integration and relative price dispersion
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Note: The red line is the mean of all countries’ financial integration level. The blue line is the standard
deviation of the relative price across countries.
1.1 Related Literature
To my knowledge, I am the first to model the effect of financial integration on cross-sectoral
capital allocations and on the relative price between consumption and investment goods. Pa-
pers in international finance have so far mostly focused on the aggregate capital stock of
integrating economies. Ju and Wei (2010) and Von Hagen and Zhang (2014) show that for-
eign capital can increase an economy’s overall investment efficiency. In both papers, financial
integration creates the opportunity to circumvent inefficient domestic financial institutions. A
different set-up, but with similar implications, is chosen by Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2008). They construct an equilibrium model of a world with two fully integrated regions
and show how a deterioration in the quality of the financial system in one region will lead to
capital outflows from that region. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (2009) explain capital
flows and global imbalances by differences in country portfolios. In a world with risky and
safe assets, if countries differ in the degree of market completeness, they will choose to hold a
different mix of the two asset types. The resulting net foreign asset positions will, in general,
not be zero. Some papers distinguish between sectors, but in a different way from my paper.
Von Hagen and Zhang (2011) construct a model of a two-sector world where both sectors
produce intermediate goods that are then combined to a final consumption good. Reis (2013)
studies the capital allocation between productive units within the nontradables sector. Such
models are less easily testable empirically across a large group of countries.
There exist several empirical studies that explore the link between financial integration
and cross-sectoral capital allocations. Pang and Wu (2009), drawing on Wurgler (2000), aim
to assess in an industry-level study whether financial integration redirects investment from
sunset to sunrise industries. Bonfiglioli (2008) and Levchenko, Rancière, and Thoenig (2009)
analyze the effects of financial integration on capital accumulation and productivity, but in
7
Figure 1.3: Relative prices, financial and economic development
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Note: The relative price residuals are residuals from a regression of the relative price on GDP per capita
(left panel) or TFP (right panel). The coefficient in the left panel is 0.10, in the right panel 0.15, both
significant at the 1% level.
contrast to my paper focus on the total amount of capital invested and not on its allocation.
Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2007) develop an index of investment efficiency at the firm
level that compares hypothetical and real returns to investment, and use it to assess the role of
financial integration. Benigno, Converse, and Fornaro (2015) analyze in an event study of the
manufacturing sector whether episodes of large capital inflows are associated with changes
in the relative investment in this sector. None of these papers links cross-sectoral capital
allocations to international differences in relative prices.
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) analyze how dispersions in the price of investment relative
to consumption can explain why investment rates differ across countries. They rely on the
observation by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) that poor countries have a low produc-
tivity in tradable goods relative to nontradable goods. If investment goods are tradable and
consumption goods (mostly) nontradable, poor countries will have a lower price of consump-
tion whereas the price of investment will be roughly the same across countries. So while in
my paper, the observed differences in relative prices are rooted in international differences in
financial development, the explanation of Hsieh and Klenow (2007) builds on international
differences in productivity. Both approaches should be seen as complementary. Figure 1.3
shows that the positive relation between relative prices and financial development persists
(albeit weaker) when controlling for GDP or TFP.
2. Model
2.1 Capital Allocation in a Closed Economy
Firms
The economy consists of two production sectors, sector Y, which produces investment goods,
and sector X, which produces non-durable consumption goods. Both sectors use capital and
labor as inputs. Throughout the paper, I make the assumption that good Y is tradable and
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good X is non-tradable. This simplifying duality is meant to make the model more tractable.
It can be motivated e.g. by assuming that good X has a high service content, whereas good Y
is a manufactured good.4
Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale:
Yt = zy
(
Kyt
)α (Lyt )1−α Xt = zx (Kxt )ε (Lxt )1−ε (1.1)
where α, ε ∈ (0,1). Kxt ,Kyt , Lxt , Lyt are sector capital and labor inputs with Kxt + Kyt = Kt
and Lxt + L
y
t = Lt the economy-wide capital and labor demand. zy, zx is technology, which is
set to be larger than one because capital in this economy fully depreciates after one period.
Investment takes one period to mature, so the investment good produced equals the new
capital stock one period later, Yt = Kt+1.
Input factors are rewarded by their respective marginal products, where rt is the return to
capital and wt the return to labor. Let pt be the price of one unit of good X, whereas the price
of good Y is normalized to 1 (so pt is at the same time the relative price of consumption to
investment goods). Then,
ryt =
∂Yt
∂Kyt
= αzy
(
Kyt
Lyt
)α−1
rxt = pt
∂Xt
∂Kxt
= ptεzx
(
Kxt
Lxt
)ε−1
(1.2)
wyt =
∂Yt
∂Lyt
= (1 − α) zy
(
Kyt
Lyt
)α
wxt = pt
∂Xt
∂Lxt
= pt (1 − ε) zx
(
Kxt
Lxt
)ε
(1.3)
Labour is assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors, so wxt = w
y
t = wt. In an economy
without financial frictions, it also holds that rxt = r
y
t .
Agents
Agents live for two periods (young, old) and there is no population growth. Each generation
consists of a mass of one. When young, the agents inelastically supply one unit of labor and
earn a wage wt (denoted in units of the investment good), of which they spend ptct on non-
durable consumption goods and st on investment goods. They can use the investment goods
in two different ways: either lend them to the credit market, where they earn an interest in
the period after, or use them to operate a firm in the X- or Y-sector. Since that investment in
both sectors takes one period to mature, firms will become operational only when the agents
are old. In their second period of life, agents thus earn the returns on their investment and/or
interest. They consume all of their income and exit the economy at the end of the period.
Each generation consists of two types of agents, entrepreneurs (of mass η ∈ (0, 1)) and
households (of mass 1 − η), which differ only in terms of their production opportunities:
Entrepreneurs can produce both investment and consumption goods, whereas households can
produce only consumption goods.5
Agents born in t maximize lifetime utility
U jt = ln
(
c jt,young
)
+ βln
(
c jt+1,old
)
(1.4)
4A paper that chooses the same duality in a model set-up is Hsieh and Klenow (2007), who seek to explain
cross-country differences in investment rates.
5These shares can be endogenized, as shown by Zhang (2014).
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where j = h, e denotes households and entrepreneurs. The first part denotes consumption
when young and the second part consumption when old. β is a discount factor ∈ (0, 1). In
each of the two periods, the agents are subject to a budget constraint:
wt = s
j
t + ptc
j
t,youngs
j
t r
j
t+1 = pt+1c
j
t+1,old (1.5)
The maximization problem yields
s jt =
β
1 + β
wtc
j
t,young =
1
1 + β
wt
pt
c jt+1,old =
r jt+1
pt+1
β
1 + β
wt (1.6)
External Capital Requirements and Financial Frictions
If all agents were able to produce in each of the two sectors, capital would be allocated
optimally across sectors, implying rxt = r
y
t = rt. This outcome would also be achieved if the
fraction of entrepreneurs, η, were larger than the fraction of capital optimally allocated to the
Y-sector. However, as shown in Appendix A, if η < (1−ε)αβ
αβ+ε
, the entrepreneurs will want to
borrow from the households until rates of return in both sectors equalize. In the following, I
will assume this to be the case. In this way, the Y-sector is more financially dependent than
the X-sector.
Assume now that there are financial frictions in the economy, which determine how much
capital an entrepreneur can borrow. The entrepreneur, when young, will invest an amount of
iet in the Y-production, using the own savings into the investment good, s
e
t , and external capital
nt. The household will invest an amount iht in the X-production and lend to the entrepreneur
an amount of savings dt:
iet = s
e
t + nts
h
t = i
h
t + dt (1.7)
Denote by ret the return to entrepreneurial capital and by r
h
t the return to lenders. Then, the
total project return is
iet−1r
y
t = s
e
t−1r
e
t + nt−1r
h
t (1.8)
The household earns on its savings iht−1r
x
t +dt−1r
h
t . No arbitrage implies r
x
t = r
h
t : the household
gets the same returns whether it invests in an own project or lends to the entrepreneur. So the
total return to the household can equally be written as sht−1r
x
t .
Financial frictions impact the economy by imposing a limit on external capital. The
entrepreneur can borrow only up to a certain fraction of total project returns,
rht nt−1 = r
h
t
(
iet−1 − set−1
) ≤ θryt iet−1 (1.9)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of financial development, which may refer to the development
of the domestic financial sector as well as to other country-specific institutions like property
rights protection, quality of corporate governance and corruption protection.6 When the bor-
rowing constraint is binding, θ limits the demand for credit (the supply of credit being fixed).
In this way, it creates a wedge between the returns to entrepreneurs and lenders.
6In this formulation, I follow Von Hagen and Zhang (2011, 2014) and Matsuyama (2004, 2007). The borrow-
ing constraint is kept as general as possible in order to not add unnecessary complexity to the model. However,
Eq. (1.9) does not have to be a black box, but can be motivated by different kinds of moral hazard stories, for
example following Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
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The return to an entrepreneur’s capital is
ret =
ryt i
e
t−1 − rht nt−1
set−1
= ryt +
(
ryt − rht
) ( iet−1
set−1
− 1
)
(1.10)
where
(
iet−1
set−1
− 1
)
is the amount borrowed per unit of investment. As Eq. (1.10) makes clear,
the return on entrepreneurial capital consists of two parts: the marginal return on the project
and an extra return earned on the external capital employed. The entrepreneur prefers to
carry out the project instead of lending the savings to the credit market if ret ≥ rht . This is
the entrepreneur’s participation constraint. If ret = r
h
t , the borrowing constraint is slack and
capital is allocated efficiently in the economy. Then it follows that rxt = r
y
t . If ret > r
h
t , the
borrowing constraint is binding and the entrepreneur will borrow up to the limit to exploit
the leverage effect. In that case, the constraint distorts the allocation of capital by creating a
wedge between the returns to external capital and entrepreneurial capital. This can be seen
more clearly by combining Eqs. (1.9) and (1.10) to ret =
ryt i
e
t−1(1−θ)
set−1
. If the borrowing constraint
is binding, ret depends negatively on θ: returns to the entrepreneur are higher when frictions
are larger.
Market Clearing Conditions
The labor market clears:
Lt = 1 (1.11)
The investment good market clears:
(1 − η) sht + ηset ≡ S t = Yt (1.12)
The consumption good market clears:
(1 − η)
(
cht,young + c
h
t,old
)
+ η
(
cet,young + c
e
t,old
)
≡ Ct = Xt (1.13)
The credit market clears:
(1 − η) dt = ηnt ⇐⇒ (1 − η)
(
sht − iht
)
= η
(
iet − set
)
⇐⇒ (1 − η) iht︸    ︷︷    ︸
Kxt+1
+ ηiet︸︷︷︸
Kyt+1
≡ It = S t (1.14)
Autarky equilibrium
Given the outcomes to firms’ profit maximization of Eqs. (1.2) and (1.3), and agents’ util-
ity maximization Eq. (1.6), the market clearing conditions Eq. (1.11) through Eq. (1.14),
wage rate equalization, the definition of returns on entrepreneurial capital Eq. (1.10), the
no-arbitrage condition and the borrowing constraint Eq. (1.9) (in combination with the par-
ticipation constraint), a unique closed economy equilibrium can be derived for a given θ.
As shown in Appendix A, there exists a threshold value below which the borrowing
constraint is binding (and consequently distorts capital allocation): θ = 1 − η
ψ
− η where
11
ψ = 1−ε
ε
αβ
1+αβ . For θ ∈ [0, θ), the borrowing constraint is binding, for θ ∈
[
θ, 1
]
it is slack.
The borrowing constraint is stricter (θ larger) if η is small (there are less entrepreneurs in the
economy), if β is large (agents are patient and want to accumulate a large amount of savings)
and if the Y-sector is more capital-intense relative to the X-sector.
In the case when the constraint is binding, the model solution is
ry−autt = α
wautt
wautt−1
1
ψθ+η
1+ψθ
rx−autt =
α
ψ
wautt
wautt−1
1
1 − ψθ+η1+ψθ
re−autt =
wautt
wautt−1
 αβ + ε(1 − ε) βη − α (1 − η)ψη 11 − ψθ+η1+ψθ
 (1.15)
Ky−autt =
β
1 + β
wautt−1
ψθ + η
1 + ψθ
Kx−autt =
β
1 + β
wautt−1
(
1 − ψθ + η
1 + ψθ
)
(1.16)
pautt =
1
1 − ε
(
1 + αβ
β
)ε 1
zx
wautt(
wautt−1
)ε (1 − ψθ + η1 + ψθ
)−ε
(1.17)
wautt =
(
wautt−1
)α (ψθ + η
1 + ψθ
)α
(1 − α)1−α zy (1.18)
The superscript aut stands for autarky equilibrium and is meant to distinguish this equilib-
rium from the integrated equilibrium described below. The model dynamics are characterized
by Eq. (1.18), the dynamic equation of wages. Since α ∈ (0, 1), a unique and stable steady
state exists with waut = (1 − α) (zy) 11−α
(
ψθ+η
1+ψθ
) α
1−α .
Ky−autt is a positive function of θ whereas Kx−autt depends negatively on θ: Frictions divert
investment from the Y-sector to the X-sector. Consequently, rx−autt is depressed and r
y−aut
t
and re−autt are inflated relative to the frictionless case where r
x
t = r
y
t = r
e
t . Also, when η, the
fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy, rises, rx−autt rises and r
y−aut
t falls, i.e. the allocation
becomes more efficient. The relative price pautt is driven upwards by financial development θ:
the consumption good is more expensive relative to the capital good, the higher the level of
financial development of the country. Wages depend positively on θ as well. (The relationship
becomes even stronger when wages are expressed in units of the consumption good, as ptwt).
Proposition 1: The model has a unique and stable steady state. In the case
when the borrowing constraint is binding, θ ∈ [0, θ), the wage rate is waut =
(1 − α) (zy) 11−α
(
ψθ+η
1+ψθ
) α
1−α , which is smaller than in the non-binding case. A binding bor-
rowing constraint creates a wedge between rates of return, re−autt > r
y−aut
t > r
x−aut
t . The
wedge is larger, the less developed the country is. Relative prices are an increasing
function of θ.
2.2 Financial Integration
Consider now a scenario where the country portrayed above integrates - partially or fully
- with the rest of the world (RoW). The country is a small economy whereas RoW is large.
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Other than in size, the two regions differ only in their level of financial development, so either
θ > θRoW or θRoW > θ. Assume that the borrowing constraint is binding everywhere.
In a financially integrated world, individuals are allowed to invest financial capital and
entrepreneurial capital in both regions. This means that entrepreneurs can operate a firm
either in their home country or abroad. Households, on the other hand, can lend their savings
to financial intermediaries of both regions, or run an X-sector firm in the region of their
choice. They continue to be excluded from operating a firm in the Y-sector.
Let Φt denote net outflows of financial capital, i.e. savings invested by domestic agents in
a foreign financial market minus savings invested by foreign agents in the domestic economy.
Conversely, Ωt denotes net outflows of entrepreneurial capital, i.e. investments by domestic
entrepreneurs in operating a firm abroad minus investments by foreign entrepreneurs in a
domestic firm. Hence, positive values denote capital outflows, negative values capital inflows.
Note that in terms of the international investment position, Φt are net debt assets and Ωt are
net assets in portfolio equity or foreign direct investments. The decision in which region to
invest is taken by young agents. Compared to the closed economy model described above,
the following equations change:
Credit market clearing now incorporates international capital flows, so Eq. (1.14) is replaced
by
Kyt + K
x
t = ηs
e
t−1 + (1 − η) sht−1 −Ωt−1 − Φt−1 (1.19)
The left-hand side denotes investments made in the economy (i.e. the demand for sav-
ings, whether by residents or foreigners), whereas the right-hand side denotes the amount of
savings which is available in the country (i.e. the supply of savings).
Assume that entrepreneurs borrow in the country where they produce.7 Then, the borrow-
ing constraint takes the form
rxt
[
(1 − η) sht−1 − Kxt − Φt−1
]
≤ θryt
[
ηset−1 −Ωt−1 + (1 − η) sht−1 − Kxt − Φt−1
]
(1.20)
On the right-hand side, the term in square brackets denotes the total amount of capi-
tal that is employed in the country’s Y-sector: entrepreneurial capital of local and foreign
entrepreneurs (ηset−1 − Ωt−1) as well as financial capital of local and foreign households
((1 − η) sht−1 − Kxt − Φt−1). The term in square brackets on the left-hand side denotes the
external capital in the Y-production.
All other equilibrium conditions carry through. Eq. (1.12) remains unchanged because
on the one hand, the demand for good Y is reduced by net capital outflows, but at the same
time, the supply of Y is reduced by net exports of the same amount. Trade flows need to be
exact mirror images of financial flows because in this model, the balance of payments must
always be balanced. (The unit of account is the same for both K and Y.) Labor is assumed to
be immobile across borders, but continues to be mobile nationally. Since good Y is tradable,
prices equalize in that sector. Being normalized to 1 in both regions under autarky, there will
be no visible effect. Note that in this way, the model abstracts from any effect of trade on
factor prices. I control for trade integration and its possible effects on relative prices in the
empirical analysis.
7Instead of the residence principle, the source principle could be imposed (entrepreneurs borrow in their
country of origin). In that case, the effect on prices would be even stronger. See Appendix A for an argumenta-
tive proof.
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Integrated Equilibrium
If the country fully integrates with RoW, unrestricted cross-border capital flows will equalize
returns on entrepreneurial capital and financial capital across the two regions. Given that the
country is small whereas RoW is large, the country’s rates of return will converge to those of
RoW, rxt = r
x−RoW
t and r
e
t = r
e−RoW
t . If the country does not fully integrate, the interest rates
will only partially converge to those of RoW. The degree of return rate equalization can thus
be used as a measure of financial integration. It ultimately translates into equilibrium levels
of capital flows.
The new equilibrium rates of return can be expressed as
rx−intt = λr
x−RoW
t + (1 − λ) rx−autt re−intt = λre−RoWt + (1 − λ) re−autt (1.21)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of financial integration, or financial openness, of the coun-
try. Higher values signify more integration. The superscript int denotes (partial) financial
integration values. If λ = 1, full integration is achieved. λ = 0 corresponds to complete
financial autarky, in which case the equilibrium described below will correspond to that of
the previous section.
In dependence of equilibrium rates of return, the equilibrium values of the other key
variables can be expressed as
ry−intt =
[
θ
rx−intt
+
(1 − θ)
re−intt
]−1
(1.22)
Ky−intt =
β
1 + β
αwintt
[
θ
rx−intt
+
(1 − θ)
re−intt
]
Kx−intt =
β
1 + β
wintt
1
rx−intt
α
ψ
(1.23)
pintt =
1
εzx
(
wintt
1 − ε
)1−ε (
rx−intt
)ε
(1.24)
wintt = (1 − α) (zy)
1
1−α
[
α
(
θ
rx−intt
+
(1 − θ)
re−intt
)] α
1−α
(1.25)
Φt−1 =
β
1 + β
wintt−1
[
(1 − η) − w
int
t
wintt−1
α
ψ
(1 + θψ)
rx−intt
]
Ωt−1 =
β
1 + β
wintt−1
[
η − w
int
t
wintt−1
α
(1 − θ)
re−intt
]
(1.26)
Lemma 2: In the model with international capital flows, there is a unique and stable
steady state for given values of θRoW , θ, η, α, β, ε, zx and zy.
The steady state interest rates, prices and wages for a given integration level λ are
rx−int =
α
1 − η
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ
(
θRoW − θ
))
ψ
re−int =
α
η
(
1 − θ − λ
(
θRoW − θ
))
(1.27)
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pint =
1
εzx
(
wint
1 − ε
)1−ε  α1 − η 1 + ψ
(
θ + λ
(
θRoW − θ
))
ψ

ε
(1.28)
wint = (1 − α) (zy) 11−α
[
(1 − η)ψθ
1 + ψ (θ + λ (θRoW − θ)) +
η(1 − θ)
1 − θ − λ (θRoW − θ)
] α
1−α
(1.29)
The cross-border steady state capital flows are
Φ =
β
1 + β
wint(1 − η)
[
1 − 1 + ψθ
1 + ψ (θ + λ (θRoW − θ))
]
Ω =
β
1 + β
wintη
[
1 − 1 − θ
1 − θ − λ (θRoW − θ)
]
(1.30)
Eq. (1.30) creates a direct link between the abstract notion of financial integration used
in the model and denoted by λ, and a real-world equivalent, the total volume of de facto
capital flows |Φ| + |Ω|. As both |Φ| and |Ω| are strictly monotonically increasing functions of
λ, |Φ| + |Ω| must also be strictly monotonically increasing in λ. Conversely, λ is a positive
function of |Φ| + |Ω|. This will be important in the empirical part of the paper.
Proposition 2: If the country is less developed than the rest of the world, θ < θRoW ,
the wedge between rates of return decreases in the level of financial integration λ.
Then, the more the country is financially integrated, the higher are wages and the
relative price. The relative price of the country approaches that of RoW from below:
pRoW > pint ≥ paut (strict inequality if λ > 0). Whenever λ > 0, the country exports
financial capital (savings) and imports entrepreneurial capital: Φ > 0, Ω < 0.
If the country is financially more developed than the rest of the world, θ > θRoW , the
opposite holds: the return wedge increases in λ, wages and the relative price decrease
in λ. The relative price approaches that of RoW from above: pRoW < pint ≤ paut.
Whenever λ > 0, the country exports entrepreneurial capital and imports financial
capital: Φ < 0, Ω > 0.
Proposition 2 states the most important result of the model. It implies that financial inte-
gration will lead to a convergence in relative prices by increasing the price of consumption
goods relative to investment goods in financially underdeveloped countries and depressing
it in countries with high financial development.8 Thus, the within-country capital allocation
will become more efficient in countries with low financial development relative to the rest
of the world, but less efficient in countries with high financial development. The predictions
on the direction of capital flows are in line with what is often observed in the real world:
Many emerging economies have positive net equity positions (Ω < 0) and negative net debt
positions (Φ < 0) vis-à-vis the rest of the world, whereas the opposite holds for advanced
economies (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007).9
8Of course, if all world regions are fully financially developed, financial integration will have no effect. In
reality, we observe also capital flows between highly financially developed regions, but these should be governed
by motives outside of this model, for example hedging purposes.
9The model makes no clear prediction on the direction of net capital flows. Depending on the parameter
15
The next part presents empirical evidence on relative prices and their link to financial
integration.
3. Empirical Analysis
Proposition 2 can be translated into two testable hypotheses about the effect of financial inte-
gration on relative prices. The first hypothesis is that integration leads to a global convergence
in relative prices. It is thus concerned with the direction of changes in relative prices. Coun-
tries with a relative price above that of the rest of the world will see the relative price decrease,
whereas in countries with a lower relative price than the rest of the world, the relative price
will increase. The second hypothesis describes the channel through which cross-border capi-
tal flows affect relative prices: the development of the domestic financial sector. According to
the model, cross-border capital flows lower the relative price in countries with a high level of
financial development and increase it in countries with a low level of financial development.
Testing the model hypotheses requires a global sample of countries. Data on the price-
level of investment and consumption for a large number of countries are available on the
aggregate level, as described in detail below, but not on the industry level10. This is why the
empirical analysis is carried out exclusively on the country-level.
3.1 Estimation Technique
I test each hypothesis through a different type of regression set-up. Both build on fixed-effects
panel data estimation. Fixed effects estimation is the most common way of estimating a panel
model of the type described below, building on the assumption that country-specific effects
are correlated with the explanatory variables of interest, and therefore need to be controlled
for in the regression. In the present sample, the choice of fixed effects over random effects is
motivated by a Hausman test.
A natural way of testing the first hypothesis is to consider directly the cross-country dis-
persion of relative prices and to check whether a higher level of financial integration decreases
the distance of a country’s relative price from the price prevailing in the rest of the world.
As a proxy for the RoW relative price I use the GDP-weighted cross-sectional mean. The
cross-sectional mean includes the country itself, but due to the large sample size, the error
introduced in this way is negligible. Indeed, excluding China and the U.S. as countries with
the highest GDP (where the bias would be largest) does not change the estimation results.
The estimation equation is described by
|relpriceit − relpricet| = f iitβ1 + f ditβ2 + X′itβ4 + uit (3.1)
with uit = αi + µt + it.
i = 1, ...,N labels the cross-sectional and t = 1, ...,T the time dimension of the panel.
relpriceit is the relative price, fiit is financial integration, fdit stands for the level of financial
values of θRoW , η and ψ, capital flows can be either uphill or downhill. The empirical evidence on this is also not
clear. While there has been a large discussion about uphill net capital flows for developing countries (see e.g.
Prasad et al., 2006, 2007), this might be due to public rather than private flows (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013,
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2014).
10For example, the EU KLEMS database is limited to a small sample of mostly highly developed countries.
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development, and Xit is a vector that comprises other control variables. The errors uit are
composed of an unobserved country-specific effect αi, an unobserved time-specific effect µt
and an idiosyncratic component it, which is assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean zero and variance σ2 . Tests indicate that in the sample, there is serial correlation as
well as cross-sectional dependence of the errors. I therefore use the Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) estimator throughout all specifications, which corrects standard errors for both types
of correlations. For the regressions to lend support to the model, β1 should be negative. The
model does not make any statement on the sign of the coefficients on the other variables.
I test the second hypothesis by splitting the sample in two subsets depending on the level
of financial development. An easy way to do this would be to separate countries into those
that have a level of financial development higher than the cross-sectional mean and those
that have a lower level. However, this might not properly reflect the distribution of the ob-
servations. A more sophisticated technique is by kmeans clustering. This method aims at
minimizing the Euclidean distance of (cross-sectional) observations from a previously spec-
ified number k of centers. Starting point are randomly or purposely chosen initial positions
of the centers. The clustering algorithm assigns each observation to the closest center, and
then recalculates the position of the center so that its distance from all observations within
the cluster is minimized. This procedure is carried out iteratively until the assignment of ob-
servations to clusters does not change anymore. In a panel data set-up, kmeans clustering can
be carried out separately for each year, which potentially results in a different country sample
for each year.
In this paper, given the results from the theory part, it is natural to set the number of
clusters to two. As initial sorting criterion, I use the cross-sectional mean. The algorithm
sorts more countries into the low development group than into the high development group.
Note that the cluster assignment of some countries changes throughout the sample period,
with the result that the sum of the number of countries in each cluster is larger than the total
number of countries in the sample.
For each cluster, I estimate the same regression equation, which is specified as
relpriceit = f iitβ1 + f ditβ2 + X′itβ3 + uit (3.2)
where uit is composed as before, and the same assumptions apply. According to the model,
β1 should be positive for the low development-cluster whereas it should be negative for the
high development-cluster. β2 should be positive always. The coefficient on GDP is expected
to be positive as well.
Throughout most parts of the analysis, t refers to annual data. Prices should react im-
mediately to changes in the supply and demand for capital, which makes a lagged response
unlikely. Furthermore, I control for short-run fluctuations at the global level by including
time fixed effects and for country-specific shocks to the domestic financial system through
a banking crisis dummy described below. Nevertheless, it is interesting to additionally take
a medium-run perspective on the relation between cross-border capital flows and relative
prices. This can be seen as a robustness check for the annual regression results. In an exten-
sion, I therefore consider non-overlapping five-year averages.
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3.2 Data, Measurement and Sources
The sample consists of annual data for 113 countries from 1996 to 2010. The choice of
observations is determined first and foremost by the availability of data. In addition, sev-
eral countries are excluded from the dataset: First, countries which are offshore financial
centers, since financial flows into these countries might be governed by motives other than
return maximization. As an indicator, I use a classification by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF, 2000). Second, I drop countries where revenues from oil exports make up more
than 50% of GDP. Investments in these countries are likely to be directed mostly at the oil-
producing industry, which differs from other industries in that it produces mainly for export.
I also experimented with dropping countries from the dataset that are no functioning market
economies. One could argue that in these countries, prices for consumption and investment
goods might not (or not completely) be determined by market forces, and therefore not reflect
the purchasing power of the country accurately. Limiting the sample to WTO members does
however not change the results, so these concerns do not seem to matter.
Appendix B provides an overview of the countries in the dataset. The dataset is summa-
rized in Table 1.2.
Relative Prices
A standard source for data on purchasing power parities and price levels is the Penn World
Table (PWT, version 8.1 used in this paper). It relies on the United Nations’ International
Comparison Program, which at regular intervals conducts surveys on local prices in a wide
range of countries and product/service categories. These are aggregated into broad expen-
diture categories. For the non-benchmark years, PWT uses estimates, which are derived by
interpolation. Price levels by expenditure category are calculated as the purchasing power
parity divided by the market exchange rate. They are expressed relative to the price level of
GDP of the United States in 2005.11
I use PWT price levels of household consumption and investment, and calculate the rel-
ative price, the dependent variable in the regressions, as the ratio of the two. The basket of
investment goods includes machinery and equipment, construction and related products. The
majority of these products should be tradable. In the category of household consumption fall
not only consumption goods and services, but also housing, energy expenses, health and edu-
cation expenditures. The assumption of non-tradability thus seems to hold fairly well for this
category, with the exception of some consumption goods and energy. Including energy ex-
penditures is also problematic because energy prices are largely driven by supply and demand
fluctuations in international energy markets. However, the share of energy in consumption
expenditures is not very high.
11Details on the methodology as well as a discussion of the problems connected to it can be found in Feenstra,
Inklaar, and Timmer (2015).
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the dataset comprising of 113 countries, annual data 1996-2010
Variable Description Source Unit of Measurement Mean Overall
Std.
Dev.
Between
Std.
Dev.
Within
Std.
Dev.
Min Max
relprice relative price PWT 8.1 price level of household consumption over price
level of capital formation
0.8881 0.2582 0.2194 0.1389 0.1357 2.0850
fi de facto financial integra-
tion
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007)
(Absolute value of) external assets plus
external liabilites as fraction of GDP
1.6623 1.3254 1.1287 0.6948 0.2429 12.4728
fi_ci de jure financial integra-
tion
Chinn and Ito (2008) Capital account openness index
(0 = completely closed, 1= completely open)
0.5131 0.3644 0.3412 0.1282 0 1
fd_credit financial development
(credit)
Beck et al. (2000) fraction of GDP 0.4026 0.4148 0.3799 0.1577 0.0001 2.7281
fd_joint1 financial development
(credit and bonds)
Beck et al. (2000) fraction of GDP 0.4114 0.2398 0.2159 0.0998 0.0713 1.3560
gdp log of GDP per capita WDI constant 2005 US$ 7.7537 1.6117 1.5962 1.5867 4.8530 11.1244
open trade openness WDI fraction of GDP 0.7566 0.3368 0.3224 0.1157 0.1493 2.2306
rule_law2 rule of law WGI composite index reflecting quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights etc., in units of std. nor-
mal distribution
-0.1192 0.9507 0.9354 0.1636 -2.07 2
1: 34 countries only: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iceland, Italy, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey,
United States and South Africa.
2: From 1996 to 2002, rule_law is available biannually only. Intermediate observations are obtained by linear interpolation.
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Financial Integration
In quantifying financial integration, often the distinction is made between de facto and de
jure integration (see e.g. Kose et al., 2010). De jure integration describes the degree to which
capital account openness is allowed for or restricted by law. De facto integration refers to
the actual links of a country to international capital markets. These two measures are not
equivalent. A country can have a completely open capital account, but still experience no
cross-border capital flows (like many African countries). On the other hand, if legal restric-
tions are not complied with or not enforced, capital flows may take place even in the presence
of limited de jure integration. In general, for developed countries, both integration measures
are highly correlated, but the correlation is less strong for developing countries (Kose et al.,
2010: 4291). Depending on the type of research question, either one or the other measure
may be more appropriate.
In the model, the index of financial integration λ refers to the extent to which rates of
return equalize across countries. By Eq. (1.30), there is a direct link from λ to cross-border
entrepreneurial capital and financial capital flows - which, in the simplified model world
with full depreciation, are equal to the stock of international capital. A de facto measure
of integration is therefore an appropriate representation. The dataset compiled by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) provides a detailed overview of external assets and liabilities for dif-
ferent asset classes. It has the advantage of an extensive coverage of countries at various
stages of development. I use their measure of gross external assets and liabilities relative to
GDP as my primary measure of financial integration.12 Unfortunately, the dataset does not
distinguish between private and public assets and liabilities. In particular, the external debt
component of the indicator includes sovereign debt. The model, not containing a government
sector, abstracts from this differentiation, but in practice, public capital flows are likely to
be governed by motives other than return maximization. Ideally, I would therefore like to
use a measure of private external positions only. Bonfiglioli (2008) suggests introducing an
interaction term between de facto and de jure financial integration indices. Capital flows in
and out of countries with a closed capital account, she argues, should reflect public transac-
tions. But the distinction is not as clear, since private capital frequently finds loopholes for
evading capital controls. I nevertheless use this interaction in an extension of my baseline
regression model. As measure of de jure integration, I use the Chinn and Ito (2008) indicator.
Based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER), this index is the first principal component of a principal component analysis on
four binary indicators that codify restrictions on cross-border financial transactions.
De facto measures of financial integration have been criticized for not being exogenous
in growth regressions, making it difficult to pin down causal effects (see Collins, 2007). Even
though reverse causality might be present in the regressions presented below, the bias would
go in the opposite direction from the effect that I will try to identify. If a country reacts to
capital misallocation by opening its capital account or by enacting measures to promote in-
ternational investments, then misallocation will lead to financial integration. In contrast, my
aim is to show that financial integration will make allocations more efficient, not less effi-
cient. Therefore, reverse causality introduces a downward bias to the coefficient on financial
integration. The regression results therefore represent a lower bound.
12All regression results are robust to using only portfolio debt, portfolio equity, FDI and the other investment
category of the International Investment Position.
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Financial Development
Another key variable in my model is the level of development of the domestic financial sys-
tem. It is a summary measure of the size and structure of the financial sector, and the quality
of its institutions. A proxy often used in the literature is the ratio of private-sector credit
to GDP.13 But credit is only one type of financing means available to economic actors. In
general, countries differ in the extent to which firms rely on banks and bank-like institu-
tions to finance investment. Among developed countries, continental European countries
have historically been characterized by a bank-based system whereas Anglo-Saxon countries
have market-based systems (see Allen and Gale, 2000 and the references therein). Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000) have assembled more refined data on financial sector de-
velopment, which, next to banks, cover other financial institutions like corporate bond mar-
kets, insurance companies, or pension funds. I use two series of this dataset as proxies for
financial development in order to capture the duality of bank- vs. market-based systems. The
bank-based measure is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
as fraction of GDP. The market-based measure is private bond market capitalization as frac-
tion of GDP.14 Bond market capitalization refers to the outstanding domestic debt securities
issued by private domestic entities. Unfortunately, bond market data have limited scope and
are available for only 34 (developed) countries of my sample. This is why, in the benchmark
specification, I rely only on credit market development. I take bond markets development
into account in an extension presented in Appendix B, where I combine credit and bond mar-
ket development into a joint measure. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus
the average sum of both measures. Note that credit and bond market development are ac-
tually highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.70. This means that, at least for
advanced economies, financing investment through banks or corporate bonds markets seem
to be complements rather than substitutes.
Additional Controls
While in the model, countries differ only in terms of financial development, in reality there
are other distinguishing features that need to be controlled for.
It is a well documented observation that the price of consumption goods relative to in-
vestment goods is lower in poor countries than in rich countries (see Parente and Prescott,
2000, Hsieh and Klenow, 2007 and the references therein). This is due to differences in TFP
or human capital, which might not only manifest themselves in relative price differences as
explained above, but could also affect relative prices in other ways. At the same time, rich
countries are financially more integrated. I believe it possible that the level of economic
development of a country has an independent influence on relative prices, which could erro-
neously be captured by the financial integration variable. Also, GDP is the denominator of
the financial development as well as the de facto integration variable, which automatically
creates a correlation. Therefore, I include per capita GDP.
13For its use in the finance and growth literature, see Levine (2005).
14In the literature, sometimes the size of the stock market is taken into account instead. However, financing
firm activities through the emission of shares is risky, and small and medium-sized enterprises usually do not
rely on the stock market for financing their investments. Therefore, stock market development does not cover
the financing schemes preferred by a large share of the economy.
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The model makes the simplifying assumption that only investment goods are tradable,
whereas consumption goods are not. Trade does not serve any other purpose than to balance
the current account. In reality, trade integration might, similarly to financial integration, re-
duce relative price differences. Classical trade theory - going back to the Heckscher-Ohlin
model - argues that trade and financial integration are substitutes: Trade in goods automati-
cally implies factor price equalization as long as the number of factors is not larger than the
number of goods. This is why I include trade as a fraction of GDP (World Development
Indicators) in the regression.
Ju and Wei (2010) argue that overall institutional quality has a different effect on capital
allocation than financial development: Low institutional quality might distort investments in-
dependently of the sector concerned, depressing the overall level of investment in a country.
I therefore include institutional quality as an additional control variable. As a proxy, I use the
rule of law-index of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. It is a composite
index reflecting the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police and the court sys-
tem. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are based on survey data of enterprises, citizens
and experts. The rule of law-index is reported in units of a standard normal distribution, with
mean zero and standard deviation of one. It runs from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher
values corresponding to better governance. Data is available from 1996, on a yearly basis
only from 2002. This variable thus puts the strongest limitations on the time dimension of
my dataset.
Unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, weak institutions and unsustainable policies may
trigger banking crises. During a banking crisis, the domestic financial sector experiences de-
faults and solvency problems of systemically important banks, which leads to a sharp increase
in non-performing loans, depressed asset prices and hikes in interest rates. Banking crises
will distort the borrowing and lending conditions in a country, and sectors dependent on ex-
ternal finance presumingly will be more strongly affected. The resulting capital misallocation
should attract foreign capital to the capital-intensive sector, leading to relative price increases.
At the same time, banking crises are periods of high uncertainty and are often accompanied
by other types of crises like sovereign debt crises or currency crises (“twin crises"), which
will deter foreign investors or change their investment behavior. The effect of a banking crisis
on the overall level of financial integration is therefore not clear. In order to account for it, I
include a dummy for year-country observations with banking crises in the regressions. Ad-
ditionally, I introduce an interaction term of the crisis dummy with the measure of financial
integration, which is meant to capture the differential effect that integration has during crisis
episodes. Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012) have compiled a global dataset in which they re-
port the occurrence of systemic banking crises and their effects starting from 1970. Between
1996 and 2010, they identify 45 crisis episodes. Almost half of them occurred during the
global financial crisis that started in 2007. While these affected mostly developed countries,
the majority of banking crises prior to 2007 happened in developing countries.
Currency crises might affect cross-border capital flows in a more direct way. Sharp nom-
inal depreciations of the currency, as observed particularly in developing countries, often
lead to capital flow slowdowns and sudden stops. While they certainly have an effect on the
size and composition of capital flows, it is not clear whether they also impact on the cross-
sectoral allocation of investments. Prices in both sectors should react almost instantaneously
to changes in the supply of capital, and therefore accurately reflect the capital allocation in
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a country. I experimented with including a currency crises dummy as a control variable in
the regressions (reported also by Laeven and Valencia, 2008), but it never had any significant
effect.
3.3 Regression Results
Convergence Regressions
Table 1.3 presents the baseline regressions for the analysis of cross-country relative price
convergence. The measure of financial development used is credit market development. For
each regression specification, I report estimations with only country fixed effects, and with
country and time fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) present a simplified regression-setup
without any controls beyond financial integration and financial development. In Columns
(3) and (4), the set-up is extended to control for other explanatory variables. Columns (5)
and (6) additionally contain the banking crises dummy and an interaction term of financial
integration with banking crises. The last columns (7) and (8) instead include de jure financial
integration and an interaction with de facto integration.15
The coefficient on financial integration is negative and statistically significant throughout
all specifications. There is thus strong evidence for a convergence effect. It is smaller when
time fixed effects are used, which indicates that in the specifications with only country fixed
effects, fi might partly pick up other time-specific influences. The coefficient in column (4)
can be interpreted such that a one-unit increase in financial integration moves the relative
price of a country closer to the cross-sectional mean by -0.0113. A one-unit increase in
financial integration corresponds for example to the difference between the average 1996
to 2010 level of financial integration of Peru to that of New Zealand, or to the increase in
financial integration experienced by Austria between 2000 and 2004. The deviation from the
cross-sectional mean is on average 0.23, so that around 5 percent of the gap is closed when fi
rises by 1.
When testing for nonlinearity of the effect, a quadratic financial integration term is not
significant. Integration does not seem to have stronger effect for countries with particularly
high or low levels of integration. An interaction term between financial integration and credit
market development equally does not produce a coefficient significantly different from zero.
Credit market development has a positive, mostly significant effect on relative price dis-
persions. The coefficient of GDP is positive and significant in the specifications with both
types of fixed effects, so in richer countries, the relative price diverges more from the weighted
cross-sectional mean. As mentioned above, the model does not offer any interpretation of
these results. The coefficient on trade openness is negative whenever significant: Trade in-
tegration, similarly to financial integration, seems to lead to convergence of relative prices.
But since the effect becomes insignificant in specifications with time fixed effects, it might
simply reflect some time trend of relative prices.
The coefficient on the banking crises dummy in column (5) is positive and significant.
Banking crises seem to exacerbate the distortive effect of financial frictions on domestic cap-
ital allocation at the mean level of financial integration. When including time fixed effects
in column (6), the coefficient becomes insignificant, however the interaction term between
15The results are similar if both the banking crisis with interaction, and de jure integration with interaction
are included.
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Table 1.3: Convergence regressions with credit market development
dependent variable: relprice deviations from cross-country mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
fi -0.0175*** -0.0131** -0.0142*** -0.0113** -0.0153*** -0.0093* -0.0147* -0.0165*
(0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0050) (0.0076) (0.0078)
fd_credit 0.0508 0.0442** 0.0487** 0.0421** 0.0386* 0.0381** 0.0512*** 0.0388***
(0.0328) (0.0167) (0.0188) (0.0166) (0.0182) (0.0160) (0.0137) (0.0118)
open -0.0758*** -0.0135 -0.0741*** -0.0131 -0.0758*** -0.0127
(0.0150) (0.0131) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0166) (0.0134)
gdp -0.0016 0.0438** 0.0030 0.0425** 0.0029 0.0455*
(0.0297) (0.0188) (0.0295) (0.0184) (0.0361) (0.0242)
rule_law -0.0207 -0.0191 -0.0165 -0.0183 -0.0189 -0.0162
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0154)
bcrisis 0.0247** 0.0123
(0.0087) (0.0096)
bcrisis*fi -0.0004 -0.0044**
(0.0025) (0.0016)
fi_ci*fi 0.0000 0.0097
(0.0101) (0.0089)
fi_ci -0.0217 -0.0024
(0.0346) (0.0318)
Constant 0.2406*** 0.2681*** 0.2997 0.0000 0.2669 0.0000 0.2771 -0.0890
(0.0169) (0.0062) (0.2340) (0.0000) (0.2316) (0.0000) (0.2652) (0.1734)
Observations 1,618 1,618 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,496 1,476 1,476
No. of groups 113 113 113 113 113 113 111 111
R-squared 0.0099 0.0637 0.0148 0.0627 0.0173 0.0631 0.0655 0.0155
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES Yes
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
banking crises and financial integration is negative and significant. This provides evidence
that when a country is going through a banking crisis, financial integration becomes more
effective in promoting the convergence of the relative price. In columns (7) and (8), I aim to
determine what type of capital flows lead to convergence in relative prices. While the coeffi-
cient on de facto integration stays negative and significant, the interaction term with de jure
integration is insignificant as well as the coefficient on de jure integration. The effect of fi
does not seem to depend on capital account openness, which could mean that private capital
flows rather than public capital flows drive the convergence in relative prices. As these might
be governed to a larger extent by profit maximization, this further supports the model.
As shown in Appendix B, the results for the coefficient on financial integration are robust
to using the joint measure of bank and bond market development instead of the simple credit
measure as a proxy for financial development. The coefficient becomes even more significant
and slightly larger, which might however be due to the different sample size.
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Cluster Regressions
Next, I investigate the second hypothesis, according to which the level of financial develop-
ment determines the direction of price changes initiated by international capital flows. The
regressions above considered squared relative price deviations, so nothing could be said on
this account. Table 1.4 shows separate regressions for countries with high and low levels of
credit market development. Columns (1) through (4) display the results for the low develop-
ment cluster, columns (5) through (8) for the high development cluster. In order to check the
validity of the model, compare the coefficients of (1) with (5), (2) with (6), (3) with (7), and
(4) with (8).
Table 1.4: Cluster regressions
dependent variable: relprice
Low Development High Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
fi -0.0296 -0.0097 -0.0249** -0.0892*** -0.0224*** -0.0239*** -0.0305*** -0.0131
(0.0170) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0177) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0087) (0.0077)
fd_credit 0.1455*** 0.2537*** 0.2504*** 0.2202** 0.0342 0.0565 0.0580* 0.0418*
(0.0419) (0.0791) (0.0829) (0.0746) (0.0327) (0.0345) (0.0302) (0.0213)
open 0.0844** 0.0858** 0.0886* 0.2419*** 0.2227*** 0.2435***
(0.0337) (0.0333) (0.0429) (0.0668) (0.0707) (0.0661)
gdp -0.3155*** -0.3271*** -0.3038*** 0.1732** 0.2254** 0.1668
(0.0305) (0.0349) (0.0393) (0.0765) (0.0909) (0.1104)
rule_law 0.1764*** 0.1883*** 0.1614*** 0.1136** 0.1234** 0.0744
(0.0145) (0.0188) (0.0144) (0.0527) (0.0535) (0.0616)
bcrisis -0.0419* 0.0167
(0.0199) (0.0388)
bcrisis*fi 0.0521*** 0.0100
(0.0136) (0.0095)
fi_ci -0.0495 0.3248*
(0.0408) (0.1573)
fi_ci*fi 0.1417*** 0.0014
(0.0229) (0.0235)
Constant 0.8217*** 3.0964*** 3.2032*** 0.0000 1.1658*** -0.8980 -1.4214 -1.0868
(0.0208) (0.1848) (0.2168) (0.0000) (0.0542) (0.7893) (0.9329) (0.9709)
Observations 1,261 1,160 1,160 1,142 357 336 336 334
No. of groups 94 94 94 92 36 36 36 35
R-squared 0.0202 0.1025 0.1095 0.1290 0.1890 0.2420 0.2615 0.2871
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
First, note that in the regressions that only estimate a level effect of financial integration,
the coefficient on fi is insignificant for the low development cluster (columns (1) and (2)) and
significantly negative for the high financial development cluster (columns (5) and (6)). This
can also be seen in Figure (1.4), which plots the residuals of a fixed effects regression of the
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Figure 1.4: Relative price residuals and financial integration
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relative price on f d, open, gdp and rule_law against financial integration (corresponding to
columns (2) and (6) in Table 1.4). Whereas in the high financial development cluster, the
correlation between relative price residuals and financial integration is clearly negative, the
dots in the low financial development cluster are very dispersed. Low development countries
seem to be a very heterogeneous group, with some countries behaving as predicted by the
model, but others not.16 But overall, integration seems to drive relative prices of high-price
countries downwards rather than driving those of low-price countries upwards. This is a po-
tentially problematic result: even though it was shown above that capital allocations become
more similar across countries, this apparently works through worsening the allocations in
high development countries rather than by improving them in low development countries.
This finding is in line with Reis (2013), who finds negative effects of financial integration on
productivity in the nontradable goods sector of Portugal, a country that is part of the highly
developed cluster. Benigno et al. (2015) find that in periods of large capital inflows, inter-
national capital are associated with negative effects on within-country capital allocation in a
sample of advanced and some emerging economies.
In columns (3) and (7), differential effect during crisis and non-crisis times is taken into
account. In normal times, financial integration affects relative prices negatively in both clus-
ters, but more so in the high development cluster. During banking crises, however, the effect
turns positive in the low development cluster, to a total of 0.0272. International capital then
seems to be particularly directed to the externally dependent capital goods producing sector,
and/or domestic capital is flowing out of the less dependent consumption goods producing
sector. This provides additional evidence that financial integration is beneficial when domes-
tic lending channels are interrupted - however only for countries with a low level of financial
development.
In columns (4) and (8), the additional interaction term with de jure integration is highly
significant and positive for the low development cluster, whereas it is close to zero and in-
significant for the high development cluster. This may be interpreted in the sense that in
countries with low financial development, public capital flows have a larger effect on in-
16For example, the correlation turns positive if we would exclude Argentina, Brazil, Sao Tomé and Príncipe
and Lesotho.
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creasing the efficiency of the capital allocation than private capital flows. However, in low
development countries, it might be easier for private capital to circumvent official capital con-
trols than in high development countries, which is why this result is to be interpreted with
caution.
The coefficient on financial development is positive and significant throughout all spec-
ifications. This is in line with the model predictions. The coefficient is smaller in the high
development cluster, which means that the effect is nonlinear. Trade openness has a positive
effect on relative prices, and so does rule of law, although the coefficient is insignificant in
the high development cluster. The effect of GDP is negative in the low development cluster,
but positive in the high development cluster. Whereas GDP was shown above to induce a
convergence of relative prices, this is not true across groups with different levels of financial
development.
Medium-Run Effects
Table 1.5: Convergence regressions for five-year averages
dependent variable: relprice deviations from cross-country mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
fi -0.0181 -0.0175* -0.0272 -0.0245
(0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0123) (0.0177)
fd_credit 0.0289 0.0469 0.0384 0.0413**
(0.0416) (0.0257) (0.0140) (0.0087)
open -0.0650** -0.0655** -0.0596
(0.0095) (0.0126) (0.0215)
gdp -0.0256 -0.0177 -0.0328
(0.0367) (0.0427) (0.0520)
rule_law 0.0277 0.0348 0.0278
(0.0250) (0.0197) (0.0308)
banking_crisis 0.0009
(0.0043)
bcrisis_fi 0.0085
(0.0054)
fi_ci -0.0112
(0.0757)
fi_ci_fi 0.0153
(0.0267)
Constant 0.2455*** 0.4844 0.4404 0.5397
(0.0123) (0.2828) (0.3119) (0.3579)
Observations 287 281 281 275
No. of groups 108 106 106 104
R-squared 0.0218 0.0205 0.0259 0.0218
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The cross-sectional convergence and development cluster regressions are replicated for
non-overlapping five-year averages. The panel is thereby reduced to three time periods: 1996-
2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010. Table 1.5 replicates Table 1.3 for five-year averages. The
results mostly confirm those of the regressions with annual data. Lower significance levels
can be explained by a much smaller sample size, whereas the point estimates are of similar
magnitude. Thus, the effects of financial integration on the allocation of capital hold also in
the medium-run.
Table 1.6 conveys largely the same message as Table 1.4: Focusing on the level effect, in-
tegration leads to a lower relative price in countries with high financial development (column
2), but has no significant effect for countries with low financial development (column 5). The
interaction of de facto with de jure financial integration again is shown to be significant only
for the low development cluster, where public capital flows may have a more positive effect
on the cross-sectoral efficiency of capital allocation than private capital flows.
Table 1.6: Cluster regressions for five-year averages
dependent variable: relprice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
fi -0.0422 -0.0501 -0.2381** -0.0142 -0.0260*** -0.0112
(0.0193) (0.0248) (0.0484) (0.0053) (0.0019) (0.0093)
fd_credit 0.2153 0.3367* 0.3204** 0.0975 0.0552 0.0054
(0.0792) (0.0840) (0.0504) (0.0378) (0.0275) (0.0108)
open 0.2191** 0.2205** 0.3225** 0.0387
(0.0500) (0.0370) (0.0611) (0.1725)
gdp -0.1695** -0.2038** 0.2181** 0.2131*
(0.0330) (0.0275) (0.0252) (0.0667)
rule_law 0.1633*** 0.1293*** 0.0441 0.0105
(0.0057) (0.0063) (0.1369) (0.1471)
fi_ci -0.1937 0.4875*
(0.0880) (0.1202)
fi_ci*fi 0.3570** 0.0223
(0.0746) (0.0315)
Constant 0.8374*** 1.9533*** 2.3054*** 1.0149*** -1.3349** -1.4676*
(0.0368) (0.1542) (0.1347) (0.0171) (0.3034) (0.4157)
Observations 226 220 214 61 61 61
No. of groups 88 86 84 29 29 29
R-squared 0.0231 0.1123 0.2429 0.0400 0.2784 0.3915
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4. Conclusion
This paper presents evidence on how financial integration influences the cross-sectoral al-
location of capital in integrating economies. In the intorduced two-sector model of a small
economy at different stages of financial integration, the level of financial development is
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a key variable. Cross-country capital flows improve the allocation of capital in financially
underdeveloped countries, whereas they have the opposite effect in developed countries. Fi-
nancial integration contributes to making the cross-sectoral capital allocations of integrating
economies more similar.
The second part of the paper tests the model predictions empirically. The price of con-
sumption relative to capital goods serves as a proxy for the cross-sectoral efficiency of capital
allocation in an economy. A panel data analysis of 113 countries over 15 years finds strong
evidence that financial integration leads to a more similar allocation of capital across coun-
tries. It also supports the model prediction that the level of financial development is important
for determining whether the cross-sectoral allocation of capital improves upon integration.
However, this works through a negative allocation effect for countries with high financial
development rather than a positive effect for countries with low financial development. In
the future, I plan to look deeper into this result. Firm-level studies can provide additional
insights on the relation between financial frictions and capital allocation (for a recent study,
see Te Kaat, 2016).
In focusing on capital allocation efficiency, this paper has looked into one channel through
which financial integration affects the real economy. The motives for and effects of financial
integration are of course more widespread. For example, this analysis has abstracted from in-
come risks. In reality, portfolio diversification can serve as an insurance against idiosyncratic
income shocks. Risk hedging is an important motivation particularly for North-North capital
flows and should bring additional benefits for the integrating economies. Thus, while the pa-
per has called into question efficiency gains in cross-sectoral capital allocations for countries
with high financial development, these countries may still enjoy gains from integration for
other reasons.
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Appendices
A. Proofs and Further Analytical Results
A.1 Non-Binding Solution and Threshold for Borrowing Constraint
The equilibrium values for the case when the borrowing constraint is slack are
Ky−autt =
β
1 + β
wautt−1
ψ
1 + ψ
Kx−autt =
β
1 + β
wautt−1
(
1 − ψ
1 + ψ
)
(A.1)
ry−autt = α
wautt
wautt−1
1
ψ
1+ψ
rx−autt =
(
ry−autt =
) α
ψ
wautt
wautt−1
1
1 − ψ1+ψ
re−autt =
wautt
wautt−1
 αβ + ε(1 − ε) βη − α (1 − η)ψη 11 − ψ1+ψ
 (A.2)
pautt =
1
1 − ε
(
1 + αβ
β
)ε 1
zx
wautt
(wautt−1)
ε
(
1 − ψ
1 + ψ
)−ε
(A.3)
wautt =
(
wautt−1
)α ( ψ
1 + ψ
)α
(1 − α)1−α zy (A.4)
When the borrowing constraint is weakly binding, this solution is equivalent to the solu-
tion for the binding constraint as laid out in the main text. Thus,
ψ
1 + ψ
=
ψθ + η
1 + ψθ
⇐⇒ θ = 1 − η
ψ
− η = 1 − 1 + ψ
ψ
η ≡ θ (A.5)
If θ < θ, the borrowing constraint is binding. In that case, return rate equalization does
not take place and pt will be too low compared to the frictionless situation. In order to ensure
that θ < 1, it needs to hold that η < ψ1+ψ =
(1−ε)αβ
αβ+ε
. This is also the requirement stated in the
main text for that entrepreneurs want to use external capital in the production.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
I prove that (1.15) - (1.18) are the model solutions in the case where the borrowing constraint
is binding.
Use (1.6) to replace utility maximising consumption and saving in all equations. Derive
optimal labor allocation across sectors: (1.12) and (1.3) yield Lyt =
β(1−α)
1+β and with (1.11),
Lxt =
1+βα
1+β . (1.14) tells how capital is distributed between X- and Y-producing firms, K
x
t =
β
1+βwt−1 − Kyt , and is used to replace Kxt . Then, prices and interest rates can be expressed as
function only of Kyt and wt. Let ϕt ≡ 1+ββ Kyt . Then,
ryt = αwt
1
ϕt
rxt =
ε (1 + βα)
(1 − ε) β wt (wt−1 − ϕt)
−1 ret =
αβ + ε
(1 − ε) βη
wt
wt−1
− 1 − η
η
rxt (A.6)
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pt =
1 − α
1 − ε
zy
zx
(
ϕt
1 − α
)α ( β
1 + αβ
(wt−1 − ϕt)
)−ε
(A.7)
When the economy is constrained by financial frictions, the borrowing constraint (1.9),
reformulated as
(
1 − θ rytrxt
)
ϕt = ηwt−1, is used to derive (1.15) - (1.17). In the case when the
borrowing constraint is slack, return rate equalization between X- and Y-sector instead closes
the model.
In both cases, the only time-varying element in the solutions for interest rates and prices
are wage rates. As explained in the main text, the dynamic equation for wages, (1.18), guar-
antees that the model has a unique steady state since α ∈ (0, 1). (1.18) is derived as follows:
Combining (1.2) and (1.3) to Kyt = α
wt
ryt
β
1+β , equilibrium output of sector Y is
Yt = zy
(
wt
ryt
)α (
α
1 − α
)α β (1 − α)
1 + β
(A.8)
Using this again in (1.2) in its formulation ryt = α
Yt
Kyt
, the unique relationship between the
two factor rewards is (
ryt
)α (wt)1−α = zy (1 − α) ( α1 − α
)α
(A.9)
Thus, for given parameter values α, β, ε, zx, zy, θ and η, there exists a unique and time-
invariant solution to the interest rates given a wage level wt−1.
The equivalent to (1.18) for the non-binding case is
waut = (1 − α) (zy) 11−α
(
ψ
1 + ψ
) α
1−α
> waut (A.10)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In the model set-up, it was assumed that both regions are in their respective steady states
before starting to integrate. Thus, rRoWt and r
aut
t are time-invariant, and so by (1.21) is r
int
t .
Hence, by (1.29), there exists a unique and stable wage level. Since wages are the only dy-
namic element in the financial integration equilibrium (1.22) - (1.30), the system has a unique
and stable steady state, and all variables in the equilibrium can be expressed as functions
uniquely of α, β, ε, zx, zy, θRoW , θ and η.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Rates of Return
By Proposition 1, rx increases in θ whereas re decreases in θ. If θRoW > θ, it must therefore
be that rx−aut < rx−RoW and re−aut > re−RoW . Then, by (1.21), the wedge increases in λ. The
opposite holds if θRoW < θ.
Wages
I prove in the following that wint monotonically increases in λ when θ < θRoW . The proof
works in the opposite direction for θRoW > θ.
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Consider two different degrees of financial integration, λ and λ˜, with λ > λ˜. Then,(
wint
) 1−α
α
[
(1 − α) (zy) 11−α ]−1 = (1 − η) ψθ
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ
(
θRoW − θ)) + η 1 − θ1 − θ − λ (θRoW − θ) (A.11)
and(
w˜int
) 1−α
α
[
(1 − α) (zy) 11−α ]−1 = (1 − η) ψθ
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ˜
(
θRoW − θ)) + η 1 − θ1 − θ − λ˜ (θRoW − θ) (A.12)
Now assume that wint > w˜int. Then,
(1 − η)ψθ
1 + ψ
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θ + λ
(
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(
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Since λ˜ < λ,
⇐⇒ ψ
2θ
1 − θ
1 − θ − λ
(
θRoW − θ
)
1 + ψ (θ + λ (θRoW − θ)) <
η
1 − η
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ˜
(
θRoW − θ
))
1 − θ − λ˜ (θRoW − θ) (A.14)
We know that η1−η < ψ (from the assumption that in both regions, the borrowing constraint
holds). Then,
ψ2θ
1 − θ
1 − θ − λ
(
θRoW − θ
)
1 + ψ (θ + λ (θRoW − θ)) < ψ
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ˜
(
θRoW − θ
))
1 − θ − λ˜ (θRoW − θ)
⇐⇒
1 − θ − λ
(
θRoW − θ
)
1 − θ︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
<1
ψθ
1 + ψ (θ + λ (θRoW − θ))︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
<1
<
1 + ψ
(
θ + λ˜
(
θRoW − θ
))
1 − θ − λ˜ (θRoW − θ)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
>1
(A.15)
which is a true statement. So from λ > λ˜ follows wint > w˜int. More generally, wint is a
monotonically increasing function of λ.
Note that even when λ = 1, the country’s wage will not fully converge to that of RoW,
since it continues to be a negative function of θ.
Prices
The steady state price in both autarky and integration is described by
p =
1
εzx
( w
1 − ε
)1−ε
(rx)ε (A.16)
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The direction of price change that results from opening the economy thus depends on the
direction of change in rx and w, which have been derived above: If θ < θRoW , both rx and
w are monotonically increasing in λ, and so is p. If θ > θRoW , the opposite holds. Note that
since wages never fully equalize between the two regions unless θ = θRoW , prices will not
equalize, either.
Steady State Capital Flows
By (1.30),
Φ =
β
1 + β
wint(1 − η)
[
1 − 1 + ψθ
1 + ψθ + ψλ (θRoW − θ)
]  ≥ 0 i f θRoW > θ≤ 0 i f θRoW < θ
Ω =
β
1 + β
wintη
[
1 − 1 − θ
1 − θ − λ (θRoW − θ)
]  ≤ 0 i f θRoW > θ≥ 0 i f θRoW < θ
Both expressions equal zero only when λ = 0, and are strictly monotone functions of λ. With-
out making additional assumptions on the parameter values, it is not possible to determine
the direction of net capital flows. However, for the extreme case where λ = 1, the direction
of net capital flows can be determined by the following proof by contradiction: Assume that
θRoW > θ and at the same time Φ + Ω > 0 (and consequently, ΦRoW + ΩRoW < 0). Using the
more general definition Φ + Ω = β1+βw
[
1 − α 1rx
(
1
ψ
+ θ
)
− α (1 − θ) 1re
]
, we get
β
1 + β
wint
[
1 − α 1
rx
(
1
ψ
+ θ
)
− α (1 − θ) 1
re
]
> 0
>
β
1 + β
wRoW
[
1 − α 1
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(
1
ψ
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)
− α
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) 1
re
]
(A.17)
Since wages are positive, for the inequality to hold it must be that
1 − α 1
rxψ
− α 1
rx
θRoW − α
(
1 − θRoW
) 1
re
> 0 > 1 − α 1
rxψ
− α 1
rx
θ − α (1 − θ) 1
re
⇐⇒ 1
rx
θRoW +
(
1 − θRoW
) 1
re
<
1
rx
θ + (1 − θ) 1
re
⇐⇒
(
θRoW − θ
)
re <
(
θRoW − θ
)
rx (A.18)
We know that re > rx, so with θRoW > θ, this statement is wrong. If the rest of the world is
more developed, it must hence be that Φ + Ω < 0. The proof works in the opposite direction
when the rest of the world is less developed.
A.5 Price Dynamics Under the Source Principle
Assume the same set-up as in the baseline model, but now entrepreneurs borrow in and un-
der the conditions of their country of origin. Entrepreneurs in the small open economy thus
face θ ≡ θS OE, and entrepreneurs in RoW θRoW . In a financially integrated world, both en-
trepreneurial capital and financial capital can flow freely across borders. This will, for each
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type of agents in each region, lead to cross-border return rate equalization: Households of
SOE get the same returns rh−S OE whether investing/lending money in SOE or RoW, house-
holds of RoW get rh−RoW everywhere, entrepreneurs of SOE re−S OE and those of RoW re−RoW .
Households are not restricted in their investment decisions, and therefore rh−RoW = rh−S OE
must hold in the financial integration equilibrium. (The same does not need to be true for
entrepreneurs.)
Combine (1.7), (1.8) and (1.9) to
1
ry− ft
=
θ f
rh− ft
+
(1 − θ f )
re− ft
where f = S OE,RoW denotes the region of origin. A region f-entrepreneur, whether op-
erating in SOE or RoW, faces the same θ f and rh− ft , and gets the same rate of return on en-
trepreneurial capital re− ft , so that the project return r
y− f
t must also be the same independently
of the region in which the firm operates.
At the same time, labor mobility within countries and competitive markets imply that all
Y-sector firms operating in one region must earn the same return on capital ry. But then, we
can invoke (A.9) to derive that wages equalize across countries. It follows from (A.16) that
prices equalize across countries.
B. Data
B.1 Countries in the Dataset
The countries included in the regressions are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Aus-
tria, Burundi, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bhutan, Botswana, Central African Republic, Canada, Chile, China,
Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Columbia, Comoros, Cabo Verde, Czech Republic, Germany, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France,
Georgia, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia, Hungary,
Indonesia, India, Icleand, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Cam-
bodia, South Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Mada-
gascar, Maldives, Mexico, Macedonia, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi,
Namibia, Niger, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portu-
gal, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Ser-
bia, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Chad, Togo, Tajikistan,
Tunesia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,
South Africa, Zambia.
B.2 Additional Regression Results
Table 1.7 reproduces Table 1.3, but I replace credit market development with a joint measure
of credit and bonds market development. Due to the fact that data on bonds market devel-
opment is available only for some, mostly economically developed, countries, the sample is
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Table 1.7: Convergence regressions with credit and bond market development
dependent variable: relprice deviations from cross-country mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
fi -0.0211*** -0.0168*** -0.0166*** -0.0192*** -0.0188*** -0.0198*** -0.0238*** -0.0264***
(0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0045)
fd_joint 0.1797*** 0.2133*** 0.2174*** 0.2007*** 0.2085*** 0.1993*** 0.1872*** 0.1713***
(0.0507) (0.0394) (0.0347) (0.0318) (0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0290) (0.0302)
open -0.0190 0.0079 -0.0263 0.0058 -0.0313 -0.0007
(0.0494) (0.0449) (0.0474) (0.0447) (0.0523) (0.0465)
gdp -0.1456*** -0.1943*** -0.1356*** -0.1894*** -0.1513*** -0.1772***
(0.0391) (0.0282) (0.0367) (0.0256) (0.0466) (0.0343)
rule_law 0.1064** 0.1092** 0.1103** 0.1108** 0.0973** 0.0963**
(0.0377) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0441) (0.0387) (0.0409)
bcrisis 0.0062 0.0021
(0.0166) (0.0180)
bcrisis*fi 0.0027 0.0007
(0.0038) (0.0033)
fi_ci 0.0081 0.0067
(0.0325) (0.0343)
fi_ci*fi 0.0151*** 0.0175***
(0.0047) (0.0035)
Constant 0.1237*** 0.1076*** 1.4063*** 1.8861*** 1.3197*** 1.8514*** 1.4695*** 1.7241***
(0.0320) (0.0171) (0.3509) (0.2331) (0.3321) (0.2138) (0.4055) (0.2840)
Observations 467 467 436 436 436 436 436 436
No. of groups 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.0807 0.1816 0.1457 0.2317 0.1504 0.2319 0.1578 0.2457
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
not representative of the universe of countries anymore. Note that the relative price cross-
sectional mean still refers to the full sample of 113 countries. In these regressions, again, the
convergence hypothesis is strongly supported. The coefficient is slightly higher. fd_joint is
more significant than fd_credit before. Some of the other coefficients are changed in sign or
significance level of the estimates. This is however due to the different sample composition
rather than the different specification of financial development: They are reproduced when
using the same sample, but the previous definition of financial development as credit mar-
ket development. It seems that in richer countries, economic development has a converging
effect, whereas rule of law has a diverging effect. Countries with open capital accounts ex-
hibit less of a convergence effect. The underlying reasons for these findings, though certainly
interesting, are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Chapter 2
External Asset Positions, Demography and
Life-cycle Portfolio Choice
With Margaret Davenport
How do demographic differences between regions affect external positions in
safe and risky assets? We answer this question focusing on the US vis-à-vis 15
European Union member states. The US bilateral position is characterized by
risky assets alongside safe liabilities. At the same time, the US population is
relatively younger. We present a structural model of two fully integrated regions,
which differ by the age structure of their populations. There are multiple over-
lapping generations of agents, who choose a portfolio of safe and risky assets
over the life-cycle. We show that the younger region has a higher relative de-
mand for risky assets, which induces international asset trades. In a simulation
starting in 1990, we replicate the observed positions between the US and the Eu-
ropean countries both in sign and in magnitude. We predict the risk asymmetry
to persist until the end of the century, whereas both safe and risky returns decline
persistently.
1. Introduction
Over the last few decades, the US has accumulated net risky assets alongside net safe liabil-
ities vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The literature has offered purely financial explanations
for this asymmetry: First, the US as the center of the international monetary system acts as
a global liquidity provider by exporting safe, short-term assets (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007).
Second, a lack of financial development in many of its counterparts not only attracts for-
eigners to US debt, but makes US investors turn towards foreign destinations in their search
for yield (Bernanke, 2005; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull, 2009; Von Hagen and Zhang,
2014). This paper provides evidence of such portfolio imbalances between the US and a
group of developed European countries. Most of them are reserve issuers and have highly
developed financial systems. This suggests another driving force for the US risk profile. The
current paper establishes diverging demographic trends as a suitable candidate.
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The external position of the US vis-à-vis 15 European Union member states (henceforth
“EU")1 is characterized by net equity assets of around 4 percent of GDP, and net debt liabil-
ities of 5 percent. At the same time, the US and EU populations differ in their demographic
composition: The US population is at present younger than the population in the EU, and over
the next decades is projected to age at a slower speed. This paper shows that demographic
differences can explain bilateral imbalances. We build a structural model with overlapping
generations. There are two regions, whose populations differ in fertility and longevity. Agents
earn a high labor income during working life, and a low pension income after a fixed retire-
ment age. They smooth consumption by saving into two types of assets: a safe asset with
a certain return, and a risky asset with a stochastic return. Asset supply is proportional to
population size. Savings patterns are age-dependent, with portfolio risk decreasing over the
life-cycle. As a result, aggregate demand for safe and risky assets reflects the age structure
of the population. In a financially integrated world, the relatively younger region imports
risky assets and exports safe assets. Calibrating the model to the US and EU economies for
1990 onwards, we obtain bilateral equity and debt positions of magnitudes similar to the data.
Since demographic trends are persistent, so are bilateral imbalances.
How do differences in demographics affect regional asset demand, and ultimately external
positions? Using data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances, we estimate life-cycle asset
holdings and portfolio choice. Savings are hump-shaped over the life-cycle, whereas the
portfolio share of risky assets declines with age. Aggregate asset demand in a region should
therefore reflect the age composition of the population. When there is a larger share of older
cohorts in the economy, the aggregate country portfolio should be shifted towards safe assets.
The total amount of savings should be higher, the larger the amount of individuals near or at
retirement age. At the same time, with fixed retirement age and constant retirement income,
changes in longevity will shift the share of life that individuals expect to spend in retirement
with low non-financial income. In order to smooth consumption over the life-cycle, they will
make adjustments to their optimal savings and portfolio choice.
While per capita asset demand should thus vary with demographics, per capita asset sup-
ply is kept constant in the model. Each individual is endowed with an identical Lucas (1978)
tree that pays a safe and a risky dividend. Therefore, in order for markets to clear, there
will be an effect on rates of return. When there are two regions whose populations age at
different speeds, they will have different market-clearing returns in autarky. Under finan-
cial integration, they will trade assets with each other until returns equalize. The resulting
market-clearing returns should reflect the age structure of both regions together.
We simulate the demographic transitions of the US and the EU between two steady states:
1950 and 2095. We assume that the two regions are financially integrated from 1990 onwards.
This corresponds to the point in time when EU countries undertook major steps towards
opening their capital accounts. The resulting US net external position is characterized by
risky assets and safe liabilities throughout the whole simulation period. Magnitudes vary
over time, reflecting how the share of retirees evolves in the US relative to the EU: Whenever
the US has a relatively lower share of retirees (dis-savers), its net external position is more
positive. On average, the model predicts safe US liabilities of 5 percent of GDP and risky
1This includes all members of the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement: Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
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assets of 2 percent of GDP, which comes very close to the data. Furthermore, the model can
explain almost all the decline in safe returns between 1990 and 2015, and a large share of
the movements in the risk premium. The rates of return continue to fall until the end of the
simulation period. An exception is a short period between 2020 and 2040, in which the baby
boomer cohorts run down their assets during retirement.
We decompose the effect of demographics on aggregate asset demand and on the portfolio
share of risky assets into three main channels: A distribution effect, acting through the shift in
the population age structure from younger cohorts towards older cohorts. A life-cycle effect
capturing the effect that increasing individual longevity has on individual decision-making.
Lastly, a valuation effect, which reflects changes in the equilibrium demand for safe and
risky assets in response to movements in market-clearing rates of return. In a counterfactual
exercise, we find that the distribution effect accounts for more than 50 percent of aggregate
asset demands in the US by the end of the demographic transition, and increases both over
time and with cohort age. For the risky share, the valuation effect is the most important one.
Our paper contributes to understanding the observed asymmetries in the international
asset position of the US. To our knowledge, we are the first to systematically analyze de-
mographics as an explanatory factor. The results of this paper show that differences in the
age structure of the population can be powerful determinants of debt and equity positions be-
tween two developed regions, which the existing literature has focused on to a lesser extent.
However, the insights of this paper are more general, and extend to the US external position
vis-à-vis other countries. Our results also allow for a long-run outlook on external positions.
Future demographics are to a large extent known well in advance. Therefore, our predictions
involve only a limited degree of uncertainty. The bilateral equity and debt positions that we
predict arise from optimal individual decision-making in two financially integrated regions
with different demographic structure. They are thus neither destabilizing nor unsustainable.
In what follows, we place our contribution in the context of the related literature. Section
2 presents the empirical evidence that motivates our research. We introduce the model in Sec-
tion 3, before explaining how it is calibrated in Section 4. Section 5 presents the simulation
results for the effects of demographic change on external positions and rates of return. We
further assess the three channels through which demographics operate. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
A growing literature in international macroeconomics has found demographics to be an im-
portant determinant of the behavior of capital flows and returns, not distinguishing between
asset types (Backus, Cooley, and Henriksen, 2014; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; Börsch-
Supan, Ludwig, and Winter, 2006; Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante, 2007; Barany, Coeur-
dacier, and Guibaud, 2015; Ferrero, 2010). Krueger and Ludwig (2007) present a complex
structural model with several world regions and a large number of cohorts. They emphasize
the need for an open economy framework to study the impact of demographic change as the
effect on rates of return is more extreme if less favorable demographics are imported from
other world regions. Backus et al. (2014) build a relatively simple model that can match
persistent capital flows in the US, Japan, China and Germany and project declining rates of
return until 2030. Barany et al. (2015) analyze the interaction of demographics with financial
development and pension availability in a structural model of a developed and a developing
economy that can replicate global imbalances. We are not aware of structural models that
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study the link between regional demographic differences and trade in different types of as-
sets. In an empirical analysis De Santis and Lührmann (2009) consider - among other things
- the link between demographics and various types of capital flows. They find that a higher
old-age dependency ratio induces net equity inflows and net outflows of debt instruments.
This is in line with our results.
Our paper also relates to closed economy studies of the effects of demographic change on
prices and returns of assets with different degrees of riskiness. This literature builds on life-
cycle models of asset accumulation and portfolio choice (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954,
1990; Merton, 1971). A consensus emerges that the entry of a large cohort into the labor mar-
ket will result in downward pressure on asset returns, as asset demand increases during prime
saving years (Abel, 2001, 2003; Poterba, 2001; Brooks, 2002, 2004; Geanakoplos, Magill,
and Quinzii, 2004; Gagnon, Johannsen, and Lopez-Salido, 2016; Carvalho, Ferrero, and Ne-
chio, 2016). However, there is disagreement about the effect on the equity premium. In a
general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, Brooks (2002) finds that the equity
risk premium should fall when a large cohort retires, but later shows that this is dependent on
unconstrained borrowing of young agents and a zero net supply assumption (Brooks, 2004).
Kuhle, Ludwig, and Boersch-Supan (2007) present a richer model with bonds in positive net
supply and find that the risk premium first falls with increased saving prior to retirement and
then increases as the large cohort retires. In a recent paper, Kuhle (2017) analytically derives
a positive relationship between fertility and the equity premium that holds for concave utility
functions and bonds in positive net supply, due to a stronger reaction of the risky rate of return
to asset demand. In discussing our simulation results for the rates of return, we will refer to
his insights.
Finally, our paper motivates the asymmetric composition of the US external position with its
relative demographic developments, and thus relates to papers that document this asymmetry
and provide potential explanations. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) provide a detailed anal-
ysis of US external debt and equity positions, whereas Gourinchas and Rey (2007) explore
the US “exorbitant privilege" – the fact that despite being a net debtor vis-à-vis the rest of the
world, the US earns a positive net investment income. They explain this by the role of the US
as the center country of the international monetary system. By issuing safe, liquid assets, the
US provides insurance to the rest of the world, and in return enjoys an insurance premium
from risk and maturity transformation. This role has been further investigated by Gourinchas,
Rey, and Govillot (2010) and Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008), among others. A sec-
ond strand of the literature has focused on cross-country differences in the development of the
financial sector Bernanke, 2005; Mendoza et al., 2009; Von Hagen and Zhang, 2014; Ju and
Wei, 2014; see also Chapter 1). Due to a limited capacity to generate safe, liquid financial
assets, demand from financially less developed countries for this type of assets needs to be
satisfied abroad. Conversely, foreign investors may bypass domestic institutions and exploit
profitable risky investment opportunities. Both liquidity provision and lacking institutional
capacity may be less relevant for bilateral US-EU asset positions. Our paper therefore con-
tributes to understanding imbalances between two developed regions.
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2. Stylized Facts
Our research is motivated by two observations: pronounced bilateral external asset positions
between the US and the EU, and differences in the age structure between the two regions. In
the following, we present empirical evidence for both. Then, we show estimates of household
life-cycle asset holdings and portfolio choice based on data from the US Survey of Consumer
Finances. To motivate that demographic trends can potentially have large effects on aggregate
savings, we carry out a statistical exercise: We combine our life-cycle estimates with data and
predictions for relative cohort sizes at various points in time.
2.1 Bilateral Positions, US vis-à-vis EU
External asset positions between the US and the EU have been characterized by an asymmetry
by asset type since the 1990s. Figure 2.1 depicts bilateral positions in safe and risky assets
over GDP for the US vis-à-vis the EU. Safe assets are comprised of short-term and long-
term debt instruments and claims from the banking sector. This corresponds to the net debt
position of the portfolio investment category and the net position from the other investment
category of the International Investment Position. Risky assets correspond to equity. We use
data on the net equity position of the portfolio investment category. In our definition of safe
and risky assets, we follow Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Gourinchas et al. (2010), but
exclude foreign direct investment, as we focus on household portfolio choice. To construct
the time series, we combine data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
(CPIS) on equity and long-term debt with data on net claims from the banking sector for short
term instruments from the US Treasury International Capital (TIC). A detailed description of
the construction of these positions is presented in Appendix A.1, along with a definition of
asset types in Appendix A.2. The different time coverage of safe and risky positions is due to
the use of different data sources.
The net bilateral asset position remains small but exhibits a slight downward trend: Since
the 2000s, the US has been a net debtor vis-à-vis the EU. The net position conceals consider-
able divergence in external positions by asset type. The US has a net external asset position
in risky assets over GDP between 2 and 5 percent between 1994 and 2015. This is offset by
a net external liability position in safe assets between 2 and 7 percent of GDP. Thus, the US
is a net exporter of safe assets and a net importer of risky assets.2
On a global scale, bilateral asset holdings between the US and the EU are important: The
US and the EU are by far the largest international investors, jointly holding between 60 and 70
percent of the world’s external debt assets and more than 70 percent of equity assets between
1990 and 2014 (see Figure 2.15 in the Appendix). Also, the US is the most important investor
2EU debt instruments include government bonds issued by countries that were perceived as having a high
default probability in some of the recent years, and in particular by Greece, which negotiated a debt haircut
in 2011. This could potentially make the safe external position to some extent risky. However, Greek debt
makes for less than 0.3 percent of US bilateral debt assets in CPIS data and the joint share of Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Ireland – the countries that received financial assistance by the European Stability Mechanism –
is 7.7 percent. Excluding this type of debt does not change the overall bilateral pattern. The safe asset position
also includes low quality corporate and asset-backed debt of both regions. In the TIC data, corporate bonds
make for 60% of EU holdings of US long-term securities between 2011 to 2016, of which however only about
6% should be asset-backed debt securities, this last number being based on less detailed data on US holdings
vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
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Figure 2.1: Bilateral debt and equity positions US vs. EU
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Net safe position: net banking claims plus net portfolio debt assets of the US vis-à-vis the EU. Net
risky position: net portfolio equity assets. Net bilateral position: Net safe position + net risky posi-
tion. Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF), US Treasury International Capital.
in the EU and vice versa. In Appendix Table 2.6 we consider the share of total US assets that
originates from the EU, and vice versa. For both debt and equity, the bilateral share lies
between 0.4 and 0.5 in the US as well as in the EU. The shares are larger when including
in the bilateral position assets from offshore financial centers, which act as intermediators
of US-EU investments (Milesi-Ferretti and Lane, 2010). The numbers necessarily exclude
any investment that is unreported, a large portion of which should also be bilateral (Zucman,
2013). This motivates our two-region approach, supported by the fact that the two regions
exhibit a high degree of de-jure financial openness since the 1990’s (Chinn and Ito, 2008).
However, the association between demographics and the risk-content of external positions
can also be found in a larger set of countries (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed analysis).
2.2 Demographic Trends in the US and the EU
The US and the EU exhibit large variations in demographic trends. The left panel of Figure
2.2 shows data and projections for the two regions’ old-age dependency ratios (the number
of people aged 65 or older relative to the number of people 20 to 64 years old) between 1950
and 2095 (United Nations, 2015). While both regions are aging quite dramatically over this
period, the level and trends differ: Dependency ratios were similar until the 1980s, but have
been diverging since, with the EU aging faster. The difference between the dependency ratios
is projected to reach 0.2 by 2050. There are also important differential trends throughout the
transition. In particular, large increases in the dependency ratios in both regions are predicted
from now on until around 2040, due to the retirement and death of the large baby boomer
cohorts on both sides of the Atlantic. This makes demographic change a particularly relevant
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Figure 2.2: Demographic trends US vs. EU, old-age dependency ratio
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Left panel: Old age dependency ratios (population aged 65 and older divided by population aged 20
to 64) of the US and the EU. The graph displays data for 1950 to 2015 and projections for a medium
variant for fertility and normal migration afterwards. Right panel: Life expectancy at age 60 for the
medium variant for fertility and normal migration is shown for the US and the EU. Source: United
Nations Population Division.
phenomenon within the next decades.
The old age dependency ratio reflects the age composition of the population due to both
declining birth rates and increasing longevity. The right panel of Figure 2.2 shows data and
projections for the life expectancy at age 60 in the US and EU. While individuals in the
US were on average living longer until the mid-1990s, this has since reversed and by 2095,
individuals in the EU can expect to live 2 years longer at age 60 than their US counterparts.
2.3 Savings, Portfolio Choice, and Demographics
How might the level and trend of demographic change affect aggregate savings and portfolios
in the two regions? Figure 2.3 shows estimates of total financial assets and the share of risky
assets of the household head by age, conditional on participation in the stock market.3 We use
data from 9 waves of the US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) between 1989 and 2013.
In order to extract age-specific effects from repeated cross-sectional data, we apply a
technique developed by Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Deaton (1997), which is based on the
assumption that only cohort- and age-specific effects exhibit a trend, whereas time-specific
effects are due to business-cycle fluctuations and should therefore net to zero.4 For the risky
3The definitions of safe and risky assets are given in Appendix A.2 and correspond to how assets are classi-
fied in the Survey of Consumer Finances. We focus on the risky share conditional on participation in the stock
market because we do not explicitly model the participation decision of households.
4The underlying problem is that we have to account for time effects (e.g., due to aggregate economic condi-
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Figure 2.3: Total financial assets and risky portfolio share by age, United States
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Left panel: Estimated total financial assets in thousands of 2010 US dollars. Financial assets are defined as the sum of safe
and risky assets, as given in Table 2.3 in the Appendix. Right panel: Estimated conditional risky share. Source: Estimated
from 1989-2013 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances.
share, we apply a two-stage Heckman estimation that takes into account a correlation between
the decision to participate in the stock market and the risky share of assets, which is well
documented in the household finance literature (Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2002; Guiso
and Sodini, 2012). Details on this estimation procedure are provided in Appendix A.3.
Savings are hump-shaped over the life-cycle, increasing smoothly until retirement age,
and gradually declining thereafter. The conditional portfolio share of risky assets peaks in
the 30s and declines over the rest of the life-cycle. A risky share that is decreasing with
age is in line with recent evidence presented in Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso (2017) and
further discussed in Guiso and Sodini (2012).5 It is also consistent with findings that the
willingness to take risk declines linearly from early adulthood until retirement age (Dohmen,
Falk, Golsteyn, Huffman, and Sunde, 2017).
Ideally, we would apply an identical estimation approach to analyze household behavior
in the EU, however, survey data is not available over a long enough period. Recently, the
Eurosystem has conducted the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) that
covers 12 out of the 15 countries that comprise our EU region. We compare the data from
SCF and HFCS in Figure 2.19 in the Appendix for pooled waves of each survey. The asset
holdings, while slightly lower for the EU, exhibit a similar age-dependent structure and the
unconditional risky share across age groups is very similar, which is in line with observations
tions) and cohort effects (e.g., due to economic conditions encountered at the beginning of working life, shown
to affect economic decisions by Cogley and Sargent (2008) and Malmendier and Nagel (2011)). Because of a
linear relationship between calendar year, birth year and age, it is impossible to estimate each of these three
effects simultaneously from repeated cross-sections of survey data.
5Earlier literature, for example Heaton and Lucas (2000), Poterba and Samwick (2001) and Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004), has reported a more pronounced hump-shape of the conditional risky share over the life-cycle.
The differences are due to the recent use of more sophisticated estimation techniques and more comprehensive
data. See Guiso and Sodini (2012) for details.
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Figure 2.4: Hypothetical asset holdings and risky share
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Upper panel: per capita financial asset holdings in thousands of 2010 US Dollars. Lower panel: per
capita risky portfolio share. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from SCF and UN Population
Prospects.
of cross-country differences in asset holdings and portfolios (Guiso et al., 2002; Guiso and
Sodini, 2012).
The life-cycle pattern of financial assets and portfolio allocation is important in the con-
text of the demographic trends described above. We want to explore the implications of a
changing population age structure on aggregate asset holdings and the risky portfolio share.
To this end, we carry out the following statistical exercise: We keep the level of financial
assets and the risky share by age group constant at (moving averages of) the levels shown in
Figure 2.3. Then we multiply by the actual or projected number of people at each age group
and divide by the total population of 26- to 79-year olds in each year. This assumes that life-
cycle financial decisions will stay unchanged over the next decades, but demographics will
change, in line with the UN predictions. The resulting hypothetical average per capita finan-
cial assets and the risky share by year are shown in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.16 in the Appendix
shows hypothetical financial asset holdings by age group for both regions.
The aggregate implications of a changing age structure of the population are large. If life-
cycle savings behavior and portfolio choice did not change (and supply reacted to satisfy any
demand changes at current interest rates), per capita asset holdings in the EU between 1950
and 2095 would increase by 25 percent, and between 1990 and 2095 by 26 percent. In the
US, the increase would be 21 percent between 1950 and 2095, and 19 percent between 1990
and 2095. Particularly strong increases can be observed between the years 2000 and 2040, the
time period during which the baby boomers retire and finally die. In levels, agents in the EU
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would always choose to hold a larger level of assets on average than agents in the US, due to
the fact that the EU is older during the time period shown. There would also be considerable
changes in the portfolio share held in risky assets: Both regions would experience a (small)
decline in the per capita risky share, but the downwards trend is stronger in the EU, as the EU
population ages faster. These calculations suggest that the relative age distribution of the two
regions can be a powerful determinant of relative asset demands for safe and risky assets. In
addition to changes in the per capita asset demand, the total population size is predicted to
increase, which will contribute to further inflating the demand for assets in both regions.
The simple statistical exercise highlights just one channel through which demographics
take effect, which we will later discuss as the distribution effect. There are two aspects that
this exercise is missing: First, we would not realistically expect that individuals keep their
life-cycle pattern of savings and portfolio choice unchanged when their life expectancy in-
creases. Second, if asset supply is not fully elastic, there would need to be a reaction in
market-clearing rates of return in response to movements in aggregate demand. These would
in turn lead to a re-evaluation of the households’ portfolios and affect their optimal decisions.
A piece of evidence pointing at the importance of valuation changes is the decline in real
bond returns observed since the 1980s both in the US and in the largest EU economies (see
Figure 2.18 in the Appendix), which some of the literature has attributed to demographics.
Thus, while a statistical exercise can partly identify the effect of demographics on aggregate
asset demand and portfolio choice, the model and simulation introduced in the following
sections will allow us to obtain a more complete picture.
3. Model
We augment the workhorse overlapping generations model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)
along several dimensions. First, we allow for cohort specific survival probabilities and birth
rates, which enable us to model the impact of a full demographic transition. Second, we
consider a two-region world, where regions differ only by their demographics. The two
regions are closed until period T and completely open afterwards.6 Third, we incorporate
endogenous portfolio choice of individuals by introducing a safe asset, or bond, and a risky
asset, or stock, for which returns are endogenous and perfectly correlated across regions.
Finally, individuals take decisions in a stochastic environment with uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk in the form of shocks to labor and pension income, and aggregate risk related to stock
returns. Idiosyncratic risk generates a precautionary motive for asset accumulation, whereas
aggregate risk, and how it relates to agents’ future marginal utility of consumption, will
determine the portfolio allocation, as well as the equilibrium risk premium that results from
our general equilibrium model.
In general, we distinguish between individual choice variables and aggregate variables
by referring to aggregate variables in capital letters. To keep the exposition clean, we drop
country superscripts until we discuss the open economy and market clearing conditions in
Section 3.5.
6In reality, the opening of the EU and US financial markets that took place around the 1990s happened more
gradually. We will consider this in an extension in Section 5.
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3.1 Demographics
We model demographics as a combination of birth rates (fertility) and survival probabilities
(longevity). Agents take into account a cohort-specific series of survival probabilities when
making decisions. At the same time, birth rates and survival probabilities jointly impact the
aggregate size of the population, and the distribution of the population across cohorts.
In each period, a continuum of individuals, indexed by i, is born at working age Nb,
forming a cohort. Each successive cohort grows at a time-varying rate, γt. The size of the
youngest cohort LNb,t evolves according to
LNb,t+1 = (1 + γt+1)LNb,t. (3.1)
Individuals live to a maximum age of Nd. Prior to age Nd, survival to age n is stochastic
with probability δn−1,t conditional on being alive at age n − 1 in period t. The size of a cohort
of age n in period t is
Ln,t =
 n−1∏
l=0
δNb+l,t−n+l
 LNb,t−n. (3.2)
Total population size is the sum over all cohorts alive at time t: Lt =
∑Nd
n=Nb Ln,t.
Agents retire at a fixed age Nr. This implies that the share of the life-cycle that is spent
in retirement will vary with changes in δn,t. While this is potentially a strong assumption,
it allows us to study the effect of demographics on asset demand independently of potential
reforms of the retirement system. A constant retirement age is furthermore in line with data on
the average effective retirement age in OECD countries since the 1970s, and with projections
until 2060 (OECD, 2015).
3.2 Market Structure
There are two financial assets in the economy. Safe assets bt, or bonds, pay a certain dividend
of dt in each period and trade at price Qt, whereas risky assets st, or stocks, pay a stochastic
dividend, d˜t and trade at price Q˜t. Gross returns of each asset are
Rt+1 =
Qt+1 + dt+1
Qt
R˜t+1 =
Q˜t+1 + d˜t+1
Q˜t
. (3.3)
Returns consist of a capital gain due to changes in asset prices, Qt+1Qt , and a dividend yield
dt+1
Qt
. The risky dividend is defined as d˜t = dt + rpt + t, where rpt is a risk premium and t an
i.i.d. shock with distribution ln t ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
Asset supply is generated by Lucas (1978) trees. We assume that when an individual is
born, two Lucas trees become available to provide financial assets to the economy: a risky
tree and a safe tree. The trees live as long as the individual. Each period, the safe tree pays
a safe dividend and the risky tree pays a risky dividend; claims to the dividend streams paid
by the trees can be traded separately in the economy. When individuals die so do their Lucas
trees, but claims traded in the previous period are still paid out. Thus, all trees of the same
type are identical to potential savers, and claims will be traded at the same price, regardless
of the tree owner’s age. In this formulation we keep the supply side of assets simple but
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responsive to demographic change.
Shocks to the risky rate of return are assumed to be perfectly correlated across regions.
In addition, we abstract from modeling (real) exchange rates and impose that the law of one
price always holds. In the model under full financial integration, domestic and foreign assets
are therefore perfect substitutes. Moreover, the international positions resulting from asset
trades are net positions, whereas the gross positions are indeterminate. While this simplifies
the portfolio choice problem7, it gets down to the core of how we think about the effect of
demographic change on asset positions: Demographics-induced external positions represent
excess saving into a certain type of asset at world prices, motivated by regional differences in
portfolio preferences. They should therefore be largely unrelated to hedging behavior, which
clearly motivates international asset purchases in reality, but should affect gross positions
rather than net positions. One limitation is that we cannot motivate home bias in equity and
bond holdings, which the literature on the international diversification puzzle tries to explain
(see Lewis, 1999; Gourinchas and Rey, 2013, for surveys). We will refer to this point in
Section 5.1 when discussing the simulation results.
The market for goods consists of one single consumption good ci,n,t, which is identical
across regions. Its price is normalized to 1. With our assumption on real exchange rates, this
implies that we can abstract from explicitly modeling international trade in goods. Thus, we
isolate the impact of demographic change on international asset trade.
3.3 Labor and Pension Income
Labor income for individual i of age n at time t is defined as
yi,n,t = Pi,n,tθi,n,tζi,n,t, (3.4)
where θi,n,t is an idiosyncratic, transitory income shock that is distributed lognormally, ln θi,n,t ∼
N(0, σ2θ) and ζi,n,t is an i.i.d. zero income shock that occurs with probability p. We take a
broad interpretation of this shock as an unemployment spell or an employment break due to
medical reasons. Pi,n,t is a permanent income component, which evolves according to
Pi,n,t = GnPi,n,t−1ηi,n,t, (3.5)
where Gn is an age-specific component of income. It generates a hump shape in the labor
income over the life-cycle, reflecting a premium on work experience or age-dependent pro-
ductivity level. The permanent income shock, ηi,n,t, is assumed to be log-normally distributed,
ln ηi,n,t ∼ N(0, σ2η), and uncorrelated with the transitory income shock. A similar specifica-
tion of the labor income process is frequently used in the life-cycle literature, going back
to Zeldes (1989) and Carroll (1992), and generates both saving motivated by life-cycle con-
sumption smoothing and a precautionary motive.8 All shocks to labor income are assumed
7On the added complexity when solving for gross positions in a setting where risky returns are independent
across regions, see Tille and Van Wincoop (2010) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011).
8Standard specifications usually do not contain zero income shocks, however Carroll (1992) shows that they
are empirically important. We include them to address an issue well known in the literature on portfolio choice
over the life-cycle: a model with standard values of risk aversion generates a counterfactually high risky share
of assets over the life-cycle, particularly for the very young and the very old (Merton, 1971; Heaton and Lucas,
1997; Constantinides et al., 2002; Guiso et al., 2002; Cocco et al., 2005; Fagereng et al., 2017).
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to be independent of the shocks to stock returns across individuals and over time. While this
assumption keeps the mechanism of our model clear, it is also empirically plausible. The
literature has sometimes found a small positive correlation between labor income and stock
returns (Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2001) and sometimes a small negative
correlation (Heaton and Lucas, 2000). Furthermore, recent work finds that the stock compo-
nent of human capital, or how much it co-moves with aggregate business cycle risk, is much
lower than that which rationalizes observed portfolio allocation over the life-cycle (Huggett
and Kaplan, 2016).
Retirees receive pension income as a fixed share φ ∈ [0, 1] of the deterministic labor
income earned in the period directly preceding retirement, subject to a zero income shock
ζi,n,t with the same statistical properties as during working age:
y¯i,n,t = φPi,Nr ,tζi,n,t ∀n = Nr + 1, ...,Nd. (3.6)
In general, zero income periods should not be encountered by retirees that receive a public
pension, but we consider these shocks rather to reflect periods of high expenditure, e.g. due
to health shocks.9
The replacement rate φ summarizes the provision of public pensions (for example, social
security payments in the US). We choose a simple constant replacement rate pension scheme
rather than explicitly modeling the pension system to highlight the direct effect of demo-
graphic change on individual behavior through the effect that it has on the effective subjective
discount rate.10 A constant replacement rate can be rationalized by interpreting pensions as
home production or by assuming that gross aggregate labor income grows over time so that
a government, by increasing taxes such that net income is kept fixed, could finance pension
payments to an increasing number of pensioners.
3.4 Individual’s Optimization Problem
Individuals choose consumption and portfolio allocation by maximizing expected lifetime
utility:

Nd∑
n=Nb
 n−1∏
l=Nb
δl,t+l−Nb
 βn−Nbu(ci,n,t+n−Nb), (3.7)
where ci,n,t is consumption of individual i who is n years old at time t. βδn,t is the subjec-
tive discount factor that takes the region-specific stochastic survival probability into account.
Period utility is of the CRRA type, u(c) = c
1−ϑ−1
1−ϑ .
Each working individual faces the flow budget constraint,
ci,n,t + Qtbi,n+1,t+1 + Q˜tsi,n+1,t+1 =
xi,n,t︷                                       ︸︸                                       ︷
(Qt + dt)bi,n,t + (Q˜t + d˜t)si,n,t + yi,n,t ∀ n < Nr. (3.8)
9On the role of medical expenses of the elderly, see De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), De Nardi, French,
Jones, and McCauley (2016), and Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro, and Tonetti (2015).
10There are several different pension systems around the world, among them fully funded and pay-as-you-go
(PAYGo) systems. Imposing a PAYGo system would require us to specify how the system remains solvent in
the presence of demographic change: Through an increase in the contribution rate, a decrease in the replacement
rate, or through an increase in the retirement age. All three of these influence the amount of life-cycle saving
and would add additional dimensions through which demographics influence aggregate asset demand.
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In the budget constraint for retired individuals, public pension income replaces labor income,
ci,n,t + Qtbi,n+1,t+1 + Q˜tsi,n+1,t+1 =
xi,n,t︷                                       ︸︸                                       ︷
(Qt + dt)bi,n,t + (Q˜t + d˜t)si,n,t + y˜i,n,t ∀ n ≥ Nr. (3.9)
xi,n,t is the state variable in our model and characterizes an agent’s total available resources
(cash on hand) in each period. bi,n+1,t+1 and si,n+1,t+1 are bond and stock holdings carried over
into period t + 1 by a household of age n in period t.
Due to the zero income shock, a natural borrowing constraint arises, because agents want
to ensure positive consumption at all times and states of the world:
Qtbi,n,t+1 + Q˜tsi,n,t+1 ≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t (3.10)
Additionally, we impose the stronger constraint that agents are not allowed to short stocks
or bonds,
bi,n,t+1 ≥ 0 si,n,t+1 ≥ 0 ∀ i, n, t (3.11)
This has been suggested by Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) as a way to gener-
ate equity risk premia closer to the data.
The timing of the model is as follows: At the beginning of each period, agents receive
the returns on their assets bought in the previous period. Afterwards, dying agents exit the
economy and a new cohort enters.11 Newborn agents do not own any financial wealth. The
number of trees adjusts according to the population. Next, all living agents receive labor
or pension income. Given their total resources, agents decide on consumption and savings
and on their portfolio such that they maximize Eq. (3.7) with respect to Eqs. (3.8), (3.9) and
(3.11), which will generate their financial wealth in the following period. They make this
decision forming expectations over future return realizations and income shocks and take
into account their age- and time-specific survival probability.
Savings and Portfolio Decisions
For simplicity, we drop individual and cohort subscripts and define end of period assets as
at+1 ≡ Qtbt+1 + Q˜tst+1 and the risky asset share as ωt+1 = Q˜t st+1at+1 . The first order condition with
respect to consumption yields the following Euler equation
c−ϑt = βδt+1
[(
ωt+1R˜t+1 + (1 − ωt+1)Rt+1
)
c−ϑt+1
]
(3.12)
Individuals will consume optimally such that marginal utility gain of an increase in current
consumption is offset by the expected loss in future consumption times the portfolio return.
The portfolio share optimality condition is
βδt+1
[
c−ϑt+1at+1
(
R˜t+1 − Rt+1
)]
= µb − µs (3.13)
where µb and µs are the Lagrangian multipliers on the no-leverage constraints spelled out in
Eq. (3.11), which satisfy (1 − ωt+1)µb = 0 and ωt+1µs = 0.
11For simplicity, we abstract from accidental bequests and assume that the financial wealth of dying agents
simply expires. Alternatively, it could be relocated to the individuals alive.
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For an interior solution, the individual optimally allocates the share ωt+1 to risky assets
such that the expected value of future marginal utility of consumption times the expected ex-
cess return equals zero. At an optimum, the individual should not be better off by rebalancing
her portfolio towards either asset.
There is no closed form solution to the optimization problem. With individuals taking
interest rates as given, we solve for age-dependent policy functions for the endogenous state
variable cash on hand xt, and the future returns Rt+1 and R˜t+1:
cˆt,n,i = c(xt,n,i,Rt+1, R˜t+1)
ωˆt+1,n+1,i = ω(xt,n,i,Rt+1, R˜t+1).
3.5 Aggregates and the Open Economy
So far, we have presented the individual’s problem and market structure separately for the
two regions we study. We now consider aggregation and market-clearing conditions for the
time for which the economies are closed and after full financial integration.
Aggregate demand for goods, bonds and stocks in each region j = e, u at time t is the sum
over cohorts weighted by the cohort size:
C jt =
Nd∑
n=Nb
L jn,tc
j
n,t B
j
t+1 =
Nd∑
n=Nb
L jn,tb
j
n,t+1 S
j
t+1 =
Nd∑
n=Nb
L jn,ts
j
n,t+1, (3.14)
where in each region, individual consumption c ji,n,t, stock holdings, s
j
i,n,t+1 and bond holdings
b ji,n,t+1 are averaged within cohorts, c
j
n,t =
1
L jn,t
∫ L jn,t
0
c ji,n,tdi; s
j
n,t+1 =
1
L jn,t
∫ L jn,t
0
s ji,n,t+1di; and b
j
n,t+1 =
1
L jn,t
∫ L jn,t
0
b ji,n,t+1di.
Total financial assets demanded at time t to be carried over into the next period are
Q jt B
j
t+1 + Q˜
j
t S
j
t+1 = A
j
t+1 and the aggregate share of risky assets Ω
j
t+1 =
Q˜ jt S
j
t+1
A jt+1
.
Given the assumption of an endowment economy where the number of safe and risky
Lucas trees is identical to the population size, the aggregate supply of stocks  jt+1 and bonds

j
t+1 is proportional to the sum of all living cohorts:

j
t+1 =
Nd∑
n=Nb
λL jn,t 
j
t+1 =
Nd∑
n=Nb
λ˜L jn,t, (3.15)
where λ, λ˜ are scaling parameters for safe and risky assets, respectively. They are identical
for both regions and can be interpreted as per capita asset supply of safe and risky assets. This
assumption for asset supply is consistent with recent evidence that, while the total supply of
financial assets in the economy is growing over time, the share that can be considered safe is
roughly constant (Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick, 2012).
The two regions we consider remain closed until period T . The countries are in autarky
and agents can buy only domestic stocks and bonds and consume domestic goods. From T +1
onwards, financial asset and goods markets of e and u are perfectly integrated, so that agents
of both regions are free to buy assets and consumption goods anywhere in the world.
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Autarky
Until period T , local demand for assets is cleared by local supply at equilibrium asset prices
in each region,
S jt+1 = 
j
t+1 B
j
t+1 = 
j
t+1, (3.16)
where stock and bond demands in each region are given in Eqs. (3.14) and (3.15).
Aggregating over cohorts, respectively, using Eq. (3.14) yields the aggregate resource
constraint under autarky:
Ct + Qt(Bt+1 − Bt) + Q˜t(S t+1 − S t) =
Aggregate Endowment︷             ︸︸             ︷
Yt + dtBt + d˜tS t . (3.17)
where Yt is the aggregate labor and pension income in the economy.
If the market clearing conditions under autarky, Eqs. (3.16) hold, the market for goods
clears by Walras’s Law and Eq. (3.17) becomes,
Ct =
Aggregate Endowment︷                      ︸︸                      ︷
Yt + λdtLt−1 + λ˜d˜tLt−1 −Qtλ(Lt − Lt−1) − Q˜tλ˜(Lt − Lt−1). (3.18)
Asset prices under autarky, Qt and Q˜t, will be such that aggregate consumption will be equal
to the aggregate endowment minus the additional savings that offset the change in the supply
of assets due to population change.
Two-Region World
In a world consisting of two perfectly integrated regions j = e, u, the asset prices will ad-
just such that the markets for assets and goods clear globally. The relevant market-clearing
conditions for stocks and bonds are:
S t+1 ≡ S et+1 + S ut+1 = t+1 ≡ et+1 + ut+1
Bt+1 ≡ Bet+1 + But+1 = t+1 ≡ et+1 +ut+1.
(3.19)
Due to our assumption of perfectly correlated returns across regions, agents of both re-
gions are indifferent between holding domestic and foreign assets. Total asset demand in
region u will consist of local assets and cross-border asset holdings from region e. A region’s
net foreign asset position in each instrument (NFBt and NFSt) is the difference between local
asset demand and local asset supply,
NFBut = Qt

bond demand by u︷       ︸︸       ︷
Buut+1 + B
ue
t+1 −
bond supply by u︷       ︸︸       ︷
Buut+1 − Beut+1
 = Qt (Buet+1 − Beut+1)
NFSut = Q˜t

bond demand by u︷       ︸︸       ︷
S uut+1 + S
ue
t+1 −
bond supply by u︷       ︸︸       ︷
S uut+1 − S eut+1
 = Q˜t (S uet+1 − S eut+1)
(3.20)
where, for example, Buet+1 are claims by agents in region u on region e’s safe trees. Region
e’s net foreign asset positions are computed analogously, such that NFBut = −NFBet and
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NFSut = −NFSet .
3.6 Equilibrium
For each period t, an equilibrium consists of a set of asset returns, Rt and R˜t; age-dependent
policy functions for consumption in each region cˆ jn,t, portfolio allocation, ωˆ
j
n,t and cash on
hand xˆ jn,t; aggregate demand for stocks S
j
t and bonds B
j
t , aggregate consumption C
j
t and for
post financial opening, net external positions for each region, NFB jt and NFS
j
t such that:
1. The asset returns are consistent with Eq. (3.3).
2. For given interest rates, the household’s problem solves with policy functions, cˆ jn,t and
ωˆ
j
n,t for all ages n and in both regions j.
3. All markets clear: Prior to opening, the aggregate stock and bond positions given in
Eq. (3.14) satisfy Eq. (3.16) and the aggregate budget constraint Eq. (3.17); after open-
ing, the aggregate world stock and bond positions satisfy Eq. (3.19).
4. The aggregate behavior in the economy is consistent with the necessary conditions for
all ages in both regions as given by Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13).
The solution algorithm that we use to solve the individual’s problem and the general
equilibrium is described in detail in Appendix B.
4. Calibration
In order to test our model’s ability to explain international external positions, we perform
an annual simulation of the demographic transition from 1950 to 2095. Regions are fully
financially integrated starting in 1990. We generate pre- and post-demographic transition
distributions of the population and asset holdings by solving the model for demographic vari-
ables in 1950 and 2095, respectively. Starting in 1950 the demographic transition begins and
agents born in 1950 take into account the full demographic transition directly through survival
probabilities and indirectly through the aggregate population structure affecting returns.
The solution and simulation of our large-scale model is not trivial. For each region, we
simulate 146 transition years, plus 80 cohorts each for the pre- and post-transition steady
states. In each simulation year, we must compute the cohort-specific consumption and port-
folio allocation for given values of the endogenous state and expectations of future returns.
Since returns in the subsequent period are a function of the entire distribution of asset hold-
ings, this requires the current and expected future aggregate distribution of assets to enter as
a state variable. We currently proceed by making two simplifying assumptions. While fa-
cilitating the simulation, they still allow us to highlight the demographic mechanisms in our
results.
First, agents are myopic with respect to future returns. In their optimization, they set their
expectations of next period returns equal to current equilibrium returns,
[Rt+1] = Rt [R˜t+1] = R˜t.
53
A similar simplifying assumption is made by Backus et al. (2014), who assume complete
myopia of agents in terms of demographic variables and factor prices determined from ag-
gregate distributions. This assumption simplifies the solution significantly because we avoid
calculating current consumption and portfolio allocation for a large number of paths for in-
terest rates. However, it comes at the cost of not being able to fully quantify the effect of
demographic change on individual behavior that works through changing expectations of re-
turns. For example, if agents can perfectly anticipate the future path of returns, they might
rebalance away from the asset with lower equilibrium returns and, on the other hand, may
adjust their level of savings to offset diminished asset returns.
Second, we run a deterministic simulation, where we set all realizations of the shocks
to their expected values. Abstracting from idiosyncratic shocks makes agents within each
cohort homogeneous. The simplification is not very restrictive in this case, given that we
assume a continuum of individuals within each cohort, so that the law of large numbers im-
plies average shock realizations to equal expected values. For the aggregate return rate shock,
a deterministic simulation has potentially strong implications. As the composition of port-
folios is age-dependent, large shocks to the risky asset returns could shift the distribution
of asset holdings across age groups, which, in turn, determines equilibrium returns. How-
ever, stochastic simulations will introduce sampling noise that makes the policy functions
dependent on a specific realization of the aggregate shock and such realizations would be
concentrated around the mean, so that accuracy for a large realization of the aggregate shock
would be low (Algan, Allais, and Haan, 2008). Our approach generates a mean path for ag-
gregate asset demands as they respond to demographic change, which is the central focus of
this paper.
The full calibration of our model is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parameters in simulation
Age at birth Nb 20 (Cocco et al., 2005)
Maximum age Nd 100 (Cocco et al., 2005)
Retirement age Nr 65 Legal retirement age, United States
Subjective discount factor β 0.96 (Cocco et al., 2005)
CRRA parameter ϑ 8 (Mehra and Prescott, 1985)
Variance of shock to risk premium σ2 0.025 (Fama and French, 2002)
Variance of transitory income shock σ2θ 0.07 (Cocco et al., 2005)
Variance of permanent income shock σ2η 0.01 (Cocco et al., 2005)
Probability of zero income p 0.005 (Carroll, 1992)
Age-dependent income growth Gn, Pn (Cocco et al., 2005)
Pension income replacement rate φ 0.68 (Cocco et al., 2005)
Survival probabilities δn,t UN Population Prospects, medium
variant, 1950 to 2095
Asset prices Qt, Q˜t 1 normalization
Safe asset supply parameter λ 160.6 Calibrated as in Section 4
Risky asset supply parameter λ˜ 83.2 Calibrated as in Section 4
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Demographics
In accordance with our model assumption that agents are born at working age, we use data
starting from age 20. Over the life-cycle agents survive with age-dependent survival prob-
abilities, for which we use data and projections from the United Nations World Population
Prospects (United Nations, 2015). Section A.1 provides further information on the construc-
tion of the data series. While we use the age- and time-specific survival probabilities in the
individual optimization problem, we simulate the aggregate population using data on actual
cohort sizes instead of using a combination of birth rates and survival probabilities. This has
the advantage that we can take into account migration, and that defining 1950 artificially as
a steady state does not skew the population distribution in subsequent simulation years (see
Section A.7 for a discussion).
We impose a fixed retirement age of 65, which roughly matches the average effective
retirement age in the US and the EU since the 1970s (OECD, 2015). There have been only
slight changes over the last decades: While the average effective retirement age was 68 in
1970 in both the US and the EU, it decreased to 64 in the US and 61 in the EU during
the 1990s and has been slightly rising to 65 (US) and 63 (EU) since. The OECD in its
projections until 2060 does not expect major increases in the retirement age, which is why
the assumption of a (roughly) constant retirement age over the whole simulation period does
not seem unreasonable.
Labor and Pension Income
For the deterministic component of labor income Gn in Eq. (3.5), we use estimates by Cocco,
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) based on the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We use their results for the group with a medium level of education, high school graduates
without college degree,
ln(Gn) = 0.6004 + 0.1682 × age − 0.0323 × age
2
10
+ 0.0020 × age
3
100
.
The variance of the transitory and permanent income shocks θ and η are also taken from
Cocco et al. (2005). The probability of a zero income shock, p, is set to 0.5 percent as
estimated by Carroll (1992).
For the replacement rate, we also use the value estimated by Cocco et al. (2005), φ = 0.68.
This equals the public pension income that individuals receive on average. Additionally,
private pension schemes play a role, particularly in the US, but these are incorporated in the
savings and portfolio choice problem of the agents.
Asset Prices
We normalize asset prices to 1 so that Qt = Q˜t ∀ t. Given the definitions for asset returns
in Eq. (3.3), this assumption implies that safe asset returns are Rt = 1 + dt and risky returns
are R˜t = 1 + dt + rpt + t. We solve for the time-varying dt and rpt that clear asset markets.
Assuming constant asset prices abstracts from capital gains in asset returns. Thus, changes
in the valuation of assets work entirely through changes in the dividends dt and in the risk
premium rpt. In consequence, we are not able to separate the effect of demographic change
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on capital gains and dividend yields, but since we are interested in the impact of demographic
change on real asset returns, this is not of first order importance.
Parameters on Asset Supply
Until the 1990s, cross-border financial flows between the US and the EU are rather small
(especially by today’s standards). Therefore, we use realized US returns during the 1980s to
calibrate λ and λ˜ in a partial equilibrium set-up for the US as a closed economy. We take real
returns to a US ten-year government bond and historical risk premia estimated for the S&P
500 from Damodaran (2016) as market-clearing returns in our model economy. We then
solve for asset demands in the economy at these rates, which are the aggregate of optimal
individual household decisions. In the closed economy, these aggregate demands have to
equal aggregate supply, so we obtain each period’s λ and λ˜ by dividing by total US model
population. We use a simple average of these values to represent the time-invariant per capita
asset supply from 1990 onward,
λ =
1
10
1989∑
t=1980
Bt
Lt
λ˜ =
1
10
1989∑
t=1980
S t
Lt
where Bt and S t are asset demands in the US at observed interest rates and Lt is the US
population. Our model results and calibrated supply parameters are very similar when using
alternative specifications, namely different scaling parameters for the US and the EU, or the
last scaling parameters that clear the markets in 1989.
5. Results
The following section contains the simulation results. We first present the results for equi-
librium rates of return and external positions. After the baseline simulation, we introduce a
version where we account for more gradual financial integration and home bias in equity and
debt. Then, we discuss the various channels through which demographic change affects the
demand for safe and risky assets. We provide intuition for the effect on life-cycle financial
decisions of individuals, before more systematically decomposing the aggregate results.
5.1 Effect of Demographics on Aggregate Outcomes
Rates of Return
The simulated equilibrium return to safe assets and the risk premium are shown in Figure 2.5.
We compare them to the same data series that were used to calibrate the supply side: real US
10-year government bond returns and risk premia estimated by Damodaran (2016).12 Due to
our calibration for asset supply, the level of the returns in the data and in the model are similar
in 1990 before demographic change becomes more pronounced. For the risk premium, due
to an increase during the 1980s, the average used for the calibration is slightly lower than
the 1990 data value. In the years following, we predict a downward trend in safe and risky
12As can be seen from Figure 2.18, real bond returns for the largest European economies are very similar to
the US rates, so that we can take US rates to represent the integrated world returns.
56
Figure 2.5: Rates of return
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The upper panel shows model predictions for safe asset returns in the solid line and data for real
returns to 10-year US treasury bills in the dashed line. The lower panel shows the model predictions
for risk premia and data for historical risk premia. Data are from Damodaran (2016).
returns, which is consistent with the data. From 1990 to 2015, world demographics induce a
decline in safe asset returns of about 200 basis points, which is almost exactly the decline in
real US returns observed over the same period in the data. This number is slightly larger than
what has been found by Carvalho et al. (2016) and Gagnon et al. (2016). Concerning the risk
premium, we predict a continued downward trend during 1990 to 2015, which comes close
to the data until around the year 2007. Afterwards, the risk premium increases in the data,
which can likely be explained with the start of the global financial crisis. As this should be
a transitory phenomenon, and one that is not accounted for in our model, we would expect
the risk premium to eventually decrease again. In general, the model rationalizes the rather
limited movements in the risk premium over the last years.
Demographic change implies a continued downward trend in safe asset returns until the
end of the century. This reflects an ever increasing asset demand in combination with fixed per
capita asset supply. The movement is however not monotonic. Between 2020 and 2040, the
model predicts safe returns to increase, which is due to the baby boomer cohorts: As retirees,
the baby boomers will run down their assets, leading to a temporary decline in aggregate asset
demand. Once they have exited the model, the effect is gone.
The dynamics of the risk premium mirror those of the risk-free rate, so that the risky return
always reacts more strongly to demographic change than the safe return. This is a general
result from our type of model. As shown analytically by Kuhle (2017), in a portfolio choice
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Figure 2.6: External positions
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model data
The upper panel shows the model predictions for US external safe asset position vis-à-vis the EU as
percent of aggregate endowment in the solid line from 1990 to 2095. Data on safe bilateral positions
as percent of GDP are constructed as in Figure 2.1 is shown in the dashed line. The lower panel
shows model predictions for bilateral risky assets positions as percent of aggregate endowment and
data on risky bilateral positions as percent of GDP.
problem with concave utility, agents are more sensitive to changes in the safe rate than in the
risky rate when choosing their portfolio, provided that the risk premium is positive. Thus, an
increase in both rates of return which leaves the equity premium unchanged will result in a
lower portfolio share of the risky asset. In our model environment where the aggregate world
risky share is required to stay constant due to the supply side specification, this implies that a
demographics-induced decline in rates of return leads to a more pronounced decrease in risky
rates in order for markets to clear, and the risk premium hence declines. This negative relation
also results from the models by Brooks (2002) and Geanakoplos et al. (2004). Additionally,
from the middle of the century onwards, the US will overtake the EU in terms of population
size. Given that the US ages more slowly, this increases the relative size of younger cohorts,
who prefer to hold a larger share of risky assets in their portfolio.
External Positions
Our model predicts sizable net asset trades between the two regions after financial opening
in 1990. Figure 2.6 depicts the predicted net external positions in safe and risky assets as
a ratio to the aggregate endowment in each simulation year. The results are compared to
smoothed data on bilateral safe and risky assets shown in Section 2, Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.7: Relative old-age dependency ratios and net external positions, 1990-2095
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The figure shows the old-age dependency ratio of the US relative to the old-age dependency ratio of
the EU in the dashed line and the model predictions for the US net bilateral asset position as percent
of aggregate endowment in the solid line. There is a negative relationship between the relative DR
and NFA position, with a correlation coefficient of -0.77.
The simple model cannot perfectly replicate all the nuances of the net US external asset
position in the data. However, it does replicate the most relevant features. Consider first
the direction of external positions. The model correctly predicts a bilateral liability position
in safe assets and an asset position in risky assets for the US. Thus, the fact that the US
population is younger than the EU population can explain the risk asymmetry in the bilateral
positions. For the period 1994 to 2015, the model predicts an average of US risky assets of
1.7 percent of aggregate endowment, whereas in the data, the value is 2.8 percent of GDP. For
safe assets, the model predicts a US liability position of 5.4 percent of aggregate endowment,
compared to 3.5 percent in the data. Thus, on average, the model predictions come close to
the data. The model fit is better from approximately the year 2000 onwards. For the period
1990 to 2000, the simulated positions in both types of assets are more extreme than those in
the data, and in particular the large negative debt liabilities do not match the data. This may
be linked to the fact that we assume full and immediate integration in 1990. While we explore
the effect of a more gradual integration process further below, we also want to point out that
until 1994, the safe position shown excludes long-term debt instruments, and in reality could
thus be more negative. Overall, demographics can explain the observed external positions
reasonably well.
For the period 2016 to 2095, the model predicts that the risk asymmetry in the bilateral
asset positions will continue: During most of the projection years, the US is an importer of
risky assets and an exporter of safe assets. The pronounced oscillations in the magnitude of
positions are closely linked to relative demographics, as shown in Figure 2.7: Whenever the
aging trend in the US slows relative to the EU, reflected by a lower relative dependency ratio,
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the US accumulates relatively more assets. This is because a lower old-age dependency ratio
corresponds to a higher share of savers in the population. When a region gets younger, the
domestic demand for assets rises faster than supply. Therefore, at rates that clear international
markets, the country wants to save more externally. The difference in demographics is most
extreme in 2040 to 2050, because the baby boom took place somewhat earlier in the US
than in the EU: By 2040, many US baby boomers will have died and the US population be
on average rejuvenated, whereas some EU baby boomers will still be alive. Dependency
ratios become more similar towards the end of the century in the transition into the new
steady state, at which point the US net bilateral position is only slightly negative. Still, the
model predicts that the asymmetry in external positions between the US and the EU is not a
transitory phenomenon, but will continue to be sizable over the next decades.
External Positions Under Gradual Integration
Although formal barriers to asset trades had to a large extent been removed by 1990, the
assumption that capital can flow freely across borders since 1990 is a strong one: On the
one hand, some formal restrictions on capital accounts in the EU remained in force until the
2000s. Indicative of this is the Chinn and Ito (2008) Index of de jure capital account openness,
which for the EU has only converged to the full integration value of 1 by 2002 (Appendix
Figure 2.17). On the other hand, informal barriers further limited asset trades. In particular
information frictions, which are sometimes brought up as an explanation for observed home
bias, may still have been pronounced in 1990, but decreased during the following years.
Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) estimate that between 1993 and 2003, the equity home
bias in the EU decreased from 0.81 to 0.62 and the debt home bias decreased from 0.59 to
0.43.13 In the US, the equity home bias decreased from 0.84 to 0.74 and the debt home bias
from 0.78 to 0.73. In our model, agents always perceive home and foreign assets of the same
type as identical, and therefore in the baseline simulation we are not able to capture the effect
of these frictions.
In this section, we assume that financial opening took place gradually, from no integration
in 1990 to full integration by 2000. We model this through restrictions on the degree of
equalization in the rates of return. However, the assumptions are ad-hoc and therefore, the
purpose of this simulation is not to obtain a fully realistic prediction. Rather, it is meant to
serve as a benchmark against which we can assess how barriers to asset trades may affect the
model outcome.
We assume that until 1990, autarky returns prevail, such that markets clear separately in
the US and the EU. Over the next 10 years, rates gradually converge to the open economy
market clearing rates so that by 2000, full integration is attained. Let ρt be a parameter
linearly increasing from 0 in 1990 to 1 in 2000:
ρt =
simulation year − 1990
10
for simulation year ∈ [1990, 2000]
Safe rates are defined as (1 − ρt)Rautt + ρtRintt and risky rates are (1 − ρt)R˜autt + ρtR˜intt where
the superscript aut denotes autarky rates and int full integration rates. We reproduce the
aggregate results for these new rates.
13The numbers exclude Luxembourg (debt and euqity) and Ireland (equity).
60
Figure 2.8: External positions under gradual integration
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−10
−5
0
5
Pe
rc
en
t o
f E
nd
ow
m
en
t
Safe Assets
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−2
0
2
4
Risky Assets
Year
Pe
rc
en
t o
f E
nd
ow
m
en
t
 
 
model data
The upper panel shows the model predictions for the US external safe asset position vis-à-vis the
EU as percent of aggregate endowment under gradual integration (solid line). The dashed line is the
same data series as in Figure 2.6. The lower panel shows model predictions for the US external risky
asset positions vis-à-vis the EU under gradual integration as percent of aggregate endowment (solid
line) and the corresponding data series (dashed line).
Figure 2.8 shows the results. Gradual integration brings the model predictions closer to
the data. In particular, the large negative safe position that our baseline model predicts for
the US is now smaller. So it seems that the large initial positions in our baseline version are
partly driven by our assumption on openness.
5.2 Effect of Demographics on Savings and Portfolio Choice
We have shown that demography has strong effects on external positions and equilibrium rates
of return. Now we want to take a closer look at how demographic change impacts savings
decisions and portfolio choice, both at the individual level and on aggregate. Figure 2.9 shows
model predictions for a cross-section of agents in the US in 2010 at market-clearing rates
of return. The left panel shows age-specific financial asset holdings, non-financial income
consisting of labor and pension income, and consumption. The right panel shows the risky
asset share. Total savings are hump-shaped over the cross-section: they increase with age
until shortly before retirement and decrease afterwards. This savings pattern reflects a desire
of agents to smooth consumption over the high labor income and the low pension income
period of life. The risky share increases slightly at the very beginning of economic life,
and then decreases continually. This is in line with the estimates presented in Figure 2.3 of
Section 2.14
14The model-predicted risky share is initially too high, but generating realistic portfolio shares is generally
difficult in this type of models (Merton, 1971; Heaton and Lucas, 1997; Guiso et al., 2002; Cocco et al., 2005;
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Figure 2.9: Life-cycle results
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The left panel shows model-predicted financial assets, consumption and non-financial income for a
cross-section of US individuals in 2010. The right panel shows the model-predicted risky share of
financial assets.
The life-cycle profiles in asset holdings and portfolio choice create a strong link between
aggregate asset demand and the age structure of the population. The higher the relative share
of older individuals, the lower is the desired aggregate risky share. A larger population mass
near or at retirement age will increase the overall demand for assets, whereas a shift towards
more dissavers (retirees) will overturn this effect. As shown in the statistical exercise in
Section 2, the population aging predicted for the US and the EU will work to increase desired
aggregate savings between 1950 and 2095, and decrease the desired risky share of assets held.
This effect working through the relative population shares of age groups is one out of
three channels through which demography impacts the aggregate demand for safe and risky
assets. We call it the distribution effect. In the following, we describe the two other channels
at work: The life-cycle effect and the valuation effect. To conclude, we show how important
each channel is, both in the cross-section and over time.
Life-cycle Effect
The life-cycle effect comprises the direct effect of longevity on the optimal level of individual
savings and the risky portfolio share. An increase in individual survival probabilities affects
how much agents optimally want to save at different points of their lives, and what type of
assets they prefer to hold. Figure 2.10 compares the total financial asset holdings and the
portfolio share of risky assets of two individuals living in the US: one in the pre-demographic
Fagereng et al., 2017). However, our high CRRA parameter in combination with zero income shocks allows us
to get closer to the data than models with more standard parameters.
62
Figure 2.10: Assets and risky share over the life-cycle: 1950 vs. 2095
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The left panel shows the difference in the life-cycle financial asset holdings in 1950 compared to
2095 at R = 1.02 and rp = 0.04. The right panel shows the difference in the life-cycle risky share
between 1950 and 2095 at the same returns.
change steady state, the other in the post-demographic change steady state. The graphs shows
the difference at each age between the two simulation years. We keep the rates of return fixed:
the safe return is 1.02 for both simulation years, and the risk premium is 0.04.
Between 1950 and 2095, we observe a strong increase of savings over the life-cycle.
Absent adjustments in the rates of return, an increased expected longevity has the effect of
making individuals more patient. This is because changes in survival probabilities prolong
the share of life that individuals expect to spend in retirement. The difference in asset holdings
is particularly strong around the age 80, because the difference in the survival probabilities is
the largest here (partly due to the fact that we require survival probabilities to converge to 0
by the age 100). The effect of longevity on intertemporal decisions can also be seen from the
Euler equation, Eq. (3.12).
The effect of demographics on portfolio choice over the life-cycle is less uniform. In-
creases in longevity affect the risky portfolio share of the very young and the very old posi-
tively, and the portfolio share of all other age groups negatively. However, the differences are
small in absolute terms. The effect works through a combination of changes in savings and
changes in human capital, the net present value of future labor and pension income.
Denote human capital of an individual of age n by
hi,n,t =
Nd∑
m=n
 m∏
l=n
δl,t−n+l

[
yˆi,m,t+m
]
Rm−n
 where yˆ =
 yy˜ if m ≤ Nrif m > Nr (3.21)
Despite being subject to shocks, human capital still resembles a safe asset rather than a
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Figure 2.11: Human capital over the life-cycle
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The solid line depicts simulated human capital for 1950, the dashed line for 2095 in the United States
for ages 20 to 100.
risky asset. hi,n,t increases in the survival probability, as future non-financial income is more
valuable the higher the likelihood of receiving it. This can be seen from Figure 2.11, which
depicts the human capital defined in Eq. 3.21: Human capital in 2095 is larger than in 1950
at all ages. The difference is particularly large during the first years in retirement, as the
increases in survival probabilities are larger towards the end of life, but discounting is strong
at the very end due to our assumption of certain death at age 100.
We revisit a key insight by Merton (1971) on optimal portfolio choice in a model with
CRRA preferences and human capital. The fraction of financial wealth held optimally in
risky assets is
ωi,n,t =
rpt
ϑση
(
1 +
hi,n,t
ai,n,t
)
(3.22)
where rpt is the risk premium assumed constant for now and ai,n,t is total financial wealth
as defined in Section 3.4. Individuals always want to hold a constant fraction of their total
(financial and non-financial) wealth in risky assets, and adjust their portfolio such that the
risky share increases in hi,n,t and decreases in ai,n,t. An increase in longevity will increase
both human capital and total financial wealth. The relative rate of change over the life-cycle
determines the effect of demographic change on the risky share. While the increase in savings
is particularly strong from age 60 onwards, thus shifting the portfolio towards safe assets,
the increase in human capital is most pronounced around retirement, which is why there is
almost zero change in the risky asset share around age 60. For the very young and very old,
the difference in ai,n,t is marginal.
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Valuation Effect
Both the distribution of cohorts across age groups and the individual life-expectancy will
affect the average per capita demand for assets at given rates of return. In contrast, the per
capita supply stays constant. Therefore, the returns need to adjust to clear markets. This
affects financial income and the asset demands for the next period. We call this the valuation
effect.
While the distribution effect and the life-cycle effect work to increase asset demand over
the demographic transition, the valuation effect is a counteracting force that decreases ag-
gregate asset demand. The market-clearing returns decline strongly over the demographic
transition, as we show in Figure 2.5. Thus, the assets held by individuals at the end of the
demographic transition have lower yields than at the beginning of the transition.
Further, individuals adapt their savings decisions and portfolio choice to the low-return
environment. Policy functions for consumption and the risky asset share at different rates of
return can be found in the Appendix, Figures 2.21 and 2.22. Here, we discuss the intuition.
Consumption is increasing in the safe asset return, which is due to a low intertemporal sub-
stitution. The income effect (higher returns implying higher expected future income, a part
of which will already be consumed today) dominates the substitution effect (higher returns
make saving more attractive). The risky share decreases in the risk-free rate. Naturally, a
higher safe return makes safe assets a more attractive investment at a constant risk premium.
An increase in the risk premium induces agents to hold a higher share of their portfolio in
risky assets, as these pay out more in expectations. This can be also seen in Eq. (3.22).
However, the higher risky share is paralleled with a decrease in consumption at a higher risk
premium. Our preference assumption induces agents to be prudent. They want to increase
precautionary savings due to the fact that future consumption will be riskier.
Overall, the decline in returns that we predict makes agents want to accumulate more
savings. The implication for the risky share is ambiguous.
Channel Decomposition
We now decompose the aggregate simulation results into the distribution effect, the life-cycle
effect and the valuation effect, both over time and across age groups. We carry out three
counterfactual experiments for the open economy period 1990 to 2095, focusing on the US.
The first serves to isolate the life-cycle channel. In this experiment, the aggregate demand
for safe and risky assets is calculated using the actual population distribution and evaluating
the portfolio at the market-clearing rates of return of Section 5.1. However, agents expect
demographics to stay constant at 1990 values. Thus, we do not allow them to internalize
their own extended life span relative to 1990. The second experiment serves to isolate the
effect of the distribution channel. In this exercise, individuals take their survival probabilities
into account correctly and evaluate their portfolio at the market-clearing rates solved for in
our baseline model, but the size of each age group is kept fixed at the level of 1990. This
identifies the amounts of assets and the risky share demanded if the population structure
stayed constant over time. Third, we isolate the valuation channel by solving for the optimal
asset demand and the risky share at 1990 returns. Cohort sizes are allowed to vary over time
and individuals take changing survival probabilities into account.
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Figure 2.12: Channel decomposition for aggregate asset demand, United States
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The left panel shows the time path for the share of aggregate asset demand resulting from shutting
off the channels one by one. The orange solid line shuts off the life-cycle effect. The lilac dashed
line shuts off the valuation effect, the green dashed-dotted line the distribution effect. The right panel
shows the same results calculated as average 1990 to 2095 shares of total aggregate assets by age.
The time path of this comparison and the average contribution to the cross-sectional ag-
gregate assets over the same period are shown in Figure 2.12. The smallest aggregate savings
response both over time and across age groups is prompted by shutting down the life-cycle
channel. By the end of the simulation period, the asset holdings would still be 88 percent of
actual holdings had individuals not internalized that they are likely to live longer. The dis-
tribution channel has a much larger impact: Only 50 percent of actual asset holdings would
result if the size of the population age groups stayed constant over the years. The valuation
effect, as described above, works in the opposite direction of the other two, being the equili-
brating force that aligns demand and supply. Had there not been a re-valuation of individual
portfolios, the total asset demand would have been 120 percent of actual asset demand by
2095.
There are pronounced differences in the cross-section. The distribution channel becomes
more important for older cohorts. This is because there are large increases in the number of
old people between 1990 and subsequent years. The US baby boomers are also visible in
this graph. Given that the reference period for cross-sectional changes is 1990, a time when
the baby boomers were of ages between 25 and 45, we see hardly any effects of shutting the
distribution channel off for those age groups. The life-cycle effect matters most for those
individuals nearing the end of the life-cycle. This is the group where increases in longevity
are the largest, as those at younger ages have high survival probabilities throughout the whole
simulation period, and we force survival probabilities to converge to 0 by the age of 100. The
valuation effect works to offset the life-cycle effect and is the mirror image of the left panel
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Figure 2.13: Channel decomposition for aggregate risky share, United States
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The left panel shows the time path for the share of aggregate risky portfolio share resulting from shutting off
the channels one by one. The orange solid line shuts off the life-cycle effect. The lilac dashed line shuts off
the valuation effect, the green dashed-dotted line the distribution effect. The right panel shows the same results
calculated as average 1990 to 2095 shares of the risky portfolio share by age.
of Figure 2.10. Absent return adjustments, those cohorts at the end of their life span would
have been the ones increasing their savings the most, because of the increase in survival
probabilities, in combination with a higher number of people at those ages.
Figure 2.13 shows the same decomposition for the risky asset share. As the aggregate
risky share corresponds to the average per capita risky share, keeping the population structure
fixed does not have any effect. The effect of disabling life-cycle responses also only has
minor effects over time, and in the cross-section matters only for the very old. Their reaction
is linked to the savings response in Figure 2.12: Higher savings of the very old increase their
share of financial wealth in total wealth. In consequence, the portfolio is shifted towards
safe assets, as we discussed in Section 5.2. The same reasoning in reverse applies to the
effects of disabling the valuation channel. Counterfactually higher savings over time result in
a lower desired risky share. In the cross-section, the valuation effect again works to offset the
life-cycle effect, mirroring the right panel of Figure 2.10.
Thus, while the distribution effect plays a big role for aggregate asset holdings, the val-
uation effect is a more important determinant of the risky asset share. We therefore need a
complex structural model that takes into account both effects (plus the life-cycle effect) in
order to fully capture how demographic change affects the demand for safe and risky assets
and ultimately, external positions.
empty space
empty space
empty space
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6. Conclusion
Differences in the demographic structure of regions can explain net external asset positions
that vary by asset type. We show this by introducing an overlapping generations model with
endogenous portfolio choice over the life-cycle. Two fully integrated regions with differ-
ent demographics trade assets with each other. In the model, a region that is younger than
its counterparty has a higher relative demand of risky assets. This is due to a decreasing
preference for portfolio risk over the life-cycle. In consequence, a positive net external as-
set position and a negative net external debt position emerges vis-à-vis the older region. In
calibrating the model, we focus on two developed regions: the US and 15 European Union
member states. Throughout the simulation period of 1990 to 2095, the US is the younger
region. The predicted external positions show an asymmetry in the riskiness of assets held,
which reproduces the pattern observed in the data between 1990 and 2015: The US is a
net exporter of risky assets and a net importer of safe assets. We identify different channels
through which demographics affect aggregate asset demand and portfolio choice. The shift of
the age distribution of the population from young cohorts with little savings towards older co-
horts with large savings is the most important channel for aggregate asset demand. Changes
in market-clearing rates are the most important channel for the risky portfolio share.
The simulation focuses exclusively on the US vis-à-vis 15 European countries. However,
the results of this paper hold more generally. The strong association of US relative demo-
graphics with US external positions can also be found with respect to other countries. This
serves as a further validation of the model. Many young regions that have currently relatively
closed capital accounts may integrate with world financial markets over the next decades. We
would expect demographic differences to lead to large external imbalances.
In order to keep the role of relative demographics clear, we have abstracted from several
important issues. First, the analysis of different pension systems and reforms thereof. As
pension systems in their current shape may become unsustainable over the next decades,
different types of reforms are discussed on both sides of the Atlantic. Policies meant to
neutralize the impact of demographics in one region will have implications for aggregate asset
demands, country portfolios and returns. Second, we exclude an endogenous response of
asset supply. Incorporating a fully formulated supply side, additional effects of demographic
change would become visible: firms are likely to increase the amount of capital used in the
production process, and thus the supply of risky assets would rise. While this would make
the decline in the rates of return less pronounced, we should at the same time observe wage
increases, which affect asset demand. We leave these aspects to future work.
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Appendices
A. Data Definitions and Further Results
A.1 Data Sources
Population data: Data on the population structure of the US and the EU is retrieved from
the United Nations Population Division (World Population Prospects, 2015 Edition). The
data series are: life expectancy at age 60 for both sexes; old-age dependency ratio (Age
65+ / Age 20-64) for both sexes; annual population by age for both sexes; abridged life
table (interpolated) for both sexes. For 1950 to 2015, the UN provides data, for 2016 to
2095 projections. For the projections, we choose the medium variant for fertility and rely
on normal assumptions for migration. Data and projections on survival probabilities are
provided in the the abridged life tables for five-year age groups and until 1990 only until age
80. We interpolate data within the age group bins and for ages 81 to 98 by setting the survival
probability to 0 at age 99; interpolation is done using shape-preserving cubic interpolation.
US household data: For cross-sectional holdings of safe and risky assets, we use the
Summary Extract data from the Survey of Consumer Finances for survey waves 1989 to
2013 (9 waves in total; in 2013 US Dollars). We drop households at the top 1 percent of
the wealth distribution. For the estimation described in Appendix A.3, we calculated moving
ges of three consecutive age observations in order to have sufficient observations in each
cohort-age-time cell. For the statistical exercise, we interpolate the estimated coefficients and
use the trend series after HP-filtering with smoothing parameter 400. Risky and safe assets
are defined in Table 2.3. To distinguish between risky and safe assets, we mostly follow the
definitions provided by the SCF and common practice, for example as in Chang et al. (2014).
Total financial assets are the sum of safe and risky assets.
EU household data: The Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) has been
carried out by the Eurosystem in 2010/11 and 2014/15 for 12 out of the 15 countries in our
EU sample, excluding Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden. We pool both waves and
treat observations for each country as resulting from the same data-generating process. Risky
and safe assets are defined so as to correspond closely to the definitions applied to SCF data
shown in Table 2.3. However, asset categories are less detailed than in the SCF.
International positions data: For bilateral external asset positions in equity and long-
term debt, we use the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). Data is avail-
able for 1997 and 2001 to 2015. According to the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual 6,
equity securities comprise all instruments usually shares, stocks, participations and simi-
lar documents. Long-term debt securities are negotiable instruments serving as evidence of
debt, giving the holders the unconditional right to fixed or contractually determined variable
payments. The maturity of a long-run debt instrument in the CPIS is more than one year or
with no stated maturity. We continue the data series back until 1994 by using the Treasury
International Capital (TIC) database (US Department of the Treasury). To conform with the
definition in CPIS, we use historical bilateral data from US Residents’ Portfolio Holdings of
Foreign Securities and Foreign Residents’ Portfolio Holdings of US Securities.
We also use TIC to construct bilateral positions on short-term debt. TIC provides data on
banking claims on and liabilities to foreigners from the US going back until 1980. Banking
claims are defined as short-term securities, excluding equities, further described in Table 2.2.
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Due to the longer available series for bilateral banking claims, the safe asset position prior to
1994 comprises predominately the other investment category of the international investment
position. Starting in 1994, we supplement TIC data with the data constructed from CPIS, so
that the safe position is net claims from the banking sector plus net debt assets (long term
only) divided by GDP.
A.2 Definition of Asset Types
Table 2.2: Definition of safe and risky assets in international data
Source Risky assets Safe assets
CPIS equity and investment fund
shares, e.g. shares, stocks, par-
ticipations or similar documents
short- and long-term debt instru-
ments, e.g. bonds, debentures,
treasury bills, negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit, commercial pa-
pers, bankers’ acceptances
TIC deposits, short-term negotiable se-
curities, US treasury bills, certifi-
cates with maturity of one year or
less and borrowing and lending
Table 2.3: Definition of safe and risky assets in household data
Source Risky assets Safe assets
SCF stocks; stock mutual funds;
IRAs/Keoghs invested in stock;
other managed assets with eq-
uity interest (annuities, trusts,
managed investment accounts)
if invested in stocks; thrift-type
retirement accounts invested in
stocks; savings accounts classi-
fied as 529 or other accounts that
may be invested in stocks
transaction accounts; certificates of
deposit; bonds (except mortgage-
backed); mutual funds invested
in bonds; quasi-liquid retirement
accounts (IRAs and thrift-type
accounts) and individual retirement
accounts/Keoghs if invested in
bonds; savings bonds; cash value
of life insurance; other managed
assets (trusts, annuities, managed
investment accounts) if invested in
bonds
HFCS Stocks; assets in managed ac-
counts; mutual funds invested in
stocks or hedge funds; life insur-
ance and pensions (partly)
sight accounts; savings accounts;
federal government or state bonds;
money market accounts; life insur-
ance and pensions (partly)
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A.3 Estimation of Life-cycle Financial Assets and Risky Asset Share
In our estimations of financial asset holdings and the risky asset share over the life-cycle, we
closely follow Fagereng et al. (2017). We apply the Heckman estimator where the first stage
is a probit estimation of the decision to participate in the stock-market, Pinct, by individual i
aged n and belonging to cohort c in year t,
prob(Pinct = 1|x) = prob (δnAn + δcCc + δtDt + δ0Trend + υZinct + ηinct > 0)
and the second stage is the estimation of the risky share conditional on participation,
ωinct = βnAn + βcCc + βtDt + β0Trend + δZinct + δ2λinct + εinct.
An Cc, Dt are age, cohort and time dummies, Trend is a linear trend, and Zinct are individual-
specific controls of the household head. We include a dummy for whether the individual is
married or living with a partner, for home ownership, for whether the household has a high-
school degree or a college degree, and the number of children living in the household. λinct is
the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage regression and ηinct and εinct are error terms.
Applying the Deaton-Paxson method, we introduce the constraints
∑
βt =
∑
δt = 0. The
linear time trend accounts for the fact that possibly, there is some trend over time, which
would be wrongly captured by the age or cohort proxies if not controlled for.
For life-cycle financial asset holdings the estimation equation is
zinct = γnAn + γcGc + γtDt + ψZinct + νinct
where Gc is a proxy for cohort effects, the macroeconomic conditions faced by cohort c at the
point of entering into the labor market. It is approximated by the deviation from trend real
GNP per capita at the age of 20. All other variables are as defined in the risky share equation.
Since the SCF over-samples rich households, we use survey weights in the estimation of
financial asset holdings. Ideally, we would do the same for the estimation of the risky share,
but this is difficult to implement in Stata. However, since the weighted and unweighted mean
of the conditional risky share are similar (0.48 and 0.46, respectively), ignoring the weights
is not likely to introduce a large bias to the estimation.
The first-stage result of the Heckman procedure is presented in Figure 2.14 and depicts
the familiar hump-shape of age-specific participation in the stock market. Tables 2.4 and 2.5
show the coefficient estimates for the relevant variables.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results for life-cycle financial assets
VARIABLES c s/e
dummyage_29 -19,067 (15,503)
dummyage_32 -4,937 (15,281)
dummyage_35 12,778 (15,437)
dummyage_38 23,980 (15,261)
dummyage_41 50,448*** (15,059)
dummyage_44 85,612*** (15,277)
dummyage_47 109,589*** (15,389)
dummyage_50 186,724*** (15,543)
dummyage_53 219,442*** (15,804)
dummyage_56 263,626*** (16,260)
dummyage_59 307,681*** (16,668)
dummyage_62 353,126*** (16,979)
dummyage_65 305,959*** (17,177)
dummyage_68 352,932*** (17,826)
dummyage_71 314,525*** (18,262)
dummyage_74 294,168*** (18,943)
dummyage_77 280,443*** (19,317)
dummyage_80 291,289*** (30,594)
real_gnp -2.247 (16.60)
kids -3,218 (2,586)
married -160,002*** (5,884)
hhouses 84,880*** (6,390)
educ_1 -318,017*** (8,086)
educ_2 -252,299*** (6,016)
Observations 187,520
R-squared 0.064
Note: The table presents regression outputs for financial
assets as described above. Column (1) are the estimated
coefficients, column (2) corresponding standard errors. Year
dummies are included but not shown. Age dummies are
relative to the group of 26-year olds (value 30939.27). ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.5: Estimation results for risky share and participation
VARIABLES risky share participation
c s/e c s/e
trend 0.00219 (0.0129)
kids -0.00204** (0.000949) -0.0783*** (0.00321)
married -0.0113*** (0.00313) -0.488*** (0.00742)
hhouses 0.0496*** (0.00491) 0.782*** (0.00819)
educ_1 -0.101*** (0.00911) -1.433*** (0.0117)
educ_2 -0.0765*** (0.00421) -0.755*** (0.00734)
dummyage_26 0.0293** (0.0120) -0.155* (0.0922)
dummyage_29 0.0268** (0.0130) -0.108 (0.0893)
dummyage_32 0.0353*** (0.0125) -0.0736 (0.0846)
dummyage_35 0.0579*** (0.0120) -0.0322 (0.0800)
dummyage_38 0.0640*** (0.0114) 0.0479 (0.0755)
dummyage_41 0.0521*** (0.0110) 0.137* (0.0711)
dummyage_44 0.0443*** (0.0108) 0.136** (0.0669)
dummyage_47 0.0562*** (0.0105) 0.237*** (0.0629)
dummyage_50 0.0554*** (0.0103) 0.242*** (0.0591)
dummyage_53 0.0474*** (0.0103) 0.275*** (0.0556)
dummyage_56 0.0367*** (0.0103) 0.321*** (0.0525)
dummyage_59 0.0231** (0.0104) 0.306*** (0.0496)
dummyage_62 0.0245** (0.0106) 0.253*** (0.0471)
dummyage_65 0.0145 (0.0108) 0.159*** (0.0452)
dummyage_68 0.0117 (0.0112) 0.0969** (0.0440)
dummyage_71 -0.000439 (0.0116) 0.0428 (0.0433)
dummyage_74 0.000418 (0.0121) 0.0189 (0.0435)
dummyage_77 -0.0131 (0.0126) 0.0690 (0.0443)
λ 0.0538*** (0.00894)
Constant 0.778*** (0.177) 0.192*** (0.0321)
Observations 187,147 187,147
Note: The table presents regression outputs for the Heckman estimation described above.
Column (1) are the estimated coefficients of the second stage, with column (2) corre-
sponding standard errors. Column (3) are estimation coefficients of the first stage with (4)
corresponding standard errors. Year and cohort dummies are not shown. Age dummies
are relative to the group of 80-year olds (risky share 0.322, participation rate 0.161). ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Figure 2.14: Participation by age, United States
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The graph shows the participation rate estimated as the first stage of a Heckman estimation apply-
ing the Deaton-Paxson technique for cross-sectional age cohorts from 20 to 80. Source: authors
calculation using data from SCF for waves 1998 to 2013.
A.4 Additional Data
A.4 Additional Data
Figure 2.15: Share of US and EU in world asset holdings
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Share of US and EU external asset holdings in total world external asset holdings by asset
type. Source: Authors’ calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
74
Table 2.6: Share of bilateral positions in total external positions
EU US
debt equity debt equity
OFCs as RoW 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.42
OFCs as bilateral 0.57 0.64 0.59 0.62
Source: CPIS, using a definition of offshore financial centers (OFCs) by the IMF. The
lower bound attributes all OFC-US and OFC-EU investments to the rest of the world
(RoW), the upper bound attributes them to the respective other region. Numbers are
averaged over 1997 - 2015. We restrict our focus on assets, because countries do not
report liabilities to the IMF, so that these positions are inferred.
Figure 2.16: Counterfactual aggregate assets by age
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The left panel shows the implied aggregate assets in the US for years 1990, 2010 and 2095. The right
panel shows aggregate financial assets for the same years in the EU (both in trillions of 2010 US
Dollars). The total population size is held fixed at the level of 2010. Source: Authors’ calculations
using data from SCF and UN Population Prospects.
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Figure 2.17: De jure capital account openness
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Source: Chinn and Ito (2008). De jure capital account openness describes the degree to which
capital account openness is allowed for or restricted by law. Based on the IMF’s Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), the Chinn and Ito (2008) index is
the first principal component of a principal component analysis on four binary indicators that codify
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. 0 signifies completely closed while 1 signifies
completely open.
Figure 2.18: 10-year government bond returns
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The graph shows 10-year government bond returns in real terms for the US, Germany, France and
the UK. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Figure 2.19: Financial asset holdings and risky share, US vs. EU
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The upper panel compares cross-sectional financial asset holdings for the US (red, solid line) and the
EU (blue, dotted line) both in trillions of 2013 US Dollars. The lower panel compares the conditional
risky asset share for the US and the EU. Source: SCF, pooled waves 1998 to 2013, and HFCS, pooled
waves 2010/11 and 2014/15.
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A.5 Demography and External Positions in the Rest of the World
The association between demographics and the risk-content of external positions can also be
found in a larger set of countries. Figure 2.20 plots countries’ old age dependency relative to
that of the US against the US net external debt and equity position vis-à-vis those countries.
Each dot represents a country-year observation. We show observations for all countries and
years that are reported to the CPIS, omitting those that have capital accounts that are less
than 50 percent open according to the measure of Chinn and Ito (2008). There are altogether
69 countries, with data available for time spans between 1997 and 2015. The correlation is
-0.3 for debt (-0.28 if we also include countries with less open capital accounts) and 0.29 for
equity (0.23 when all are included).
This is not just a further validation of our model, but also allows for an outlook on the
US external balance sheet in a future where many countries that are so far little financially
integrated (for example China) engage more in international asset trades. Some of these
countries have a much younger population than advanced regions.
Figure 2.20: US External positions and relative demographics
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The left panel plots the net external debt position of the US relative to other countries against the
relative old-age dependency ratio. The right panel plots net external equity positions against relative
old-age dependency ratios. Observations with de jure capital openness of less than 0.5 are omitted.
Source: CPIS.
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A.6 Additional Results
Figure 2.21: Policies at varying safe returns
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The left panel shows the level of consumption for varying safe returns for a US individual at age 45 in
the year 1950. The right panel shows the risky share at varying safe returns for the same individual.
The results are qualitatively equivalent for all age groups. The risk premium is kept constant at 0.04.
Figure 2.22: Policies at varying risky returns
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The left panel shows the level of consumption for varying risk premia for a US individual at age 45 in
the year 1950. The right panel shows the risky share at varying risk premia for the same individual.
The results are qualitatively equivalent for all age groups. The safe rate is kept constant at 1.02.
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A.7 Population Structure in the Simulation
Figure 2.23 highlights the difference between the actual (observed or predicted) population
size and a population size that would result when starting from the 1950 population structure
and updating it annually using birth rates and survival probabilities, as described in the model.
The simulated population structure in both regions is lower for two reasons: first, because the
simulation ignores immigration, which is generally positive and highest for the youngest age
group. Second, because in the simulation we use 1950 as a steady state, and slowly move
out of it over the next years (so that the last cohort born into the steady state only dies by
2020). In reality, the 1950 population did not represent a steady state, which means that in
most cases, Ln,t × ∆δn−1t−1,t , Ln,t−1. Not taking this into account would lead to unrealistically
low population in the simulation, although as far as this effect concerns both regions to the
same extent, the difference on external positions would not be large.
Figure 2.23: Life-cycle results comparison
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The left panel shows total population between 1950 and 2095 for the US: The solid line is the actual population
size, the dashed line is the population size that would result from a simulation using the population structure
of 1950 and updating it for subsequent years using survival probabilities and birth rates. The right panel shows
actual and simulated population for the EU for the same time period.
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B. Appendix: Model Solution
A closed-form solution does not exist for the household’s portfolio problem or aggregate
asset returns. We describe the numerical solution algorithm below.
B.1 Solution to Individual’s Optimization
We can formulate the household’s problem recursively dropping time, individual and age
subscripts and denoting next period variables at+1 as a′. The Bellman equation is the indirect
utility function Vn(x, z) and given as the solution to the following problem for an individual
of age n:
Vn(x, z) = max
c,a′,ω′
c1−ϑ − 1
1 − ϑ + βδnVn+1(x
′, z′), (B.1)
subject to c + a′ = x (B.2)
ω′ ≥ 0 (B.3)
(1 − ω′) ≥ 0, (B.4)
where cash on hand x′ = R˜′ω′a′ + R′(1 − ω′)a′ + y′ is the endogenous state variable that
summarizes the available resources for the individual in the next year of life. The vector
z′ = [′θ′η′ζ′]ᵀ summarizes the exogenous states (the shock realizations in the next period).
The individual policy functions are the solution to the individual’s problem given in
Eq. (B.1) and are derived by backward induction from the terminal period of life. In order
to conserve computational time for grid search on a′ and x, we use the endogenous gridpoint
method (Carroll, 2006; Hintermaier and Koeniger, 2010). The continuous distributions for
shocks z′ are approximated using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method (Judd, 1998). Indi-
viduals take the aggregate returns as given when making decisions. We solve for the policy
functions as decision rules given the endogenous state variable cash on hand and a grid of
aggregate asset returns, representing expected future returns. In the sections that follow, we
suppress indices for region, individuals, and time, so as to focus on the recursion by age in
the solution algorithm. Policy functions are denoted with hat characters.
We construct a triple exponential grid for savingsA = (a1, a2, ....a j)′ and a linear grid for
the two asset returns, R = (R1,R2, ....Rk)′ and R˜ = (R˜1, R˜2, ....R˜l)′ each with j = k = l = 15
gridpoints. The return grid for the risky return that excludes the shock realization is
R˜l −  = 1 + d + rpl ∈ [1.03, 1.10],
and the shocks for returns are log-normally distributed with parameters given in Table 2.1.
We then form 3-dimensional arrays of grids with dimensions j× k× l, each element of which
corresponds to a unique combination of the elements of A , R′ and R˜′. We solve for policy
functions using the following procedure:
1. For the terminal period of an individual of age Nd, the solution is trivial: cˆNd = xˆNd ,
saving is zero and the continuation value of the Bellman equation is VNd+1 = 0 such
that the value function is VNd = u(c).
Working recursively from age n = Nd − 1 to age Nb:
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2. Use the policy function for next period consumption cˆ′n = cˆn+1 from step 1 to find the
portfolio allocation ωˆ′n that satisfies the portfolio optimality condition
βδn
(
(R˜l
′ − R′k)u′(c′j,k,l)
)
= 0 ∀ j, k, l.
The expected future consumption is evaluated using the condition c′j,k,l = x
′
j,k,l where
the indices j, k, l correspond to savings and expected future returns.
3. Given optimal portfolio choices ωˆ′n from step 2, use the Euler equation to solve for the
policy function for consumption cˆn for each grid point:
c j,k,l =
[
βδnx′,z′
(
(R˜′j,k,lω
′
j,k,l + R
′
j,k,l(1 − ω′j,k,l))(c′j,k,l)−ϑ
)]−1/ϑ
4. Collect the policy functions for age n on grids for savings and asset returns. The cor-
responding gridpoints for the endogenous state variable xˆ arise endogenously from the
budget constraint: xˆ = cˆ + A′, where A′ has the same dimension as cˆ. This gives
triplets cˆn, ωˆ′n and xˆn.
5. Stepping back to age n − 1, the pairs from step 4 are used to interpolate u′(c′) in the
determination of the optimal portfolio allocation as in step 4.
The algorithm provides 4-dimensional arrays of policy functions based on age, savings a,
the safe asset return R′ and risky asset mean return R˜′ which can be used to simulate the
aggregates in the economy and, using the market-clearing conditions, find the equilibrium
asset returns.
B.2 General Equilibrium
We carry out a deterministic simulation and solve for the equilibria by explicit aggregation.
We set the draws for idiosyncratic labor income shocks equal to their expected values. Since
we assume them to be i.i.d. and uncorrelated with the aggregate return shock, and because
there is a continuum of individuals born in each cohort, idiosyncratic shocks will aggregate
by age to expected values. For the aggregate risk, we set t = 0 in each period of the simula-
tion. An alternative approach, which we will carry out in future iterations of the work, takes
aggregate risk into account by running Monte-Carlo simulations over several time paths of
draws of the aggregate shock to the risk premium and calculating the distribution of possible
aggregate time paths.
In order to simulate the model for a representative individual at each age, we require the
state variable cash on hand, x, as well as future expected returns, which are themselves en-
dogenous. Given the high-dimensional nature of the model, for the time being, we reduce the
problem’s dimensionality by assuming that individuals set expectations of the risk premium
and future safe dividend to current equilibrium values:
(rp′) = rp (d′) = d.
Of course, with this assumption, we isolate the agents’ forward looking behavior in terms of
the exogenous survival probability. An important step for future work will be to provide the
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benchmark of fully forward looking behavior of individuals, incorporating fully endogenous
expectations of future returns.
Equilibrium interest rate solution: For the two regions, we each simulate 305 years and
305 cohorts (2× (Nd − Nb) + 2095− 1950) on the grid of safe and risky return realizations as
discussed above. For each year, we aggregate asset positions, consumption and non-financial
income over living cohorts as in Eq. (3.14). For simulation years prior to opening in 1990,
the relevant market clearing condition for asset holdings is given by Eq. (3.16) and after
1990 by Eq. (3.19). For each gridpoint for safe asset returns, we use interpolation to find the
equilibrium risky rate of return as the solutions to:
F(R′, R˜′) ≡ B − = 0 G(R′, R˜′) ≡ S −  = 0.
Asset supply is found using Eq. (3.15) with calibrated supply parameters given in Table 2.1.
This algorithm results in two sets of return pairs that respectively clear bond and stock mar-
kets globally. Since combinations of world returns must clear both asset markets, we find the
equilibrium pair as the intersection of the two sets of returns pairs. For each simulation year,
there is a unique return pair that is contained in each set of returns. These equilibrium returns
are shown in Figure 2.5.
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Chapter 3
Benign Effects of Automation: New Evidence
From Patent Texts
With Lukas Püttmann
We provide a new measure of automation based on patents and study its em-
ployment effects. Classifying all U.S. patents granted between 1976 and 2014
as automation or non-automation patents, we document a rise in the share of au-
tomation patents from 25 percent to 67 percent. We link patents to the industries
of their use and, through local industry structure, to commuting zones. Accord-
ing to our estimates, advances in national automation technology have a positive
influence on employment in local labor markets. Manufacturing employment
declines, but this is more than compensated by service sector job growth. Com-
muting zones with more people working in routine occupations fare worse.
1. Introduction
What is the effect of automation technology on employment? The answer to this question
is not obvious: While machines may replace workers, new jobs could also be created. For
example, if self-driving vehicles become widely used, taxi and truck drivers might lose their
jobs. Other sectors such as retail could, however, experience employment growth through
lower transport costs.
To identify the employment effects of automation, this paper introduces a new indicator
of automation technology. The large literature addressing this question has so far relied on
indirect proxies of automation, such as routine task input (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008,
Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003, Goos and Manning, 2007, Autor and Dorn, 2013), in-
vestment in computer capital (Beaudry, Doms, and Lewis, 2010; Michaels, Natraj, and van
Reenen, 2014) or investment in robots (Graetz and Michaels, 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2017). Many of these papers find evidence for job polarization, but the smaller literature on
aggregate employment changes reports more ambiguous results. This may be due to difficul-
ties in measuring automation comprehensively.
Our proposed automation indicator relies on patent grant texts. Patents are a natural can-
didate for measuring technological progress and frequently serve as proxies of innovation.
However, few studies examine the consequences of technological progress through patents.
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Also, while patent meta-data such as citation counts or the identity of innovators is used reg-
ularly (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Celik, 2014; Bell, Chetty,
Jaravel, Petkova, and Reenen, 2017), the actual patent texts have not been in the focus so far.
We classify patents as automation patents if their texts describe physical inventions (such as
robots) or immaterial or conceptual inventions (such as software), which carry out a process
independently of human interference.
We extract the texts of all 5 million U.S. patents granted between 1976 and 2014 and train
a machine learning algorithm on a sample of 560 manually classified patents to sort patents
into automation and non-automation innovations. As a result, we document a strong rise in
both the absolute and the relative number of automation patents. As a share of total patents,
automation patents have increased from 25 percent in 1976 to 67 percent in 2014. Applying
a probabilistic matching that is based on Canadian patents, we link patents to the 956 4-digit
SIC industries where they are likely to be used. In this way, we quantify trends in newly
available technology at the industry level.
Next, we compare the indicator to established measures of automation. The number of
automation patents is positively correlated across industries both with investment in computer
capital and with robots shipments. More automation patents have been granted in industries
with a larger share of employment in routine occupations in 1960, a result that is in line with
the literature on routine-biased technological change. Also, industries with more automation
patents were characterized by a rise in non-routine cognitive and non-routine interactive task
input and a fall in routine cognitive and routine manual task input.
To estimate the labor-market effects of automation, we transfer our industry-level data
to U.S. commuting zones through industry-county employment counts. Commuting zones
approximate local labor markets as workers tend to look for jobs within commuting distance
from where they live. We obtain a panel dataset of new automation technology across 722
commuting zones over 39 years. Up to the late 1980s, there was a higher density of automa-
tion in the Great Lakes region, but automation technology has become less geographically
concentrated over time.
Our empirical analysis benefits from the fact that we examine local economic outcomes
which are impacted by, but unlikely to affect, the innovation activity of industries at the
national level. Our key assumption is that commuting zone-specific developments in the
medium-run do not affect automation innovation in industries that operate there. This is plau-
sible for the following reasons: First, we separate the industries where patents originate from
where they are used. Second, many patents belong to foreigners and universities who re-
spond to other incentives than local firms. And third, local industries are small in comparison
to national aggregate industries. Our approach thus follows Bartik (1991).
Our main econometric analysis is a fixed effects panel regression for five-year periods.
Interpreting the automation index as a flow measure of technology, we assess the relationship
between the sum of automation and changes in employment. While we find a positive effect
of automation on total employment, this is driven by job growth in the service sector, which
compensates for a fall in manufacturing employment. This result is robust to adding a variety
of other economic and demographic controls and to weighting patents by the number of
citations they received. We also consider separately patents belonging to specific groups
of assignees: universities and public research institutes, foreigners and governments. All
three should be less responsive to US labor market trends than US companies. Our results
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hold in the regressions for the subgroups of patentees as well as in an instrumental variable
regression. Lastly, we find that automation is associated with more job creation in commuting
zones where the share of routine occupations is low.
All in all, our study thus shows automation to be more beneficial for employment than
some of the previous literature (Autor et al., 2015; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017), which
might be due to our broader definition of automation. Our results are in line with Gregory,
Salomons, and Zierahn (2016), who show that the detrimental substitution effect of automa-
tion on routine jobs is more than compensated by a positive labor demand effect due to larger
product demand.
In the final part of our paper, we apply our indicator to replicate two central papers (Autor
and Dorn, 2013 and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2015) that study the influence of automation
on labor markets using the routine task share of jobs. First, we show that non-college em-
ployment rose in commuting zones where more automation patents could be used and where
more people worked in routine occupations. Second, we find that automation leads to rises
in employment levels even when controlling for Chinese import competition, which stands in
contrast to Autor et al. (2015). We provide further evidence that employment increases were
driven to a larger extent by flows into the labor force than by a fall in unemployment.
There are strengths and weaknesses to our approach to quantifying automation technol-
ogy. Text classification is an inherently imprecise activity and we introduce further inaccu-
racies through probabilistic matchings of patents to industries and commuting zones. Also,
we make assumptions on the usefulness of patents and the way they are implemented. On
the upside, we have to impose fewer ex-ante assumption on the nature of advances in au-
tomation technology, compared to the literature using routine task shares or computer and
robot investment. Our indicator allows us to closely track the technology frontier, translating
newly granted patents into a fine-grained industry- or commuting zone-level dataset. With
these caveats in mind, we consider our indicator a complement to previous measures of au-
tomation.
2. New Automation Index
This section introduces the new automation index. We start by arguing why patents are a
suitable data source for measuring technological progress and then define automation. We
show how we construct the indicator and how the classification algorithm works. Then, we
explain how to link patents to industries in which they are likely to be used. The resulting
indicator traces the technology frontier across 956 industries and 39 years and displays plau-
sible co-movement with existing indicators of automation such as computer investment, the
number of robots used in production and the share of routine tasks across industries.
2.1 Patents as Indicators of Technological Progress
The purpose of patents is to encourage innovation and technological progress by offering a
temporary monopoly on an invention. Once granted, no one can re-engineer, create or sell the
same object or idea. In return, the text of the patent is made publicly available. The language
in the patent text is technical and highly standardized. Applicants have an incentive to provide
exact and correct information about their innovation to obtain full protection of their ideas.
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Professional patent examiners judge a patent’s claims and make changes where appropriate.
In return for disclosing the content of the innovation to the public, an intellectual property
right is granted for 20 years. To be patentable, an innovation must be novel, non-obvious and
useful. The description must further be exact and detailed enough to allow for replication
and it must name the invention’s most important application. All these characteristics make
patents a valuable data source.
Researchers in economics have made frequent use of patents, often in the form of the
database established by Hall et al. (2001). Griliches (1990) provides an extensive survey
of various issues related to using patents in economics. However, patents are so far usually
interpreted as proxies for innovative activity, not as increments of technological progress
whose effects can be studied (for an overview of the more recent literature, see Nagaoka
et al., 2010). This is related to the fact that existing research almost exclusively uses patents’
metadata, such as the location or affiliation of a patentee or a patent’s importance.1
Magerman, Looy, and Song (2010) note that there is almost no research which uses the
actual texts of the patent document, although this has been recommended as early as Griliches
(1990). An exception is Bessen and Hunt (2007), who identify software patents by searching
patent texts for keywords. Our approach differs as we do not specify a priori which words to
search for, but use a state-of-the-art text classification algorithm. Also, we apply the derived
measure to study the effects of technology on the labor market, whereas the goal of Bessen
and Hunt (2007) is to characterize firms that file software patents.
In other areas of economics, text search has become common, with Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2010) and Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) being prominent examples of papers that use
newspaper articles. However, patent texts hold several advantages for researchers over other
document collections: The precise technical language with a high degree of standardization,
the incentive to deliver correct information, the additional check through the patent examin-
ers’ review and the public access to patent grant texts make patents well suited for text search
analysis.
Patent text analysis is common in the private sector for prior art and freedom-to-operate
searches by firms and lawyers. However, none of these providers – to the best of our knowl-
edge – offers a comparison of technological trends over time, which leads us to develop our
own approach.
2.2 Patent Data
We obtain all 5 million utility patent documents granted in the United States from 1976 to
2014 from Google.2 While Europe, Japan and increasingly China are also important patent
legislations, of the roughly 10.9 million patents effective (“in force”) worldwide in 2014, the
largest fraction (about one fourth) had been granted in the United States (WIPO, 2016). In
addition, the most important innovations are usually patented in all major patent legislations.
These properties make U.S. patents a good proxy for the technological frontier in the United
States and beyond. Also, given that this paper studies the effect of automation in the United
States, U.S. patents are an obvious candidate for how available technology changes.
1Patent citations, in particular, are widely applied as indicators of the value of an invention, for example by
Bell et al. (2017).
2google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents.html
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We only consider utility patents, which account for around 90 percent of all patents. Util-
ity patents are “issued for the invention of a new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof" (USPTO, 2015). Other
patent types are design, plant and reissue patents and do not track technology that we aim to
measure. According to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in the period
1976-2014, 83 percent of all patents granted were owned by firms – mostly large multina-
tional corporations. 15 percent of patents were owned by individuals and less than 2 percent
by the U.S. government. About half of all patents are granted to foreign applicants, a share
that has increased over time. During the period of our analysis, IBM, Canon and Samsung
were the corporations with the largest number of patents granted (USPTO, 2014).
The patent grant document includes the title, patent number, name of the inventor, date,
citations of other patents, legal information, drawings, abstract and a detailed description, as
well as information on the technology class of the invention. Every patent is assigned one
or more technology classification numbers by the patent examiner which describes techno-
logical and functional characteristics of a patent and on which we base our link from patents
to industries. We exclude chemical and pharmaceutical patents from our classification.3 The
overwhelming majority of these patents do not meet our definition of an automation patent
(14 out of 560 manually classified patents were automation patents from those sectors), but
including these patents might distor our classification.
2.3 Definition of Automation
We define an automation patent to describe a device that carries out a process independently.4
This broad definition captures technologies such as software, a robot used in a production
or the self-driving vehicle mentioned in the introduction. The “device" can be a physical
machine, a combination of machines, an algorithm or a computer program. The process it
automates may be a production process, but also anything else where an input is altered to
generate an output. An important element of the definition is the notion of independence:
It works without human intervention, except at the start or for supervision. We require the
automation innovation to be a reasonably complete process, product or machine. In addition,
we require it to have an at least remotely-recognizable application. This excludes inven-
tions that are minor parts of an automation innovation and highly abstract patents with no
obvious application. We make no difference between process and product innovations, so an
automation patent could describe either. Table 3.1 displays some examples of automation and
non-automation patents.
2.4 Classification of Patents
Based on the definition above, all patents can be classified as either automation or non-
automation patents. We use an automated approach. To train a classification algorithm,
3Excluded USPC technology numbers: 127, 252, 423, 424, 435, 436, 502, 510-585, 800, 930, 987.
4This is a standard definition that can be found in encyclopedias. For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica
defines automata as “any of various mechanical objects that are relatively self-operating after they have been
set in motion" and adds that “the term automaton is also applied to a class of electromechanical devices—either
theoretical or real—that transform information from one form into another on the basis of predetermined in-
structions or procedures" (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015).
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Table 3.1: Examples of automation and non-automation patents
Patent title Patent number Automation patent?
“Automatic taco machine" 5531156 Yes
“Color measuring method and device" 6362849 Yes
“Coinfusion apparatus" 8857476 Yes
“Hair dye applicator " 6357449 Yes
“Hand-held scanner having adjustable light path" 5552597 No
“Bicycle frame with device cavity" 7878521 No
“Process for making pyridinethione salts" 4323683 No
“Golf ball" 4173345 No
Note: Authors’ classifications according to manual coding guidelines. Click on the patent num-
ber for the weblink to the patent document.
we need reliable and objective classifications on which we can base the comparison. To this
end, we manually classify 560 randomly drawn patents according to rules laid out in man-
ual coding guidelines.5 Baker et al. (2016) proceed similarly when they manually classify
newspaper articles to check the performance of their dictionary-based classification. We aim
to minimize coding mistakes and biases by providing a structured classification process, by
classifying patents in random order and by reviewing every classification by a second person.
The language in patent texts might have changed over time. But patents from the 1970s
read very similar to those from the 2000s and important technological classes such as com-
puters and robots are developed and patented throughout the sample period. The technical
nature of the documents and the fact that legal terms change more slowly than other lan-
guage also makes it less likely that there are short-lived trends that could pose a problem for
a classification based on specific terms.
From our sample of patents, we extract word stems, called tokens, with the Porter2 stem-
ming algorithm. This shortens “automation", “automated", “automatically", “automatable"
to “automat". Table 3.2 summarizes these tokens. A typical title contains about 5 tokens, a
typical abstract about 36 and the rest of the patent (the “body”) about 500 to 600.
Table 3.2: Tokens in 560 manually classified patents
Part All tokens Unique tokens Mean Median
Title 2796 1301 4.99 5
Abstract 20781 3971 37.11 36
Body 339366 31499 606.01 506.5
Source: USPTO, Google and own calculations.
In principle, one could now record for all 5 million patents whether they contain one of
the roughly 32,000 tokens that we can assign probabilities to. But to keep the computation-
intensive data collection feasible and to remove noise features, we use the mutual information
5See: http://lukaspuettmann.com/assets/pdf/manual_coding_guidelines.pdf
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Figure 3.1: Words that indicate an automation patent
Note: Token size is proportional to the value of the mutual information criterion in sample
560 classified patents. We show only the 150 highest ranked tokens excluding chemical
and pharmaceutical words.
Source: USPTO, Google and own calculations.
criterion to extract those tokens which are most informative about which class a patent be-
longs to. This is an established statistic for feature selection which prefers tokens that appear
significantly more often in one of the classes and punishes tokens that appear rarely overall
(Manning et al., 2009). We then pick the highest ranked (according to the mutual information
criterion) 50 title tokens, 200 abstract tokens and 500 patent body tokens. The final search
dictionary consists of 623 tokens.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the 150 tokens with the highest mutual information criterion. The
most important token is unsurprisingly “automat”. After that come “output”, “execut”, “in-
form”, “input” and “detect”. Some tokens are indicative of software, such as “microproces-
sor”, “database”, “comput”, “program” or “transmiss". Others are more likely to appear in
descriptions of physical machines, such as “motor”, “move”, “metal” or “apparatus”. The
last discernible group of tokens are action verbs that appear in descriptions of a wide range of
independently operating devices, such as “distinguish”, “command”, “respons” or “perform”.
Our algorithm emulates how a human being would have classified each patent. We apply
the Naive Bayes algorithm which is a supervised learning method which is easy to interpret
and which computationally scales well with large amounts of data. The “naive” assumption
the probability of a token to appear in a document is independent from the appearance of
other tokens. Despite its simplicity it has been shown to perform quite well (Domingos and
Pazzani, 1997).6 One reason for this that the low number of parameters it estimates make it
unlikely to overfit (Murphy, 2012).
Manning et al. (2009) explain how this algorithm picks the class c for every document d
with maximum a posteriori probability P(c | d). In our analysis, the documents d correspond
to patent grant texts and the two different classes are automation patents and non-automation
6Gentzkow et al. (2017) also recommend this algorithm if the number of observed features (tokens) is much
larger than the size of the training sample, as is the case in our analysis. Antweiler and Frank (2004) proceed
similarly, as they manually classify 1000 messages and then use the Naive Bayes algorithm to generalize to over
1.5 million other messages.
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patents. In the Bernoulli Naive Bayes that we use, every document d is represented by a
vector e, where entry ei (i = 1, . . . ,M) is 1 if token i appears at least once in the document
and 0 if it does not. Patent texts contain matter-of-fact language, where words are often
repeated. So the occurrence of a word is more important than the frequency of its appearance
and we therefore ignore how often a word appears in a document.
According to this language model, in any document in class c the token ei occurs with
conditional probability P(ei | c). Therefore, the probability of a document d to show up in
class c is
P(d | c) =
∏
1≤i≤M
P(ei | c), (3.1)
and the conditional probability of document d to belong to class c is according to Bayes’ rule7
P(c | d) ∝ P(c)
∏
1≤i≤M
P(ei | c). (3.2)
We estimate the prior P̂(c) as the relative frequency of documents in class c in the training
set. This is P̂(autom) = 147483 = 0.304, as about a third of eligible patents (i.e., after removing
chemical and pharmaceutical patents) were manually labeled as automation patents. We then
estimate the conditional probabilities of a certain token to occur in class c, P̂(ei | c) as
P̂(ei | c) = P̂(i | c)ei + (1 − P̂(i | c))(1 − ei), (3.3)
where P̂(i | c) is the share of documents with token i in class c. In this way, we calculate
posterior probabilities for all 5 million patents to belong to either class and assign each patent
to the class with the higher posterior probability.
Table 3.3: Contingency table
Computerized
No Yes
M
an
ua
l No 323 88 411
Yes 25 124 149
348 212 560
“No": not automation patent
Table 3.3 shows how human examiners and how the computer algorithm classified the set
of manually investigated patents. Both the manual coding and the algorithmic classification
judged around a quarter of patents to be automation patents. In 80 percent of cases (= 323+124560 )
both approaches agreed. The probability of a false positive (type I error) is 21 percent (= 88411 ).
The probability of a false negative (type II error) is 17 percent (= 25149 ).
While some share of misclassified patents remains, as long as there is no underlying
bias in the classication this should only add noise to our indicator series as we only aim to
7P(c | d) = P(c)P(d|c)P(d) ∝ P(c)P(d | c).
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Figure 3.2: Patents, 1976-2014
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Note: See text for classification of automation patents and assignment of patents to
categories.
Source: USPTO, Google, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and own calculations.
approximate trends in technology over time. Any noise should therefore push our empirical
results towards zero, making it harder to detect an effect of automation.
A more precise classification might be possible when including patents’ other observable
characteristics such as their technological class (USPC and IPC numbers), grant years, the
origins of inventors or the sector of firms. But we keep the classification into automation
and non-automation separate from these observables to allow comparing automation trends
across time and industries, without making these associations automatic.
2.5 Aggregate Properties of the Indicator
Figure 3.2 is a graphical representation of all 5 million patents granted in the United States
between 1976 and 2014. We show patents by when they were granted, not when applied for,
as inventions are unlikely to be shared before they are protected by a patent.
There has been a steady increase from 70,000 granted patents in 1976 to more than
300,000 patents in 2014. Over the whole period, we classify 2.2 million of these as au-
tomation patents. The red-shaded parts of the bars show the patents which we classified as
automation patents and blue colors signal all other patents. We observe a sharp upward trend
in automation patents from 16,000 in 1976 to 180,000 in 2014. The share of patents related
to automation also increased, from 25 percent of patents in 1976 to 67 percent of patents in
2014. Table 3.16 in the Appendix provides the yearly numbers.
Figure 3.2 further shows broad categories of patents based on an aggregation method by
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Hall et al. (2001) which relies on the technological classification (USPC number) of patents.8
Patents in the sub-category computers and communication have become much more frequent
over the sample period and we mostly classify them as automation. Many of these are likely
software patents. Electrical, electronic and mechanical patents also contribute significantly
to the stock of automation patents. Robots, for example, fall in this category. By design, most
chemical and pharmaceutical patents are not classified as automation patents, but they make
up a large portion of the non-automation patents.
The rise in the total number of patents granted is a potential concern for the interpretation
of the time-dimension of patent texts. If the nature of patents had changed in parallel with
the number, so if the increase in patents is due to something else than an increase in research
productivity, the data might not be comparable across time. An increase in the number of
automation patents would then not be interpretable as an increase in automation technology.
Kortum and Lerner (1999) evaluate different possible explanations for why the number of
patent grants has changed: increased patent protection due to patentee-friendly court rul-
ings, regulatory capture by large firms that patent eagerly, new technology fields producing
patentable inventions (e.g., information technology, biotechnology and financial intermedia-
tion) and more applied research. The authors refute all hypotheses except for the increase in
research productivity. This result is in line with an OECD survey (OECD, 2004) in which
94 percent of surveyed firms responded that an increase in the number of inventions was
an important or very important driver of their increased patenting activity (66 percent very
important). In contrast, changes in patentability played only a minor role. We therefore con-
clude that the quality of patents granted has not changed over time and that we do not need to
worry about any distortive effects of a change in grant numbers. As an additional check, we
compute a deflated version of our indicator, for which we divide the number of automation
patents in each industry and year by the total number of patents granted in that specific year
relative to the number of patents granted in 1990. The resulting measure is an automation
count in units of 1990 patents, which takes higher values for earlier years and lower values
for later years than the original measure. Our empirical results in section 4 are insensitive to
the time deflation.
2.6 From Patents to Industries
Various researchers have proposed matchings of patents to industries. Hall et al. (2001)
identify firms filing for patents and Lybbert and Zolas (2014) propose an automated approach
that compares descriptions of industries with descriptions of patents’ technological classes.
The OECD (2011) reviews these techniques in more detail and Griliches (1990) describes the
difficulties in matching patents to industries.
However, we are interested in how automation technology affects labor markets. There-
fore, we aim to find the industries where automation patents are used, not where they origi-
nate. These two need not be the same, so that the industry of the patentee is not necessarily
the industry we want to assign the patent to. As an example, IBM owns many patents that are
not used in the computer industry, but by companies in the manufacturing or in the retail sec-
tor. These patents are either sold or licensed out. Attributing them to the computer industry
would overstate the automation intensity there, while understating it in the other sectors.
8Note that this is a different classification than the one we will employ to match patents to the industries they
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Table 3.4: Automation patents across industries of use
Industries Manufac- Automation Share SICs
turing patents (1000s) (1987)
Computers 3 499 88% 357
Other electronics 3 250 46% 36*
Measuring instruments; watches 3 193 60% 38
Telephones and telegraphs 3 185 68% 3661
Machines 3 183 40% 35*
Hospitals 137 46% 8062
Househ. audio and video equip. 3 104 69% 3651
Other services 118 47% 70-89*
Transportation equipment 3 115 39% 37
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, oil 3 101 18% 28, 30, 29
Utilities (transport, gas, sanitary) 57 44% E
Fabricated metal products 3 51 33% 34
Medical laboratories 37 64% 8071
Construction 34 24% C
Printing publishing; paper 3 34 32% 26, 27
Metal, stone, clay, glass, concrete 3 29 22% 32, 33
Retail and wholesale trade 26 32% G, F
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 24 33% A
R&D, management 3 23 64% 87
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 20 38% 39
Public administration; finance 20 47% J, H
Food, tobacco 3 19 24% 20, 21
Mining 16 37% B
Apparel, wood, furniture 3 15 17% 22-25, 31
total 2,290 46%
Note: Patents are counted if they can be used in an industry, as described in text. Numbers
are sums of patents 1976-2014. Shares are calculated by dividing automation patents by all
patents in industry. An asterisk * indicates that some subindustries are shown separately.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002) and own calculations.
Linking patents to the industries of their use is difficult. If we wanted to measure the
actual usage of a specific patent in a certain industry, we would need data on out-licensing.
But this information is not available, as firms and research institutions have incentives to
keep their licensing agreements private. Interpreting patents more indirectly as a proxy for
automation technology rather than a direct measure, we can use information about the areas
in which patents can potentially be applied. There have been attempts by Schmookler (1966)
and Scherer (1984) to manually classify patents and link them to industries of use, but this
would not be feasible for a large number of patents. Patent offices themselves usually do
not provide information on the link of patents to industries. However, we benefit from an
exception to this rule by the Canadian patent office. Between 1978 and 1993, Canadian
are likely to be used in. See section 2.6.
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patent officers assigned industries of use for all granted patents. Based on this information,
Kortum and Putnam (1997) assembled the “Yale Technology Concordance”, a way to link
patents through their technological classification to the industries in which they are likely
to be used. This is based on the assumption that the pattern linking patents’ technological
class to industries of use should be similar in Canada and the United States. We use the
files provided by Silverman (2002), who calculates empirical frequencies for cross-overs
from patent technology classes (IPCs) to 1987 SIC industries using 148,000 patents granted
between 1990 and 1993.9
This allows for a probabilistic matching. We connect a patent to an industry with the
probability of being used in that industry. So if patent A is used in two industries X and
Y, then half the patent count is assigned to industry X and half to Y. However, patents are
often assigned several IPC technology classifications. In that case, we divide each value for
that patent by the number of its IPCs. So if patent A now is assigned another IPC number,
then only a quarter of its value will now be attributed to industries X and Y each and the rest
to industries in the new IPC. This fractional counting of patents ensures that more general
patents that are assigned to several IPCs do not have get more weight than more specialized
patents that are assigned to fewer IPCs.10
As a result, we obtain an annual dataset of new patents and new automation patents that
can be used in 956 industries and over 39 years. Table 3.4 displays all automation patents
by industries of use over the whole time period 1976-2014. (The totals differ slightly from
Appendix Table 3.16 due to rounding errors and the probabilistic conversion to patent equiv-
alents as described before.)
Out of a total of 2.3 million automation patents, 1.8 million (79 percent) are used in the
manufacturing sector (division D in SIC 1987). Half a million automation patents could be
used in the production of computers (SIC 357) which includes personal computers, main-
frames, storage devices, terminals, billing machines, automatic teller machines and periph-
eral equipment such as printers, scanners, office equipments or typewriters. The production
of electronic devices, sensors and communication equipment also received a large number of
automation patents. Outside of the manufacturing sector, hospitals, utilities and medical lab-
oratories were assigned a large number of automation patents. In large parts of the economy
– such as agriculture, mining, public administration, finance or retail – only few automation
patents were granted. We also calculate the share of patents used in an industry that we clas-
sify as automation. This ratio is high for the computer industry or communication-related
industries and is low for the chemical industry or “Apparel, wood, furniture".
In our following empirical analysis, we interpret these indices as worker intensities by
fully assigning all new (automation) patents in an industry to each person employed in that
industry and year. This is equivalent to assuming that patents assigned to an industry will
potentially be used by everyone working in that industry. If we considered our indicator
narrowly as an exact measure of the use of patents in the production process, this would not
be a realistic assumption. But to us, a patent is just one part of an innovation process that will
produce many types of outputs. Being a measurable outcome of this process, patents serve
9The fact that we use only data for 1990–1993 means that the matching should be most precise during this
period, while becoming less exact the further away we move from this period. It helps that this periodis in the
middle of our sample, but the fact that patents grow much more near in the later years is some cause for concern.
10This also enables us to interpret the resulting indicator as full patent equivalents which we will still refer to
simply as “patents" in the remainder of the paper.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison with other indicators of automation
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Note: NIPA computer investment is the mean of 1976-2001 in millions of 1996 U.S. dollars, ASM
computer investment is the mean of 2002-2014 in thousands of 2009 U.S. dollars. Robots is the mean
number of robot shipments in the U.S. over 2003-2014 (U.S. data for 2003-2010 are imputed from
North America data). Automation patents are counted for the same time period as the respective
comparison data. All three figures show binscatters of log values.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002), NIPA, ASM and IRF (2014).
as a proxy for it.In our regressions we will use the total number of automation patents as our
main explanatory variable, but we will also control for the amount of all other patents that
can be used in an industry.
3. Comparison with Previous Automation Proxies
Next, we analyze how our new industry measure of automation technology is related to es-
tablished automation indicators. Previous proxies of automation differ from ours along two
lines. First, they are indicators of realized automation in the production process, not indica-
tors of automation technology. Second, most capture only one specific facet of automation
technology, such as computers or robots, while our indicator incorporates both and even al-
lows delineating it from other kinds of technological progress.
As a measure of computerization, studies use survey data of computer use at the work-
place (Autor et al., 2003, Beaudry et al., 2010) or industry-level investment in computer
capital (Autor et al., 2003, Michaels et al., 2014). Frey and Osborne (2017) manually assess
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Table 3.5: Relationship between automation patents and other automation proxies
contemp. 1st lag of 2nd lag of 3rd lag of
automation automation automation automation
A. Time fixed effects
computer invt 0.391*** 0.393*** 0.395*** 0.398***
(ASM) (0.0568) (0.0572) (0.0576) (0.0582)
computer invt 0.194** 0.193** 0.191* 0.189*
(NIPA) (0.0948) (0.0953) (0.0958) (0.0963)
robot ship- 0.0846 0.121 0.167 0.220
ments (IRF) (0.308) (0.323) (0.342) (0.365)
B. Time and industry fixed effects
computer invt 0.247** 0.250** 0.257** 0.259**
(ASM) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.128)
computer invt 0.336 0.322 0.272 0.250
(NIPA) (0.252) (0.243) (0.231) (0.220)
robot ship- 0.350*** 0.335*** 0.465*** 3.095**
ments (IRF) (0.120) (0.107) (0.156) (1.440)
Note: ASM: N = 2,524 (14-3 years with max 465 industries); NIPA: N = 1,380 (26-3
years with max 71 industries); IFR: N = 186 (11-3 years with max 24 industries).
The table shows results of regressions of various automation proxies on the log of
(one plus) the automation measure at the contemporaneous level and various lags.
Each coefficient estimate represents a separate regression. Data are annual; industry
fixed effects are at the most disaggregate level of industries, but at maximum at the
3-digit SIC level. Regressions include a constant. Industry-clustered standard errors
in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
the probability of computerization of a number of occupations. Akerman et al. (2015) exploit
a natural experiment, the introduction of broadband internet in Norway, to study employment
effects of automation.
As a proxy for physical automation innovations, Graetz and Michaels (2015), Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017) and Dauth et al. (2017) count the number of robots used in production,
a dataset assembled by the International Federation of Robotics. Lewis (2011) applies a
more general understanding of automation by looking at adoption rates for new automation
technologies, but with limited coverage of industries.
To show how our index relates to some of these measures, Figure 3.3 correlates automa-
tion patents with investment in computer capital and shipments of robots. We use two dif-
ferent data sources for investment in computer capital: The National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA), which provides annual data until 2001 for 71 2- and 3-digit SIC indus-
tries and the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), which is available annually from 2002
onwards and for 465 4-digit SIC industries, the majority of them being manufacturing in-
dustries. As a measure of robots, we use the dataset on robot shipments by the International
Federation of Robotics, which is provided at an annual frequency for North America starting
from 2004 for 24 SIC industries. All correlations are highly positive, which indicates that
our automation measure captures both advances in robotics and in software, which are then
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Figure 3.4: Automation patents and routine labor
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Note: Binscatter of log of total number of automation patents in industries against routine
task input share in 1960 across 258 SIC 3-digit industries, 1976-2014.
Source: Autor et al. (2003) and see text.
translated into production and trade of computers and robots.
This positive relationship holds even in a panel regression that controls for time- and/or
industry-specific effects. Table 3.5 shows further that the correlations are significant at var-
ious lags of automation, accounting for the fact that it may take some time to translate a
patented innovation into the actual production of this technology. Although the results across
the three variables are not directly comparable due to different time periods and industries
covered, the link with computer investment might be slightly stronger than that with robot
shipments.
Another way to contextualize our indicator is to evaluate how it relates to the nature of
jobs. A large strand of literature, pioneered by Autor et al. (2003), analyzes the labor market
effects of automation based on the assumption that automated machines are good at carrying
out repeated tasks and fail at complex intellectual or manual tasks. For each occupation, they
calculate what share of a job comprises routine (manual or cognitive) tasks. The resulting
routine-task index thus measures the outcome of automation given specific – theory- and data-
supported – assumptions. Weighing the index by occupation-specific employment, Autor
et al. (2003) further create a routine task intensity measure across 140 industries from 1960
to 1998, based on which they show that changes in routine-task intensity are predicted by
investment in computer capital: The share of non-routine tasks increases, whereas that of
routine tasks decreases as a result of computer investment.
Figure 3.4 plots the routine task share of industries in 1960 against new automation tech-
nology patented between 1976 and 2014.11 The relationship between automation patents and
the routine-task index is positive: The larger the routine task share of an industry in 1960,
the more automation technology was subsequently invented, patented and potentially used in
that industry in the following decades. Our indicator thus seems to be capturing the same
phenomenon as described by the literature on routine-biased technological change. The cor-
11Data on routine-task intensities at the industry level is obtained from David Autor’s website
economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor (accessed 14.07.2015). Their dataset is for U.S. Census industries
which we translate into SIC industries using a concordance scheme of the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table 3.6: Automation and industry task input
Outcome: Within-industry change in task input
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-98
∆ Non-routine analytic Auto Technology -0.012 0.033*** 0.011
(0.011) (0.005) (0.014)
Constant 0.068*** 0.110*** 0.139***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
R2 0.004 0.019 0.001
∆ Non-routine interactive Auto Technology 0.017* 0.062*** 0.007
(0.010) (0.008) (0.018)
Constant 0.131*** 0.206*** 0.279***
(0.017) (0.030) (0.036)
R2 0.004 0.016 0.000
∆ Routine cognitive Auto Technology -0.032** -0.066*** -0.031***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -0.081*** -0.185*** -0.254***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.038)
R2 0.008 0.027 0.003
∆ Routine manual Auto Technology -0.010*** -0.022*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.002 -0.058*** -0.095***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
R2 0.008 0.021 0.000
Note: The table presents separate OLS regressions for the subperiods 1970-1980, 1980-
1990 and 1990-1998, always using as explanatory variable the average change of new
automation patents between 1976 and 1998 (divided by 1000). The dependent variable is
the change in industry-level task input as calculated by Autor et al. (2003). Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
relation is strongest in the 1970s to 1980s and declines over time. We interpret this as a
sign that the nature of automation technology may have changed: While in the 1970s until
1990s, automation technology mostly replaced routine tasks, it nowadays spreads into other
tasks. This could be because many routine jobs have already been replaced by automation,
so that additional research in this area is less demanded and less profitable. Another possible
explanation is that recent advances in the automation technology frontier affect non-routine
workers by being able to replace more complex intellectual or manual tasks. (The self-driving
vehicle comes to mind.)
To explore this finding further, we examine the effects of technological change separately
for routine manual, routine cognitive, non-routine analytic and non-routine interactive tasks.
We regress changes in industry task input within each decade on our measure of new automa-
tion technology. This is a replication of a regression analysis by Autor et al. (2003), but we
replace investment in computer capital with our index. To stay as close to the analysis of
Autor et al. (2003) as possible we calculate the left-hand side variable separately for 1970-
1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-1998 whereas on the right-hand side, we use the mean of new
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automation patents over the whole time period from 1976 to 1998.12
Table 3.6 shows that more automation patents were granted in industries where routine
cognitive and routine manual task inputs declined and where the share of non-routine analytic
and non-routine interactive tasks increased. It is noteworthy that for all four task inputs the
effect is strongest in 1980-1990. This differs from Autor et al. (2003) who found that for
routine tasks the effect had monotonically increased over time.
4. Labor Market Effects of Automation Technology
In this section, we first motivate our unit of analysis, local labor markets, before explaining
how we translate our index from industries to U.S. commuting zones. We show graphically
how automation across commuting zones changed over time. Then, we apply the derived
measure in our econometric analysis of employment effects. In the regression set-up, we rely
on fixed effects five-year overlapping time periods, which we explain in detail before dis-
cussing the results. We run regressions for the full sample and separately for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing employment.
4.1 Commuting Zones as Level of Analysis
We study the effects of automation on employment at the level of U.S. commuting zones.
Tolbert and Sizer (1996) have grouped all counties of the U.S. mainland into 722 commuting
zones which each exhibit strong commuting ties within, but weak commuting ties between
one another. These regions are meant to approximate local labor markets. In response to a
shock to labor demand, most adjustments in the short- and medium-run will take place within
the local labor market (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Moretti, 2011). Workers, when laid off,
usually first look for a new job within the same commuting zone. This is particularly true for
low-skill workers, who are likely to be affected the most by automation (Notowidigdo, 2011).
Therefore, studying the effects of automation on employment on the level of commuting
zones gives us a more complete picture of the employment effects of automation than an
industry-level analysis, which would neglect worker flows from one industry to another. This
is of particular relevance because of the substantial shift of employment from manufacturing
to services in the sample period.
We use employment data by the County Business Patterns (CBP) to convert patents per
industry to worker patent automation intensities on a commuting zone level.13 To create
the commuting zone measure of automation, we first take (one plus) the natural logarithm
of industry-level automation patents in order to account for the different levels of patenting
across industries: In some industries the pace of technological progress is too fast for patents
12Results are very similar when we use the whole period that our indicator covers, 1976-2014. Alternatively,
we can count only automation patents of the decade for which the change in task input is calculated. The results
stay qualitatively the same. Regression outputs are available from the authors upon request.
13In this dataset, employment numbers are reported by county and 4-digit SIC (6-digit NAICS) industry. In
contrast to Census data, which is sometimes used for commuting zone analysis, CBP provides annual data for
the whole period of analysis. Agriculture (SIC < 1000) and public administration (SIC > 9000) are excluded
from CBP. To avoid imprecision due to SIC-NAICS correspondences and missing CBP employment data for
some particular industries, we aggregate employment and the automation index on the 3-digit SIC level before
matching.
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to be a feasible way to protect innovations, while in others, inventors have strategic reasons
not to file for a patent. We then divide the employment-weighted sum of automation patents
by total employment in the commuting zone. The resulting measure is
autointc,t︸    ︷︷    ︸
automation intensity
=
∑
i ln(1 + automation patentsi,t)Li,c,t
Lc,t
, (3.4)
where L is employment, i stands for industry, c for commuting zone and t for time period.
Figure 3.5 shows the number of automation patents per worker across U.S. commuting
zones in four subperiods: 1976-85, 1986-95, 1996-2005 and 2006-14. The colors represent
four quartiles of the distribution of automation intensity (in levels) in these subperiods: dark
red color signals the 25 percent of commuting zones with the most patents, white color signals
the 25 percent with the least patents. The map thus indicates which commuting zones have
a high or low share of patents relative to the rest of the United States in the specific sub-
period.14
There are pronounced regional patterns in the dispersion of available automation tech-
nology. Between 1976 and 1995, the region around the Great Lakes had a large automation
patent intensity relative to the rest of the United States. This stems from the conjunction
of both a high number of patents in manufacturing industries and a large share of industrial
employment in this area. Starting in the mid-1990s, many commuting zones in this region
move to a lower quartile as the number of manufacturing employees decreased relative to the
number of employees in sectors with fewer patents. But our map of automation density is not
simply a reflection of the manufacturing share. In a particular the Southern United States
The commuting zones with the highest automation intensities are more dispersed in the
1990s and 2000s. Commuting zones in Montana, North and South Dakota and Nebraska
attract many automation patents per employee. The Rocky Mountain region has a low share
of patents throughout the whole sample period. The map therefore reveals substantial geo-
graphic variation over time, which we exploit in the regression analysis.
14As the legend shows, the absolute number of patents has increased across all quartiles. An individual
commuting zone may thus have had its absolute number of patents increase constantly over time, but change
from dark red to white because the index increased relatively more slowly than in other commuting zones.
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Figure 3.5: Intensity of automation patents across commuting zones, 1976-2014
(a) 1976-1985 (b) 1986-1995
(c) 1996-2005 (d) 2006-2014
Note: Shows averages of the number of national automation patents that can be used by a single
worker.
Source: USPTO, Google, Silverman (2002), CBP and own calculations.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
Our dependent variable is the five-year change in the employment-to-population ratio Lc/popc
in commuting zone c:
∆
Lc,t
popc,t
=
Lc,t
popc,t
− Lc,t−5
popc,t−5
,
where in contrast to automation, we observe employment directly at the commuting-zone
level. We choose a medium term period as new patents might start to be used by firms only
with some lags.15 This also holds the additional benefit of smoothing out business cycle
effects.
The main explanatory variable is the five-year sum of the automation intensity in a com-
muting zone:
∑4
s=0 autointc,t−s. By using sums, we interpret patents as a flow measure of
technology and therefore, the five-year sum of new patents is the five-year difference in the
stock of patents.
In our econometric analysis we ask the following question: What is the impact of newly
available nationwide automation technology on changes in the employment structure at the
local level? In order to answer this question causally, we need to argue convincingly that
our automation measure is exogenous to employment changes. The main potential source of
endogeneity is that in their research activity, firms may be reacting to local developments, for
example changes in labor costs, regulations or demand, thus introducing a reverse causality
bias. There are several reasons why this is less of a concern for us:
Automation by industry of use: Assigning patents to the industries where they are likely
to be used, not filed, weakens the danger of reverse causality: The research effort of a firm
in one industry is less directly linked to employment trends in another industry than, for ex-
ample, data on actual investment in automation technology. Additionally, many patents are
granted to universities, research institutes or individuals that might follow other objectives
than profit maximization, for example intellectual curiosity or an interest in advancing sci-
ence. These sources of innovation are of relevance, as in year 2000 about 7000 patent licenses
to firms were issued by U.S. universities and U.S. public research institutions (OECD, 2003).
Further, around half of the patents granted by the USPTO are filed by foreign applicants. This
reduces the potential for a feedback from industry wage structure to innovative activity, as a
patent from, for example, a manufacturer in Japan is less likely to respond to employment
conditions in the manufacturing industry in the United States.
National innovation, local effects: We measure innovations at the level of national in-
dustries, whereas we observe employment changes locally. Our constructed commuting zone
automation measure is thus a proxy for unobserved locally applicable innovation in the spirit
of Bartik (1991), as recently explained by Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2017). A
national industry is unlikely to react to local employment trends in its research activity un-
less the following conditions hold: First, the specific commuting zone is of key importance
to the industry (by hosting a large share of industry employment) and second, the industry
is represented strongly in the commuting zone, so that industry trends will translate directly
into commuting zone employment trends. These conditions do not drive our findings: In our
sample, only two commuting zones are above the 25 percent double threshold (CZ 35002 in
15Results are robust to changing the length of a period.
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Arizona and CZ 37601 in Nevada, in both of which mining is dominant) and only 34 commut-
ing zones are above the 10 percent double threshold. Excluding these does not significantly
change the results.
Fixed industry structure: We fix the employment structure in equation (3.4) to the be-
ginning of each five-year period. This means that in the following five years we assign all
patents to a commuting zone according to the initial employment share of relevant industries
in this commuting zone. Our indicator thus does not pick up employment changes that hap-
pen within the five-year period. A downside of keeping the employment structure fixed is
that we potentially do not count all those patents which workers in a commuting zone can
use, but might over-represent declining and under-represent growing industries.16
Additionally, in Secion 4.6 we exploit information on the owners of patents in order to
identify innovations that more likely result from research effort that is unrelated to trends in
US labor markets. We show that our baseline regression results hold when focusing only
on patents held by foreigners, governments or universities and public research institutes, or
when using these as instruments for the patents held by US companies.
4.3 Regression Set-up
We consider changes in overlapping five-year time periods and the sample therefore com-
prises 34 consecutive five-year periods across 722 commuting zones.17
The estimation equation takes the form
∆
Lc,t
popc,t
= αk + γt + β1
4∑
s=0
autointc,t−s + β2
4∑
s=0
non-autointc,t−s + β3routinec,t−5+
β4
 4∑
s=0
autointc,t−s × routinec,t−5
 + X′c,t−5 β5 + εc,t,t−5 ,
(3.5)
where γt are time fixed effects and αk are state fixed effects. Xc,t−5 are additional control
variables. The main variable of interest autoint is automation intensity, non-autoint is the in-
tensity of any non-automation patents and routine is the routine task share which we describe
below. To construct the left-hand side variable, we take county level population data from
the Census Population and Housing Unit Estimates and county-level employment data from
CBP. Because the CBP omits employment in some SIC industries for certain years, there are
a few large jumps in the outcome variable, which we exclude from the analysis by dropping
data below the 1th and beyond the 99th percentile in each year.18
In addition to commuting zone intensities of automation patents, we include intensities
of non-automation patents (non-autoint) in the regression, computed analogously to equation
16The results are however robust to using an adaptive industry structure.
17The overlapping data structure generates serial correlation. We correct the standard errors by using the
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator, which corrects both for serial and spacial correlation. An alternative
would be to use non-overlapping time periods. But not only would this mean losing a considerable amount of
observations (and thus precision), but it would also require us to choose cut-off points for the five-year intervals,
which would always be to some extent arbitrary. As shown in the appendix, all main results go through using
this more standard estimation procedure instead.
18For details, see census.gov/program-surveys/cbp/technical-documentation. The number of
commuting zones in each year falls to 708.
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics of main variables in baseline regression
Variable Mean Overall Between Within Min Max
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
∆ emp/pop 1.19 2.71 0.710 2.62 -9.40 13.2
∆ manu emp/pop -0.342 1.08 0.457 0.977 -5.35 4.33
∆ non-manu emp/pop 1.53 2.19 0.542 2.12 -8.63 12.9
autoint 16.4 3.02 1.23 2.76 7.63 28.6
non-autoint 18.8 1.89 1.38 1.29 8.88 26.7
routine 34.4 5.32 4.25 3.20 8.51 56.3
Note: Variables are as defined in the text.
(3.4). This variable controls for the effect of technological change other than in automation
technology. Given that some industries generally patent more, it is likely that the number of
automation patents and non-automation patents granted annually are correlated across indus-
tries and commuting zones. At the same time, non-automation inventions may also have an
independent effect on employment. In particular, they may be interpreted as an indicator for
local growth potential, which we might otherwise suspect to be accountable for correlations
between automation and employment: If growing industries increase their workforce as well
as invest more in R&D, this should be reflected by the coefficient on non-autoint.
As described in Section 3, an often-used measure of susceptibility to automation is the
routine-task index by Autor et al. (2003). The different construction of this measure from
ours creates the opportunity to explore how the effects of these two are related and to ask the
question: How does the effect of automation depend on the routine task share of a commuting
zone? We therefore include the initial (t − 5) routine task share (routine) in the regression as
well as an interaction term between this measure and the variable for automation intensity.
We further include the initial share of manufacturing employment in total employment
(CBP) to capture structural change in the economy. Automation patents occur to a larger
extent in the manufacturing sector than in the service sector, so an increase in the automation
index may parallel a decline in the manufacturing industry for other reasons, such as the
cheap import of manufactured goods from abroad or changes in the demand for goods. If not
included as a control, any effect stemming from non-automation-related structural change
might be attributed to automation technology.
Similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), our set-up also includes the log of initial com-
muting zone population because employment in larger and smaller commuting zones – in
particular when interpreting this as a proxy for urban vs. rural areas – might react differ-
ently to automation. We also control for the share of non-white citizens in the commuting
zone population and for the (log of) per capita level of personal income. Data on the demo-
graphic variables are taken from the Census Population and Housing Unit Estimates, data
on income come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Economic Information
System (REIS), which exploits county-level data from administrative records and censuses.
Table 3.7 summarizes the main variables of interest. Employment per population grew
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on average over the sample period.19 Employment changes were negative on average for
the manufacturing sector and positive for the non-manufacturing sector with more within and
across variation for the latter.20 Our automation intensity measure autoint takes the value 16.4
on average across years and commuting zones. This value is equivalent to a commuting zone
with a flat industry structure (i.e., all 377 SIC 3-digit industries having the same employment
share) where 25 new automation patents are granted every year in all industries. Because
patents are skewed across industries, this number will be larger for most industries.
4.4 Estimation Results: Total Employment
Table 3.8 presents the baseline results. Throughout almost all specifications, autoint has a
significantly positive coefficient in the range of around 0.10 to 0.23 percentage points. So new
automation technology per worker is significantly related to employment gains in the same
commuting zone. This result is robust to controlling for several economic and demographic
variables.
Column (1) shows the positive association between automation and employment when no
further controls but time and industry fixed effects are included. The relationship becomes
more pronounced when we control for other non-automation patents in column (2). Columns
(3) shows our preferred regression specification. The coefficient on autoint in column (3)
can be interpreted such that a one-unit increase in the automation intensity leads to a 0.178
percentage point increase in the employment-to-population ratio. As laid out in Table 3.7,
this is about one sixth of the average five-year increase across all observations. The within-
year interquartile range of autoint lies between 1.23 and 2.15, so a one-unit increase is well
within the range of variation of the sample. In terms of the actual number of new patents
that this implies, a one-unit increase in autoint around its mean is equivalent to the number
of new automation patents in a commuting zone with a flat industry structure rising from 23
to 29 per year.
A particularly interesting result is how automation technology interacts with the routine
task share. In the setup with both variables in column (4), the coefficients on automation and
on routine-intensity become insignificant. This is likely due to the fact that the variables mea-
sure overlapping concepts, as argued in Section 3. However, both coefficients are significant
when we include the interaction between the two variables. The negative coefficient on the
interaction shows that the magnitude of the effect of automation on employment varies with
the level of the routine task share: In commuting zones with more routine labor, automation
technology has a less positive effect. The total effect of automation in column (5) turns nega-
tive for commuting zones with a routine task share larger or equal to 54.5 percent. The mean
of routine is 34.4 and in only 0.1 percent of all observations it exceeds 54.5 percent. So, the
total effect of automation is positive in the overwhelming majority of commuting zones.
Non-automation patents are not associated with changes in employment. This might be
19This is mainly driven by increases in female labor market participation, which rose from 47 percent in 1976
to 57 percent in 2014, peaking at 60 percent in 1999. (See the BLS series LNS11300000, LNS11300001 and
LNS11300002.) Male participation rates fell quite monotonously from 78 percent in 1976 to 69 percent in 2014.
We take care of these structural long-run changes in the labor market not related to automation through time
fixed effects.
20We will use “non-manufacturing” and “services” interchangeably, but “non-manufacturing” also includes
mining and construction.
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Table 3.8: Labor market effects of automation, five-year overlapping time periods
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.105*** 0.222*** 0.178** 0.144 0.563**
(0.0363) (0.0783) (0.0853) (0.0886) (0.214)
non-autoint -0.120 -0.0245 0.0249 -0.0170
(0.0997) (0.0931) (0.0920) (0.0989)
manufacturing -1.782* -1.211 -1.177
(1.016) (1.082) (1.121)
population 0.0875 0.0745 0.0525
(0.114) (0.108) (0.102)
income -1.319*** -1.284*** -1.232***
(0.351) (0.347) (0.338)
non-white -1.222*** -1.256*** -1.383***
(0.259) (0.273) (0.283)
routine -0.0257 0.143*
(0.0161) (0.0787)
autoint × routine -0.0109**
(0.00468)
Observations 24,064 24,064 24,064 24,064 24,064
R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43
Note: The table presents fixed effects regressions using five-year changes in employ-
ment as percent of commuting zone population as the dependent variable. autoint and
non-autoint are five-year sums of new automation and non-automation technology.
routine is the initial percentage of routine tasks in commuting zone employment. The
initial manufacturing share, the log of initial commuting zone population, the log of
initial per capita income and the initial share of non-white citizens in the population
are further controls . All regressions include state and year fixed effects and a con-
stant. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p
< 0.1.
driven by the nature of these innovations. Many non-automation patents are chemical or
pharmaceutical and some are patents without any clear applications. In contrast, automation
patents are required by our definition to have at least a distantly recognizable application.
The initial manufacturing share has a mildly significant negative coefficient in our base-
line setup of column (3), which might capture the part of the secular trend from manufacturing
to services that takes place in the five-year periods we study. The population size is not sig-
nificantly related to employment changes. A higher per capita income negatively predicts
employment changes across all specifications. The employment level is generally higher in
commuting zones with a higher per capita income. This could be a sign of convergence in
employment shares across commuting zones, but could also reflect a reversely causal effect:
as personal income is composed to a large extent of labor income, there could be slower em-
ployment growth in commuting zones with a higher wage level, because it is more costly to
create jobs. A higher share of the non-white population is negatively associated with employ-
ment changes.
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Our findings thus paint a more positive picture of the net employment effects of automa-
tion than Autor et al. (2015), Graetz and Michaels (2015) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017),
who found negative or insignificant effects of automation on jobs.21 It is, however, in line with
the findings by Gregory et al. (2016), who show that next to a substitution effect on routine-
task jobs, automation lower the production costs. Declining goods prices boost product de-
mand, and so new (non-routine) jobs are created. The positive product demand effect trumps
the negative substitution effect. Both the positive level effect of automation and the negative
coefficient on the interaction term with the routine task share in our regressions support this
explanation. By using a broader measure of automation, we can thus extend the knowledge
on its employment effects beyond the findings of a literature that focuses on specific types of
automation.
4.5 Estimation Results: Sectoral Employment
We further study the effect of automation on different types of employment separately. Table
3.9 shows pointedly different effects of automation technology on manufacturing and non-
manufacturing employment.
Panel A consistently shows that manufacturing employment falls when the automation in-
tensity increases. The effect is significant in our preferred specification (3) and when adding
the routine task share in column (4). In contrast to the total US population, the group of
manufacturing workers experiences job losses - even when controlling for the initial man-
ufacturing share, which itself has a significantly negative effect. The negative employment
effect of automation is more pronounced in commuting zones with a higher routine task share,
as the interaction term shows. It turns positive only for commuting zones with a routine task
share below 20.9 percent. This is only the case for 115 out of 24,058 observations. Panel B
paints a very different picture. In non-manufacturing industries, automation has a very robust
job-creating effect. The coefficients are twice as large as in Table 3.8. Non-manufacturing
occupations are clear beneficiaries from automation in terms of employment numbers. In
contrast to Panel A, the routine task share in the commuting zone does not play a significant
role for the size of the automation effect.
Related to this, the coefficient on the routine task share also reveals strong differences
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment. Commuting zones with a lot
of routine labor lose more manufacturing jobs, but this is not the case for non-manufacturing
employment. This is likely due to the larger share of routine tasks in the manufacturing than
in the service sector. These findings may explain why Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), in
their analysis of the impact of robot use on employment, found automation to be harmful
for employment and why Graetz and Michaels (2015), using the same dataset, found evi-
dence for skill polarizing effects of robots: Robots are mainly used in the manufacturing
sector and indeed 19 out of the 24 industries covered by IRF robot data are manufacturing
industries. Other types of automation innovations, in particular those that can be used in the
non-manufacturing sector, may have a more positive effect on employment than industrial
robots. Indeed, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) show that the effect of robots is less negative
or even positive in non-manufacturing industries. They also find that computer usage tends
to increase the demand for labor.
21Section 4.5 sheds light on why this is the case.
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Table 3.9: Labor market effects of automation for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
employment, fixed employment structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.0169 -0.0480 -0.173*** -0.200*** 0.144
(0.0176) (0.0665) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0911)
non-autoint 0.0317 0.235*** 0.275*** 0.240***
(0.0747) (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0218)
manufacturing -2.581*** -2.142*** -2.127***
(0.587) (0.617) (0.656)
population -0.0335** -0.0437*** -0.0608***
(0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0149)
income -0.739*** -0.712*** -0.668***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.201)
non-white -0.122 -0.150 -0.259
(0.238) (0.232) (0.214)
routine -0.0200*** 0.119**
(0.00247) (0.0437)
autoint × routine -0.00898***
(0.00243)
Observations 24,058 24,058 24,058 24,058 24,058
R2 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.113*** 0.278*** 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.420***
(0.0344) (0.0984) (0.0768) (0.0799) (0.147)
non-autoint -0.169 -0.293*** -0.290*** -0.296***
(0.112) (0.0870) (0.0840) (0.0894)
manufacturing 0.852 0.883 0.887
(0.728) (0.719) (0.726)
population 0.118 0.117 0.115
(0.109) (0.103) (0.101)
income -0.612** -0.610** -0.604*
(0.291) (0.299) (0.298)
non-white -1.105*** -1.107*** -1.122***
(0.178) (0.188) (0.194)
routine -0.00136 0.0186
(0.0173) (0.0384)
autoint × routine -0.00129
(0.00256)
Observations 24,067 24,067 24,067 24,067 24,067
R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Note: The table presents fixed effects regressions for five-year changes in manufactur-
ing employment-to-population and non-manufacturing employment-to-population. The
control variables are defined as in Table 3.8. All regressions include state and year fixed
effects and a constant. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p
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We add to the existing literature by documenting different effects of automation on manu-
facturing and non-manufacturing employment: Next to a polarization in skills and tasks, au-
tomation has lead to a sectoral shift. Manufacturing sector jobs win, while non-manufacturing
jobs lose from automation.
The results presented in this and the previous section are robust to weighing patents by
how often they have been cited. Patent citations are sometimes used as an indicator of the
value of an invention and therefore, giving stronger weight to highly cited patents might
paint a more realistic picture of the degree to which a patent is used in the production pro-
cess. In Tables 3.19 and 3.20 we replicate the regressions presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 us-
ing a citations-weighted measure of automation, which we explain further in the Appendix.
While our sample is thus shortened by several years, we still find a mildly positive effect
of automation for total employment and a pronounced disparity between manufacturing and
non-manufacturing.
4.6 Effects of Automation by Assignees
Patents contain information on who owns (or “is assigned") a patent. This information is
valuable, because it hints on how closely a patentee’s research activities are linked to de-
velopments in US labor markets. Innovation activity by entities that do not have business
interests in US markets is less likely to be influenced by developments on US labor mar-
kets. By focusing on new automation technologies that are originating from such groups, we
therefore get a cleaner identification.
To classify the patents, we use data by Lai, D’Amour, Yu, Sun, Doolin, and Fleming
(2011), who extract the names of assignees from 1976 until 2012 and provide a host of other
information about patents and their owners. We focus on patents held by three groups of
assignees, who we believe to be less directly responsive to US labor market trends than US
companies: foreigners (these can be companies, individuals or public entities), government
bodies (US or foreign) and universities and public research institutes.22
Research by foreigners can be assumed to respond to developments in their home country
rather than in the United States, as long as the following two conditions are met: The company
does not operate on a large scale in the United States, and the domestic labor market trends
are not linked to US trends. We do not observe if these conditions hold, so the group of
foreigners is the most endogenous of the three. Universities and public research institutes
conduct more basic research than corporations, so for them, the immediate applicability or
profit maximization might only be a distant motivation. Government patents are also unlikely
to be motivated by labor market developments, but should rather respond to military buildups,
the needs of certain ministries or cycles in budgetary planning.
Table 3.10 shows summary statistics for patents by the different groups of assignees. US
firms are the largest group with around 1.9 million patents. The second largest group are
foreigners, who hold 1.8 million patents. Based on the classification by Lai et al. (2011), we
identify 45 thousand patents that are assigned to governments. The most important assignees
in this category are the US Navy with 10,922 patents, the US Army with 6,217 patents,
the US Department of Energy with 4,416 patents, the US Air Force with 3448 patents and
22These groups are mostly mutually exclusive, but we count foreign governments (a small group) in both the
“foreign” and the “governments” category and foreign universities also show up in the foreigners category.
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Table 3.10: Assignee summary statistics, 1976-2012
Assignee Patents Automat Share Cit. Cit. Excl. Length
(1000s) (1000s) (weighted)
US firm 1875.7 948.3 51% 12.2 1.24 14% 1012.3
foreigners 1827.8 777.1 43% 7.1 0.78 12% 831.5
universities 115.1 67.0 58% 10.4 1.02 41% 1435.8
governments 44.8 19.1 43% 8.6 0.74 17% 700.8
missing 609.9 187.5 31% 9.7 0.91 9% 653.8
Note: “Automat" are automation patents as described in text. “Cit." are the average number of
citations, “Cit. (weighted)" are the number of citations after removing time-subclassification
(HJT) means, where subgroups correspond to those of Table 3.17. “Excl." is the share of
excluded patents due to being pharmaceutical and chemical patents. “Length" is the average
number of lines in a patent document.
Source: Lai et al. (2011) and own calculations.
NASA with 2,823 patents. The largest foreign government institutions owning US patents
are French nuclear energy and aviation commissions and the British and Canadian defense
ministries. To identify patents assigned to universities, we inspected the 10,000 assignees
with the most patents and determined whether they are an university or a public research
institute. There are 581 such entities holding a total of 115 thousand patents. The most
productive are the University of California (5,400 patents), the Industrial Research Institute
of Taiwan (4,289 patents), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (3897 patents), the
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute from South Korea (3,606 patents) and
the French Institute of Petroleum (2,471 patents). For the remaining 610 thousand patents,
we do not know the assignee, as this information is missing in Lai et al. (2011). A casual
inspection of these patents suggests that most of these also belong to US firms or individuals.
The automation patents assigned to foreigners, universities or governments may be of a
different nature than those held by US firms – not just for their less direct link to economic
developments in the United States, but for reasons related to their applicability. We might see
different effects of automation on employment if they were not representative of the technol-
ogy frontier in automation. Table 3.10 shows that patents held by US firms are characterized
by a larger share of automation patents and are more widely cited than those held by other
patentees. However, automation patents are highly correlated across groups at the industry
level, as Table 3.11 shows. Automation innovations by governmental, foreign and university
patentees seem to be applicable in similar industries as automation innovations patented by
US firms or individuals. This is not the case when considering all patents. So while it is
reasonable to assume that patented automation technology is similar across assignee groups,
this is not the case for technology in general.
Indeed, the types of patented innovations differ across technology subgroups. As Ta-
ble 3.17 shows, US firms hold a particularly high share of “Communication & Computer"
patents, which contain a large number of automation patents. Foreigners hold fewer phar-
maceutical patents, but many mechanical patents and their patents are cited least often. The
column “Cit. (weighted)" in Table 3.10 shows that this holds even after controlling for time
and subgroup fixed effects. Universities hold many chemical and pharmaceutical patents
and few in the “Communication & Computer" category. These patents are also particularly
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Table 3.11: SIC-level correlation of patents in assignee subcategories with US companies
Assignee Patents Automation
year year & SIC year year & SIC
foreigners 0.33 0.33 0.94 0.95
universities 0.35 0.36 0.88 0.88
governments -0.45 -0.43 0.02 0.04
Note: Numbers show correlations of subcategories with the cat-
egories of US firms and missing assignees. "year" indicates that
year trends are taken out, "year & SIC" indicates that year and
industry trends are taken out.
lengthy. In contrast, governments hold many patents on electric and electronic innovations,
and the corresponding patent texts are shorter than those from other assignees.
We replicate our empirical analysis from the previous section in two ways. First, we re-
peat the panel data regressions of Table 3.8 and Table 3.9, but for autoint and non-autoint we
use the intensities computed from either only university patents, foreign patents or govern-
ment patents. Second, we use all three automation sub-indicators as instrumental variables
for possibly more endogenous category of US companies and non-identified assignees. The
purpose of this exercise is to extract only the component of automation that is unrelated to US
labor market developments. As we only have assignee data until 2012, we limit our analysis
to the period 1976 to 2012.
For university patents, we document positive net effects of automation on employment.
The same holds when using all three groups of automation patents as instruments in col-
umn (4). It is striking that again none of the effects of automation on total employment is
negative. The size of the coefficient in Table 3.8 lies in the middle of the new estimates.
Table 3.13 reports separate results for manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment.
We find negative effects of automation on manufacturing employment for all assignee groups
apart from university patents. All types of patented automation technology lead a rise in
non-manufacturing employment. The magnitude of the coefficients again frame the previous
estimates. The findings strongly support the results from our baseline analysis and thus show
that the earlier findings were likely not biased by endogeneity of the regressors.
While having roughly the same effects on employment, we can detect slight differences
between the patent assignee categories. Automation technology patented by universities and
public research institutes has the most strongly positive effects on employment and even
the manufacturing sector does not lose from this type of technology. The negative employ-
ment effects of automation on the manufacturing sector are strongest when we consider only
government patents. Why could this be the case? Universities hold many chemical and
pharmaceutical patents, while governments patent many electrical and mechanical patents
(Table 3.17). But as explained before, we exclude most chemical and pharmaceutical patents
and the classification algorithm further extracts only a relevant subset of patents. As Ta-
ble 3.18 shows, the makeup of the final automation patents does not differ much between
those two groups of assignees. Pharmaceutical patents make for 4 percent of university au-
tomation patents and 1 percent of government university patent. A more likely explanation
is that the innovations by universities and governments differ along other dimensions that we
do not measure.
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Table 3.12: Labor market effects of automation, various assignee groups
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4)
university foreign gov’t IV
autoint 0.410* 0.153 -0.108 0.128*
(0.217) (0.128) (0.223) (0.0717)
non-autoint -0.332 0.0145 0.379 0.0344
(0.238) (0.144) (0.252) (0.0756)
manufacturing -0.769 -2.017 -2.061* -1.961***
(1.217) (1.203) (1.058) (0.377)
population 0.121 0.110 0.113 0.119***
(0.114) (0.112) (0.116) (0.0232)
income -1.225*** -1.393*** -1.358*** -1.358***
(0.342) (0.369) (0.370) (0.192)
non-white -1.277*** -1.256*** -1.301*** -1.255***
(0.233) (0.256) (0.250) (0.255)
Observations 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648
R2 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
Note: All columns replicate column (3) of Table 3.8. In columns (1) - (3),
the full automation measure is replaced by automation by universities,
foreigners and governments, respectively. The non-automation measure
is constructed accordingly. The last column represents an IV regression,
where university, foreign and government (automation) patents are used
as instruments for the remaining (automation) patents. Standard errors in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5. Reassessing the Literature
With our new dataset we revisit findings from two important papers of the literature on the
local labor market effects of automation. We investigate whether our measure of automation
predicts different effects for the growth of non-college service sector jobs (Autor and Dorn,
2013) and how the effects of automation compare with those from China import competition
(Autor et al., 2015).23 Apart from gaining additional insights through our new indicator, this
allows comparing our results to the findings from the literature using the established routine-
share measure.
5.1 Revisiting Autor and Dorn (2013):
The Non-College Service Sector and Employment Polarization
Autor and Dorn (2013) address the issue why there has been an increasing polarization in both
employment and wages in 1980-2005. They focus on non-college service sector jobs (e.g.,
cleaners or security guards), which have grown more rapidly than other less-educated and
low-paying occupations (such as factory work) and which have experienced wage increases.
23Data and replication files for both papers are from David Dorn’s website, ddorn.net/data (accessed
10.02.2017).
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Table 3.13: Labor market effects of automation for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
employment, various assignee groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
university foreign gov’t IV
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.120 -0.208*** -0.435*** -0.216***
(0.114) (0.0314) (0.128) (0.0329)
non-autoint 0.157 0.286*** 0.518*** 0.303***
(0.145) (0.0375) (0.169) (0.0331)
manufacturing -1.796** -2.827*** -2.441*** -2.807***
(0.672) (0.652) (0.693) (0.171)
population -0.0399*** -0.0429*** -0.0419*** -0.0321***
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.00941)
income -0.807*** -0.793*** -0.862*** -0.724***
(0.213) (0.234) (0.213) (0.0746)
non-white -0.287 -0.130 -0.310 -0.0937
(0.264) (0.257) (0.270) (0.125)
Observations 22,642 22,642 22,642 22,642
R2 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.518*** 0.380*** 0.354*** 0.374***
(0.170) (0.112) (0.125) (0.0598)
non-autoint -0.479** -0.304** -0.175 -0.314***
(0.204) (0.135) (0.148) (0.0637)
manufacturing 0.912 0.897 0.337 0.963***
(0.849) (0.842) (0.605) (0.310)
population 0.157 0.150 0.150 0.147***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0200)
income -0.431 -0.611* -0.506 -0.661***
(0.304) (0.311) (0.314) (0.167)
non-white -0.989*** -1.143*** -0.978*** -1.188***
(0.138) (0.131) (0.146) (0.207)
Observations 22,650 22,650 22,650 22,650
R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: All columns replicate column (3) of Table 3.9. In columns (1) - (3),
the full automation measure is replaced by automation by universities, for-
eigners and governments, respectively. The non-automation measure is con-
structed accordingly. The last column represents an IV regression, where
university, foreign and government (automation) patents are jointly used as
instruments for the remaining (automation) patents. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The authors hypothesize that this is due, among other things, to an increase in automation
technology: Automation has reduced the demand for routine manual tasks, while increasing
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the demand for non-routine manual tasks, thus benefiting non-college service sector jobs at
the expense of non-college production jobs.
In their empirical analysis, Autor and Dorn (2013) use the routine-task share as a proxy for
automation and show that in commuting zones where initially more people worked in routine
occupations, there was a larger increase in non-college service employment. In Table 3.14,
column (1), we reproduce their finding to the letter.
Table 3.14: Automation and non-college service employment, 1980-2005
Outcome: 10 × annual change in share of non-college
employment in service occupations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
routine 0.105*** 0.105*** -0.336
(0.0320) (0.0284) (0.230)
autoint -0.00100 -0.000990 -0.00533**
(0.000688) (0.000645) (0.00227)
routine × autoint 0.0139*
(0.00695)
Constant -0.00632 0.0568*** 0.0241 0.161**
(0.0104) (0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0740)
R2 0.179 0.171 0.185 0.188
Note: 2,166 observations (3 time periods × 722 commuting zones); robust
standard errors in parentheses; all models include state fixed-effects and pe-
riod fixed effects and are weighted by start of period commuting zone share
of national population.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Own calculations following Autor and Dorn (2013), Table 5.
We then add autoint, our new automation intensity measure. The interaction term in col-
umn (4) between autoint and routine is positive and significant: Non-college service jobs rise
in commuting zones with a high routine-task share initially and where many new automation
patents could be used. This is consistent with the model presented by Autor and Dorn (2013)
and highlights an important piece of evidence: the presence of those routine jobs that can be
easily automated is necessary for the shift of low-skilled employment into the service sector,
not the availability of automation technology by itself.
However, the total effect of automation changes from negative to positive only at a routine-
task share of 0.38, a number reached by just 2 out of 2,166 observations and the coefficient
on autoint in columns (2) and (3) is insignificant. So although we found in Section 4.5 that
automation creates non-manufacturing jobs, the rise in non-college service jobs depends cru-
cially on the mix between automation and the existence of routine jobs.
5.2 Revisiting Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015):
Automation vs. Chinese Trade Exposure
Since the 1990’s, there has been a strong rise in trade between the United States and China.
A number of papers, such as Autor et al. (2013), Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Pierce and
Schott (2016), argue that Chinese import competition is responsible for employment losses
in those regions where firms reside that are most exposed to it. Autor et al. (2015) investigate
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Table 3.15: Labor market effects of automation patents, routine employment share and expo-
sure to Chinese import competition, 1990-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: Share of employed in workage population
routine -0.0481 -0.0369 -0.207 -0.185
(0.224) (0.233) (0.254) (0.260)
autoint 0.215*** 0.206*** 0.331*** 0.297***
(0.0670) (0.0748) (0.0757) (0.0792)
∆ (Imports from China -0.831*** -0.832*** -0.942***
to US)/Worker (0.215) (0.181) (0.221)
B. Outcome: Share of unemployed in workage population
routine -0.0144 -0.0247 -0.00513 -0.0104
(0.0616) (0.0653) (0.0702) (0.0728)
autoint -0.0579** -0.0645** -0.0926*** -0.0914***
(0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0222) (0.0285)
∆ (Imports from China 0.186*** 0.249*** 0.221***
to US)/Worker (0.0527) (0.0676) (0.0612)
C. Outcome: Share of not in labor force in workage population
routine 0.0624 0.0616 0.213 0.195
(0.172) (0.178) (0.194) (0.197)
autoint -0.158*** -0.141** -0.239*** -0.206***
(0.0538) (0.0608) (0.0667) (0.0672)
∆ (Imports from China 0.645*** 0.583*** 0.721***
to US)/Worker (0.188) (0.155) (0.190)
Note: The table is based on Autor et al. (2015), Table 1, juxtaposing the effect of Chinese import compe-
tition and routine biased technological change on 10-year equivalent changes in the employment status of
the working-age population. N = 1444 (2 time periods 1990-2000, 2000-2007, 722 commuting zones). All
regressions control for the start of period levels of share of employment in manufacturing, share of popu-
lation that is college educated, share of population that is foreign born, employment rate among females
and Census division dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on state. Models are
weighted by start of period commuting zone share of national population. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.1.
whether this “China shock" or automation has a larger impact on U.S. labor markets. They
find that while import competition reduces employment in local labor markets, automation –
as measured by the routine task share – is not related to employment changes.
We revisit this finding with our dataset. Table 3.15 replicates the baseline analysis of
Autor et al. (2015), Table 1, in which the authors regress 10-year equivalent changes in the
employment-to-population ratio, unemployment-to-population ratio and non-participation rate
among working age adults. The two main variables of interest are the contemporaneous
change in Chinese import exposure per worker and the start-of-decade employment share in
routine occupations, both of which are being instrumented.24
24The instrument for the trade variable is imports from China to other advanced economies. For the initial
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Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.15 are exact replications of columns (1) and (3) of Autor
et al. (2015), one containing only the initial routine share, the other one both the routine share
and the China shock as explanatory variables. In columns (2) and (5), we replace the routine
share by our commuting zone automation intensity. While the coefficient on the routine
share is always insignificant, our automation measure has a significantly positive effect on the
employment share and a significantly negative effects on both share of unemployed workers
and the share of workers that are not in the labor force. This even holds when including both
autoint and the routine task share. Automation patents have positive effects by reducing the
unemployment rate and the number of people outside of the labor force, with a larger effect
on the latter group.
An additional finding is that while the effect of the routine task share stays insignificant
when including the China shock in column (5), the estimates become even more strongly
positive when using our automation indicator. The coefficient on the China shock change
little when using autoint (column (5)) instead of the routine (column (4)). This lends further
support to the findings of Autor et al. (2015) on the detrimental effect of Chinese import
competition, while automation is playing a more positive role now.
6. Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions: First, it provides a new indicator of automation by
applying a text classification algorithm to the universe of U.S. patents granted since 1976.
Linking patents to their industry of use and, ultimately, to commuting zones, we construct
geographical intensities of newly available automation technology. The second contribution
is a fresh assessment of the labor market effects of automation. In an econometric analysis, we
show that in commuting zones where more newly-invented automation technology becomes
available, the employment-to-population ratio increases. At the same time, there is a shift
from routine manufacturing jobs towards non-routine service sector jobs. These results hold
when we study only patents by universities, governments or foreigners, which are likely less
responsive to developments in US labor markets than domestic firms.
While rising employment ratios in response to automation technology are good news, the
benefits of automation may be unevenly distributed. We hope that future research will provide
more insights in this respect. A more general contribution of this paper is that it pioneers a
way of extracting trends in innovation which can also be used to study the effects of other
technologies on the economy.
routine task share, Autor et al. (2015) use its 1950 value in all states but the one that contains the commuting
zone, weighted by 1950 employment shares. They argue that in this way, they can isolate the stable, long-run
differences in the production structure across commuting zones.
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Appendices
A. Additional Tables
Table 3.16: Yearly automation and non-automation patents
#A #P #A #P #A #P
1976 16279 70194 (25%) 1989 27928 95565 (35%) 2002 77267 167400 (54%)
1977 15433 65215 (26%) 1990 25925 90421 (34%) 2003 82017 169077 (56%)
1978 15412 66087 (26%) 1991 28037 96561 (35%) 2004 84372 164384 (58%)
1979 11721 48840 (28%) 1992 29165 97472 (36%) 2005 69602 143891 (54%)
1980 14937 61815 (28%) 1993 30439 98385 (38%) 2006 91201 173822 (59%)
1981 15885 65770 (28%) 1994 33699 101695 (39%) 2007 83196 157331 (60%)
1982 15092 57877 (31%) 1995 35135 101431 (41%) 2008 86705 157788 (62%)
1983 14546 56863 (31%) 1996 40411 109654 (44%) 2009 92843 167463 (62%)
1984 17665 67212 (31%) 1997 40217 112019 (44%) 2010 121163 219835 (62%)
1985 19415 71668 (32%) 1998 57293 147577 (46%) 2011 126328 224871 (63%)
1986 19515 70867 (32%) 1999 58464 153591 (45%) 2012 147550 253633 (65%)
1987 24359 82963 (34%) 2000 61273 157595 (45%) 2013 163112 278507 (66%)
1988 22006 77938 (33%) 2001 64796 166158 (46%) 2014 178422 301643 (67%)
total 2158825 4971078 (43%)
Note: #A: number of automation patents as classified by own algorithm; the patent totals #P are reported as
counted by us in the patent files. The USPTO reports slightly different numbers for total patent counts on its
website, but the difference is below 0.5% in all years.
Source: USPTO, Google and own calculations.
Table 3.17: Assignee’s patents across technological categories, 1976-2012
Assignee Patents Chem- Comm., Drugs, Electr., Mech- Miss- Oth-
(1000s) ical Comput. Med. Electron. anical ing ers
US firm 1875.7 17% 22% 11% 15% 13% 10% 12%
foreigners 1827.8 16% 20% 7% 19% 18% 10% 9%
universities 115.1 23% 12% 31% 17% 6% 6% 5%
governments 44.8 21% 14% 11% 21% 14% 11% 8%
missing 609.9 11% 7% 11% 9% 21% 11% 29%
Note: Technological classifications are based on USPC numbers and aggregated using the scheme by
Hall et al. (2001).
Source: Lai et al. (2011), Hall et al. (2001) and own calculations.
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Table 3.18: Share of automation patents after excluding patents
Assignee Patents Chem- Comm., Drugs, Electr., Mech- Miss- Oth-
(1000s) ical Comput. Med. Electron. anical ing ers
US firm 1875.7 2% 21% 2% 8% 5% 6% 3%
foreigners 1827.8 1% 17% 1% 7% 7% 6% 2%
universities 115.1 2% 11% 4% 10% 2% 4% 2%
governments 44.8 2% 11% 1% 10% 4% 6% 2%
missing 609.9 1% 6% 2% 4% 6% 4% 5%
Note: Technological classifications are based on USPC numbers and aggregated using the scheme by
Hall et al. (2001). This table excludes all patents based on the selected pharmaceutical and chemical
industries as explained in text.
Source: Lai et al. (2011), Hall et al. (2001) and own calculations.
B. Further Robustness Checks
B.1 Patent citations
Not all patents are of the same importance. Scherer and Harhoff (2000) show that the returns
on innovation are highly concentrated, with the 10 percent most valuable patents accounting
for around 80 percent of realized value. While Griliches (1990) argues that using a large
number of patents partly addresses this concern, we can count how often a patent was cited
by other patents as an indicator of its value. We use the patent citations files by Lai et al.
(2011) until 2009. The number of citations per patents follow a well-known hump-shape,
as newer patents are cited less frequently, but the propensity to cite has risen. Also, some
industries (such as pharmaceutical and chemical patents) cite many more patents than others
(such as electronics). To control for this, we demean citations across years and the broad
technology classes defined by Hall et al. (2001). This is the “fixed effect” method proposed
by Hall et al. (2001).
We then weight patents by how often they were cited and replicate our analysis. The
analysis shows similar results: Manufacturing employment falls and service employment
rises when more (citation-weighted) automation patents become available. The baseline ef-
fect on all employment becomes insignificant in this specification, but the interaction between
automation and routine task share is still significant.
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Table 3.19: Labor market effects of citations-weighted autoation patents
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.0896** 0.177* 0.0337 -0.0226 0.456**
(0.0339) (0.0990) (0.0748) (0.0834) (0.212)
non-autoint -0.0917 0.104 0.182* 0.106
(0.124) (0.0885) (0.0949) (0.107)
manufacturing -2.391** -1.458 -1.264
(0.887) (1.080) (1.171)
population 0.192** 0.171** 0.146*
(0.0846) (0.0800) (0.0771)
income -1.337*** -1.285*** -1.222***
(0.389) (0.380) (0.378)
non-white -1.374*** -1.420*** -1.559***
(0.129) (0.136) (0.123)
routine -0.0417** 0.142*
(0.0152) (0.0772)
autoint × routine -0.0117**
(0.00424)
Observations 20,524 20,524 20,524 20,524 20,524
R2 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34
Note: The table replicates the regressions of Table 3.8 but using citations-weighted
five-year sums of new automation and non-automation technology. We only include
observations until 2009. Citations are adjusted with the Hall et al. (2001) fixed effect
method. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
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Table 3.20: Labor market effects of citations-weighted automation patents for manufacturing
and non-manufacturing employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint -0.0198 -0.110 -0.262*** -0.292*** 0.0443
(0.0186) (0.0762) (0.0373) (0.0425) (0.136)
non-autoint 0.0948 0.332*** 0.375*** 0.323***
(0.0884) (0.0418) (0.0490) (0.0488)
manufacturing -2.880*** -2.374*** -2.237***
(0.536) (0.590) (0.613)
population -0.0310** -0.0425*** -0.0595***
(0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0169)
income -0.792*** -0.765*** -0.721***
(0.169) (0.162) (0.169)
non-white -0.167 -0.192 -0.287
(0.224) (0.216) (0.175)
routine -0.0228*** 0.106*
(0.00440) (0.0592)
autoint × routine -0.00826**
(0.00320)
Observations 20,520 20,520 20,520 20,520 20,520
R2 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.103*** 0.295*** 0.315*** 0.297*** 0.405**
(0.0313) (0.0722) (0.0615) (0.0705) (0.157)
non-autoint -0.202** -0.258*** -0.233*** -0.250***
(0.0832) (0.0741) (0.0799) (0.0882)
manufacturing 0.519 0.818 0.861
(0.673) (0.776) (0.829)
population 0.218** 0.211** 0.205**
(0.0832) (0.0782) (0.0757)
income -0.580* -0.563 -0.549
(0.332) (0.334) (0.336)
non-white -1.275*** -1.289*** -1.321***
(0.110) (0.105) (0.0997)
routine -0.0132 0.0281
(0.0169) (0.0413)
autoint × routine -0.00263
(0.00296)
Observations 20,529 20,529 20,529 20,529 20,529
R2 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28
Note: The table presents fixed effects regressions for five-year changes in manufac-
turing employment-to-population and non-manufacturing employment-to-population.
Automation and non-automation are citations-weighted. We only include observations
until 2009. Citations are adjusted with the Hall et al. (2001) fixed effect method. The
other control variables are defined as in Table 3.9. All regressions include state and
year fixed effects and a constant. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses. *** p
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B.2 Non-Overlapping Five-Year Periods
Table 3.21: Labor market effects of automation, five-year non-overlapping time periods
Outcome: Employment-to-population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
autoint 0.154*** 0.324*** 0.258** 0.246* 0.611***
(0.0334) (0.0892) (0.126) (0.134) (0.162)
non-autoint -0.173** -0.0776 -0.0610 -0.0825
(0.0740) (0.125) (0.137) (0.133)
manufacturing -1.191* -1.031* -0.886
(0.616) (0.601) (0.595)
population 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.0908***
(0.0256) (0.0236) (0.0241)
income -0.644*** -0.627*** -0.601***
(0.228) (0.224) (0.223)
non-white -1.215*** -1.232*** -1.281***
(0.447) (0.444) (0.427)
routine -0.00751 0.132**
(0.0136) (0.0507)
autoint*routine -0.00969***
(0.00356)
Observations 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663 5,663
R2 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41
Note: The table presents fixed effects panel data regressions using non-overlapping
five-year equivalent changes in employment as percent of commuting zone population
as the dependent variable. autoint and non-autoint are five-year sums of new automa-
tion technology and non-automation technology, as defined in the text. routine is the
initial percentage of routine tasks in commuting zone employment. Further controls
are the initial manufacturing employment share, the log of the initial commuting zone
employment, the log of initial per capita income and the initial share of non-white
citizens in the population. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and a
constant. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
As an alternative to the five-year overlapping regressions presented in the main part of
the paper, we show regression results for non-overlapping periods. These are 1977-1981,
1982-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006, 2007-2011 and 2012-2014, for
which we compute five-year equivalents for the last period that covers only three years. The
panel therefore comprises 8 time periods and 708 commuting zones. The results are similar
to those presented in the main text. The coefficients in Table 3.21 are slightly larger and
more significant than those presented in Table 3.8. The effects of automation for the two
employment groups of Table 3.22 are also each slightly more positive than those of Table
3.9, but the finding of the contrary effect of automation is strongly supported.
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Table 3.22: Labor market effects of automation for manufacturing and non-manufacturing
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Outcome: Manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.00382 -0.0365* -0.110*** -0.137*** 0.255***
(0.0102) (0.0216) (0.0269) (0.0297) (0.0653)
non-autoint 0.0409** 0.164*** 0.205*** 0.179***
(0.0187) (0.0285) (0.0328) (0.0390)
manufacturing -1.588*** -1.209*** -1.055***
(0.222) (0.223) (0.231)
population -0.00100 -0.0118 -0.0239*
(0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0125)
income -0.710*** -0.666*** -0.645***
(0.139) (0.143) (0.140)
non-white -0.149 -0.191 -0.237
(0.198) (0.208) (0.190)
routine -0.0181*** 0.133***
(0.00402) (0.0262)
auto*routine -0.0104***
(0.00184)
Observations 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660 5,660
R2 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26
B. Outcome: Non-manufacturing employment-to-population
autoint 0.137*** 0.363*** 0.368*** 0.382*** 0.260
(0.0317) (0.0778) (0.113) (0.124) (0.160)
non-autoint -0.230*** -0.253** -0.274** -0.267**
(0.0612) (0.104) (0.121) (0.123)
manufacturing 0.321 0.115 0.0700
(0.425) (0.419) (0.424)
population 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.114***
(0.0246) (0.0207) (0.0210)
routine 0.00957 -0.0371
(0.0138) (0.0390)
autoint*routine 0.00324
(0.00239)
income 0.0393 0.0176 0.0101
(0.172) (0.178) (0.176)
non-white -1.032*** -1.013*** -0.992***
(0.229) (0.219) (0.219)
Observations 5,662 5,662 5,662 5,662 5,662
R2 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37
Note: The table presents fixed effects panel data regressions for non-overlapping
five-year equivalent changes in manufacturing employment-to-population and non-
manufacturing employment-to-population. See Table 3.8 for variable definitions. All
regressions include state and year fixed effects and a constant. Standard errors clus-
tered at the state level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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